DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 295 324 EA 020 086

AUTHOR	Rizvi, Fazal
TITLE	Multiculturalism as an Educational Policy. ESA 842, Policy Development and Analysis.
INSTITUTION	Deakin Univ., Victoria (Australia).
REPORT NO	ISBN-0-7300-0118-0
PUB DATE	85
NOTE	123p.
AVAILABLE FROM	Publication Sales, Deakin University Press, Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria 3217, Australia ($12.95 Australian; quantity and educational discounts).
PUB TYPE	Viewpoints (120) -- Collected Works - General (020)
EDRS PRICE	MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS	*Acculturation; *Cultural Pluralism; Educational History; *Educational Policy; Elementary Secondary Education; Foreign Countries; Government School Relationship; Ideology; Immigrants; *Marxian Analysis; Political Socialization; *Politics of Education; Social Integration; Social Stratification

ABSTRACT

The monograph that begins this volume analyzes multiculturalism as an educational policy in order to identify the broader values and interests that are served by its promotion. It begins with a historical review of Australia's post-World-War-II immigration policies. In the next two sections, the major elements of the policy of assimilation, a policy widely advocated during the 1950s and the 1960s, are presented and critically analyzed. The sections that follow examine the development of multiculturalism during the 1970s, arguing that both assimilation and multiculturalism represent the state's intervention in the reproduction of social relations to maintain hegemony and class domination. The last section looks beyond multiculturalism to identify the directions of an educational policy that might constitute a more appropriate response to the migrant presence in Australia. Four readings by different authors follow: (1) "State and Ethnicity: Multiculturalism as Ideology," by A. Jakubowicz; (2) "Racism in Society and Schools: History, Policy, and Practice," by Chris Mullard; (3) "Migration and the Dilemmas of Multiculturalism," by Tanya Birrell; and (4) "Schooling in a Democracy: Transformation or Reproduction?" by George H. Wood. An annotated bibliography is included. (TE)

****
*   Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made   *
*   from the original document.   *
****

ED295324

Multiculturalism as an educational policy

Fazal Rizvi

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
☒ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.
• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Fay Warby
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."



EA 020086

ESA842 POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS
2

ESA842 Policy development and analysis

Multiculturalism as an educational policy

Fazal Rizvi

Deakin University

Deakin University

Published by Deakin University, Victoria 3217
Distributed by Deakin University Press
First published 1985
Reprinted 1986

© Deakin University 1985

Edited and designed by Deakin University Production Unit
Printed by Deakin University Printery

National Library of Australia
Cataloguing-in-publication data

Rizvi, Fazal, 1950 -
Multiculturalism as an educational policy.

Bibliography.
ISBN 0 7300 0118 0.

1. Intercultural education—Australia. 2. Pluralism (Social sciences)—Australia.
I. Deakin University. School of Education. Open Campus Program. II. Title.
III. Policy development and analysis.

370.19'6'0994

This book forms part of the **ESA842 Policy development and analysis** course offered by the School of Education in Deakin University's Open Campus Program. It has been prepared for the **ESA842 Policy development and analysis** course team.

Course team
Lawrence Angus
Richard Bates
Diana Macmillan (course developer)
John Prunty
Fazal Rizvi (course chairperson)
Peter Watkins

Consultants
Richard Smith
Deborah Towns

The course includes:
John Prunty, *A Critical Reformulation of Educational Policy Analysis*
Fazal Rizvi, *Multiculturalism as an Educational Policy*
Richard Smith, *The Inequalities Debate*
Deborah Towns, *The Responsibility to Educate Girls for a Technologically Oriented Society*
Peter Watkins, *Youth, Schooling, and Work*

These books are available from Deakin University Press, Deakin University, Victoria 3217.

Students enrolled in the course are also supplied with a guide to the course.

Series introduction

The series of monographs of which this volume is part is devoted to providing an outline to an alternative approach to policy studies in education. The dominant tradition in policy studies has clearly been that of functional analysis based upon essentially economistic conceptions of education. Moreover, policy development has been seen largely as something done by experts and imposed by administrators on a somewhat recalcitrant education system. It is our view that such a conception of policy development and analysis seriously misrepresents the nature and activities of education systems.

While there can be little doubt that a conception of education as a *production* system is widespread, and that such a conception implies that industrial corporate management techniques are appropriate, it is becoming clear that education is also a *cultural* system that involves not only the learning of basic life skills but also systems of meaning, aspiration, and purpose through which notions of personal and social identity are articulated.

Education systems display both the diversity of approach to these issues evident in the wider society and also a degree of autonomy from other institutions. These characteristics ensure that education systems have become, as Bowles and Gintis suggest, laboratories in which competing solutions to the problems of personal liberation and social equality are tested, and the arena in which social struggles are fought out.

Collectively these monographs attempt to explore some of the dimensions of these struggles in Australian education. Beginning with a formulation of a critical theory of policy development and analysis, the series continues with a historical examination of various federal initiatives on educational policy; these are followed by an analysis of the equality debate. Against the theoretical background provided by the first three monographs, a number of key policy issues are examined. These include the current crisis in relations between youth, schooling, and work; gender and schooling; and *multiculturalism*. We hope, in the future, to add further monographs on such issues as examinations, certification, and credentiation; curriculum policy; the role of minors in policy formation. Each will be set within the context of the struggle to create an equitable, just. and humane education system as a contribution to the development of a society that exhibits these qualities more strongly.

F. Rizvi

Fazal Rizvi
Course team chairperson

Contents

Series introduction iii

Multiculturalism as an educational policy 3

Introduction 3

The rhetoric of multiculturalism; a critical analysis of multiculturalism as an educational policy

Immigration and post-war capitalism in Australia 4

Introduction; functionalist accounts; a conflict orientation

Assimilation 9

An institutional response; education as an agent of assimilation

Assimilation under attack 11

Practical and moral criticisms; a developing crisis in ethnic relations; ethnocentrism; a legitimation crisis for the State

The development of multiculturalism 16

Integration; the celebration of multiculturalism; the Galbally Report—underlying assumptions

Multicultural education as an ideology 22

Ambiguity as an ideological force; cultural identity; prejudice; cultural tolerance; equality of opportunity and access; social cohesion

Beyond multiculturalism 32

Radical pedagogy; civic courage

References 35

Readings

1. A. Jakubowicz
   State and ethnicity: Multiculturalism as ideology 43
2. Chris Mullard
   Racism in society and schools: History, policy, and practice 64
3. Tanya Birrell
   Migration and the dilemmas of multiculturalism 82
4. George H. Wood
   Schooling in a democracy: Transformation or reproduction? 91

Annotated bibliography 115

About the author 119

Acknowledgments 120

Multiculturalism as an educational policy



Introduction

The rhetoric of multiculturalism

'Multiculturalism—an unstoppable tide', declares Zubrzycki (1983, p. 13), insisting that 'multiculturalism is part and parcel of Australian population, not an aberrant feature'. Over the past decade, the notion of multiculturalism has acquired considerable academic and political prominence. So much so that it would be reasonable to say that it has now achieved the status of an orthodoxy. Certainly, all major political parties in Australia have unreservedly espoused multiculturalism (Wilkinson 1981). As an educational policy, it has been accepted by many as the only response possible to the fact of cultural and linguistic diversity in our schools. Indeed, such has been the widespread appeal of the rhetoric of multiculturalism that all state educational authorities in Australia have been induced by governments to implement the policy of multicultural education without delay. The Ministerial Paper No. 4 in Victoria specifically mentions multiculturalism as a policy guideline that is non-negotiable, that is, a directive within the framework of which school councils must develop their curricula (Education Department of Victoria 1983, p. 6).

Now while there is widespread acceptance of multiculturalism as an educational policy, it is seldom clear what this term means, or indeed what it entails as far as educational practice is concerned. In facing up to the question of the nature of multiculturalism, we confront a term that encompasses a diversity of formulas, descriptions, values, and goals. 'Multicultural education' has been variously used to describe such diverse practices as a multicultural perspective across-the-curriculum, education for intercultural understanding, ethnic studies, English as a second language, bilingual and bicultural education, and even citizenship training (see Matthews 1979).

Such has been the widespread use of the term 'multiculturalism' that it would indeed be appropriate to say that it has now become a slogan. Like other political slogans, multiculturalism is used in many different ways, but mainly to evoke positive mental associations and feelings of approval. As Hill (1975) has pointed out, it is less helpful to ask of a slogan 'What does it mean?' than 'Who said it, and what do they hope to gain?' (p. 3). That is, when examining a slogan, it is less helpful to ask for a conceptual clarification than to ask how it is used to promote and legitimise certain practices and assert control. Accordingly, in this monograph, the analysis of multiculturalism as an educational policy involves an attempt to identify the broader values and interests that are served by its promotion.

A critical analysis of multiculturalism as an educational policy

This view of policy analysis is broadly consistent with the approach to critical educational policy analysis that Prunty (1984) advocates in his monograph. Importantly, this approach attempts to locate multiculturalism in its historical context. This implies the need for an examination of the politico-economic features of recent Australian history that have enabled multiculturalism to become institutionalised into an official educational policy. It also involves (1) looking at the way multicultural education has been interpreted and implemented by educational practitioners, and (2) establishing its role and function in a society committed to the capitalist mode of production.

The monograph opens with a historical review of Australia's post-World-War-II immigration policies. In the next two sections, the major elements of the policy of assimilation, a policy widely advocated during the 1950s and the 1960s, are presented and critically analysed. The sections that follow examine the development of multiculturalism during the 1970s. It is argued that both assimilation and multiculturalism represent the State's intervention in the reproduction of social relations in order to maintain hegemony and class domination. The last section looks beyond multiculturalism and seeks to identify the directions of an educational policy that might constitute a more appropriate response to the migrant presence in Australia.

The main argument put forward in this monograph is that multiculturalism is an ideology that represents the State's attempt at resolving the problems of, on the one hand, immigrants' increasing awareness of social inequalities and, on the other, the recognition by the State that the earlier policy of assimilation was counter-productive in creating social conditions conducive to capital accumulation. It is argued that multiculturalism as a policy has served the function of obscuring and diffusing issues concerned with class conflict and structural inequalities in Australian society.

It will be noted that this monograph does not deal with policies formulated over the years in response to the unique problems that Aborigines confront in Australian society. There are two reasons for this. Most Aboriginal groups have maintained that they wish to remain outside the framework of the multicultural debate, for theirs is a unique situation in Australia, deserving of special rights and privileges (Sherwood 1984, p. 95). The considerations that apply to an analysis of the Aboriginal situation are not the same as those that apply to migrants. It is argued, moreover, that in discussing the issues concerning Aborigines within the broader framework of multiculturalism, there is a danger that their special claim to land rights is diffused and obscured.

Immigration and post-war capitalism in Australia

Introduction

The post-World-War-II years in Australia have witnessed a massive migration program, which has seen the population more than double in less than forty years. At the end of the war, the Australian population numbered approximately seven million, most of which was Anglo-Celtic in origin, and predominantly monolingual. The ambitious immigration policies that Australia has pursued since the war have radically altered the social landscape with a mosaic of people from more than a hundred countries and speaking some fifty languages. Data based on the 1981 census shows that more than 20 per cent of Australians do not speak English as their first language and about 30 per cent were born overseas. Demographically,

Australia is now one of the most culturally diverse nations in the world (see Table 1). The changes that have occurred in Australia as a result of migration have been appropriately referred to as constituting a 'demographic revolution' (Appleyard 1972).

Table 1. Australian population by birthplace (with sex ratios): Census 1981, adjusted (Price 1983, p. 11)

Birthplace		Nos
England	Nos	918250
	S.R	97
Scotland	Nos	156300
	S.R	99
Wales	Nos	24850
	S.R	91
Ireland	Nos	69800
	S.R	90
U.K. & Eire	Nos	1169200
	S.R.	96
Scandi-	Nos	15700
navia	S.R	69
Finland	Nos	9800
	S.R	93
Germany	Nos	113950
	S.R	100
Nether-	Nos	98800
lands	S.R	85
Austria	Nos	23450
	S.R	84
France	Nos	13800
	S.R	97
Other	Nos	12900
North	S.R	83
N. Europe	Nos	288400
	S.R	90
Baltic	Nos	23500
States	S.R	89
Czecho-	Nos	16600
slovakia	S.R	68
Hungary	Nos	28700
	S.R	77
Poland	Nos	60950
	S.R	80
USSR/	Nos	28600
Ukraine	S.R	106
Yugoslavia	Nos	153600
	S.R	83
O/East	Nos	7750
	S.R	69
East	Nos	319700
Europe	S.R	83
Italy	Nos	283300
	S.R	84
Greece	Nos	150550
	S.R	94
Cyprus	Nos	24050
	S.R	94
Malta	Nos	58700
	S.R	85
Spain	Nos	15650
	S.R	82
Portugal	Nos	12100
	S.R	89
Other	Nos	2200
South	S.R	56
South	Nos	546550
Europe	S.R	87
Egypt	Nos	31550
	S.R	95
Lebanon	Nos	54600
/Syria	S.R	86
Turkey	Nos	25000
	S.R	89
Israel	Nos	6300
	S.R	88
Other	Nos	9400
W.Asia	S.R.	87
W.Asia	Nos	126850
	S.R	98
China	Nos	27550
	S.R	100
Hong	Nos	16300
Kong	S.R	93
Singapore	Nos	12350
	S.R	108
Japan	Nos	8300
	S.R	108
Malaysia	Nos	32700
	S.R	97
Indonesia	Nos	12900
	S.R	88
Philipp-	Nos	15950
ines	S.R	185
Indo	Nos	51700
China	S.R	85
Other	Nos	20900
Asia	S.R	107
E/SE	Nos	198650
Asia	S.R	100
India	Nos	42900
	S.R	99
Pakistan	Nos	3600
/B'desh	S.R	86
Sri Lanka	Nos	17450
	S.R	101
S.Asia	Nos	63950
	S.R	99
Canada	Nos	18250
	S.R	100
USA	Nos	33700
	S.R	85
BWI	Nos	2850
	S.R	100
Argentina	Nos	8300
	S.R	100
Chile	Nos	14400
	S.R	102
Uruquay	Nos	9550
	S.R	103
Other	Nos	12150
Lat.Amer	S.R	107
Americas	Nos	99200
	S.R	96
S.Africa	Nos	27800
	S.R	106
Mauritius	Nos	10800
	S.R	103
Other	Nos	22900
Africa	S.R	88
Africa	Nos	61500
	S.R	99
Fiji	Nos	9700
	S.R	102
PNG	Nos	19400
	S.R	103
O.Pacific	Nos	10150
	S.R	110
Pacific	Nos	39250
	S.R	105
New	Nos	183200
Zealand	S.R	96
Total		
O'Seas	Nos	3096450
Born	S.R	93
Australia	Nos	11758411
	S.R	102
Grand	Nos	14854861
Total	S.R	100

NOTES.
1) Sex Ratio (S.R) is females per 100 males.
2) The census figs. have been adjusted, differentially for age & birth-place, to allow for census undercount.

Over the years, a number of sociologists and political scientists have attempted to explain Australia's post-war immigration policies. Why have the immigrants been so prepared to come to Australia, and why have successive Australian governments encouraged immigration? The answers to these questions, as we shall see, are essential for understanding the factors that have shaped post-war educational policies and programs in response to the migrant presence in Australia.

Functionalist accounts

Most sociological accounts of immigration and its social consequences in Australia have employed theoretical perspectives that are linked to some form of functionalism. These accounts suggest many different factors to explain the nature and pattern of post-war migration. Predominantly, they suggest that migrants wished to migrate to Australia to improve their economic conditions, to escape from political and inter-ethnic conflicts in Europe, to seek better educational opportunities for their children, and to generally improve their life-styles. The Immigration Advisory Council (1973), for example, maintains that for many post-war European migrants, emigration was seized upon as an opportunity to escape financial, social, and interpersonal problems, and hopefully to start all over again in Australia with a clean slate, as it were. Australia, on the other hand, required migrants in order to build up its population as a contribution towards post-war reconstruction. During the war, Australia's security had been shown to be vulnerable, and a larger population and greater industrial strength seemed to be an obvious solution.

Functionalist explanations of immigration policies, while being to a certain extent accurate, are not entirely adequate, for they do not tell the full story. They point to a view of the relationship between immigration and Australian industrial needs as a simple function of the economics of supply and demand, and posit an account that suggests a relatively unproblematic transition for the migrant from an uncertain political and economic climate in Europe to a stable one in Australia. No account is taken in these explanations of the conflict that existed after the war between the State, which encouraged capital accumulation through a larger workforce, and the general Australian public, which was on the whole xenophobic and feared a cultural invasion. Moreover, functionalist accounts, linked as they are to the theoretical framework of methodological individualism, focus attention on the conceptual orientation of the individual, but in so doing, do not explain how this orientation is constructed and reproduced. Nor do functional accounts of immigration policies explain why some policies are projected and accepted at certain periods in history and not at others. Functional accounts are, in short, *ahistorical*. They represent a reality that is static. As de Lepervanche points out:

> A description of cultural responses *per se* is one area to focus upon, and a sensitivity to meaning and symbolic interaction is important, but to anchor analysis at this level is to remain remote from history and structure, and from some of the significant determinants that shape cultural responses in the first place.
>
> (de Lepervanche 1984, p. 191)

A functional analysis of the migrant presence in Australia is necessarily limited because it rests entirely on the 'descriptions of observable regularities in behaviour and of people's expressed beliefs' and thus obscures the extent to which 'social factors are governed by underlying structural relationships such as class' (de Lepervanche 1984, p. 184).

A conflict orientation

A more satisfactory account of Australia's immigration policies, an account that is based on a conflict orientation, is presented by Collins (1975, 1976). Collins's basic argument is that immigration has been of vital importance to Australian post-war capitalism. Crucial to an understanding of Collins's argument are the Marxist notions of 'industrial reserve army' and the 'labour aristocracy' (Marx, 1918). According to Marxist theory, the term 'industrial reserve army' refers to a more or less permanently unemployed and basically unskilled sector of the working-age population, the existence of which is a general characteristic of capitalist economies. Marx argues:

> But if a surplus labouring population is a necessary product of accumulation or of the development of wealth on a capitalist basis, this surplus population becomes, conversely, the lever of capitalistic accumulation, nay, a condition of existence of the capitalist mode of production. It forms a disposable industrial reserve army, that belongs to capital quite as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its own cost.
>
> (Marx, 1918, p. 693)

In contrast, 'labour aristocracy' refers to that sector of the working class that, by acquiring the techniques of negotiation with employers, is able to defend its privileged position ahead of the workers who constitute the 'industrial reserve army'. A consequence of this division is that the solidarity of the working class is undermined, and that the interests of the ruling class are thus preserved.

Collins argues that post-war immigration has served the function of reinforcing a division within the Australian working class, with immigrants, particularly those from Southern Europe and the Middle East, constituting an 'industrial reserve army' and predominantly Anglo-Australian workers forming a 'labour aristocracy' (Collins 1975, p. 105). The importation of migrant labour in the three decades after the war was largely used to fill deficiencies in the labour force brought about by the rapid expansion of Australian industry. Significantly, most of the migrants were recruited in the lower level jobs, specifically to fill the least attractive positions that Anglo-Australians vacated for the growing number of better jobs elsewhere in the occupational system. The immigrants joining the 'industrial reserve army' were, moreover, recruited from predominantly rural, less developed societies, and generally had educational levels significantly below those of the Anglo-Australian workers.

Viewed in this way, migration is an economic process. It is the movement of labour to places where capital has come to be located. To meet the requirements of capital, the State regulates the movement of labour with varying degrees of rigidity, often making invidious judgments about the appropriateness of people of particular origins for particular jobs. This selective process, by which people are sorted out according to various criteria that are linked to patterns of economic activity, is a phenomenon that has characterised the immigration policies of all Western countries this century (see Porter 1975, pp. 290–1).

Collins maintains that, during the post-war years, Australian capitalists desired access to a reserve army of workers in order to keep down the costs of labour, and that immigration served this function. There was also the structural problem of the conflict between the growing aspirations of a better schooled, more affluent, and thus more socially mobile Anglo-Australian population and the continued existence of low-status, repetitious, heavy or otherwise undesirable jobs, especially in the manufacturing and construction industries. Australian capitalism saw immigration as an economically cheap 'solution' to this problem. Immigration was also seen as a way of helping to undermine the growing strength of the trade unions. It was expected that immigration would have the effect of reducing the bargaining power of the unions and of introducing labour into the system at existing, rather than increased, rates of pay. Major private employers therefore pressed relentlessly for immigrant labour, and successive Australian governments responded with programs of active recruitment. Collins concludes:

> Immigration has been of vital importance to Australian post-war capitalism. In the most obvious sense, it has provided an industrial reserve army of workers, alleviating labour shortages that have restricted Australian capitalism almost continuously since settlement. More importantly, by providing an easily directed, mobile workforce to accept jobs for wages and conditions that Australian indigenous workers would reject, it has been crucial for capital accumulation and growth. It is the immigrant workers who have been placed at the bottom of the labour market, become the 'factory fodder' for local and imported capital, and are used as a 'buffer' reserve army to minimise social and economic instability.
>
> (Collins 1975, p. 125)

The strength of Collins's argument can be measured by noting the occupational distribution of the migrant workforce in post-war Australia. Collins himself observes that, in 1982, migrant workers comprised 25.8 per cent of the workforce compared to 7.3 per cent at the beginning of the post-war migration program in 1947 (Collins 1975, p. 185). Birrell and Birrell (1981, p. 110) show that even as late as the early 1970s more than 50 per cent of immigrants from Southern Europe remained in manufacturing and construction industries, with only approximately 25 per cent Anglo-Australians holding positions in these areas. They provide an example of this disparity. In 1972, only 8.84 per cent of unskilled labourers employed at Ford's Broadmeadows assembly plant in Victoria were Anglo-Australians, the remainder of the workforce being made up of predominantly Southern European migrants (p. 76). In the context of discussing the 1973 strike of the predominantly migrant workforce at Broadmeadows in Victoria, Connell argues that the existence of such a characteristically large migrant workforce in manufacturing industry 'points to the way the expansion of industrial capitalism in Australia has depended on an inflow of relatively cheap labour from Europe' (Connell 1977, p. 2). The available statistics clearly illustrate that most European migrants have usually entered low-paid, low-status, and insecure jobs constituting an underclass to the Anglo-Australian working class. (Birrell & Birrell 1981).

Moreover, a number of studies (for example, the Henderson Report 1974; the Jackson Report 1975) have documented the poor working conditions in industries that employ many migrants. These studies point out that large segments of these factories are noisy, dirty, and often contain dangerous, outdated machinery, confirming the suggestion that capital investment in industries that employ migrant workers has been kept to a minimum. There is also typically a vast social and communication gulf between the predominantly Anglo-Australian managers at the top and the often non-English-speaking blue-collar workforce at the bottom. Perhaps the clearest demonstration of the low status of the jobs that migrants generally have is the unwillingness of many young Anglo-Australians to seek work in them, despite the current high levels of unemployment. Birrell and Birrell (1981, p. 114) claim that native-born Australians are generally reluctant to accept jobs at 'the lower end of the occupational structure'. The contribution made by migrant women has also been important to Australian capitalism. Their low-paid labour has been of considerable importance to smaller manufacturers, particularly in the clothing industry.

In summary, post-war immigration has been crucial to Australian capitalism. It has helped create stratification of the working class into Anglo-Australian and migrant workers. Anglo-Australian workers have taken on the role of a labour aristocracy, and have used their fluency in English, their relatively better qualifications, and their executive authority within the trade unions to gain advantages in negotiations with employers over wages and conditions. The stratification of the working class has also contributed to the reproduction of racist ideologies in the Australian community, an 'us' and 'them' mentality. The persistence of a labour aristocracy has thus served to weaken the working class, and has reinforced economic and social discrimination against non-English-speaking migrants.

Assimilation

An institutional response

It is in this historical context that we can now examine the successive policies that led to the formulation of multiculturalism. The institutional response in Australia to the migrant presence in the 1950s and 1960s was in the form of a policy of assimilation and Anglo-conformity (Bullivant 1981a, ch. 7). Immigrants were expected to fit into the social and economic conditions that were dominated by cultural forms that were exclusively Anglo-Australian. Predominantly, the policy makers at that time wished to see the Australian nation as a unitary whole, politically and culturally indivisible. So while large numbers of migrants were needed to match the requirements of Australian industry, it was thought that migrants from Britain and Northern Europe, who could more easily integrate into a homogeneous culture, were to be preferred. It was only in the mid-1950s when the supply of migrants who were at once assimilable and prepared to accept low-paid, low-status jobs in industry became exhausted that Australian immigration policy became more broadly based. Even then, the so-called 'White Australia policy' was strictly applied to keep the supposedly 'unassimilable' non-Caucasians out (Bullivant 1981a, pp. 174–6). The ruling class in Australia required a docile and mobile industrial reserve army of labour, but it also wanted to keep the economic and social cost of importing this labour to a minimum. On the basis of experiences in the rest of the world, and especially the USA, it was feared that the presence of a culturally and racially distinct non-White population in Australia could lead to the disintegration of overall social relations and thus create the potential for fragmentation of the structural foundations of the Australian nation.

The policy of assimilation was clearly and unambiguously designed to preserve the hegemony of the Anglo-Australian ruling class. Yet it was 'sold' to the large number of European immigrants in post-war Australia in a language that suggested egalitarianism and equality of opportunity. According to the rhetoric used, immigrant groups were encouraged to assimilate into a homogeneous culture so that they too could have an opportunity to take an equal and informed part in the creation and maintenance of Australian society (Martin 1978, ch.2). Immigrants were permitted to maintain some of their traditions, but these were tolerated only to the extent that they could not possibly undermine the social and ideological bases of the dominant culture, or threaten the structural stability of what was seen, in spite of the presence of Aborigines here for tens of thousands of years, as the 'host' Anglo-Australian culture.

While the policy of assimilation was never enforced by legal sanctions, it was nevertheless widely advocated, and at times given official approval. As late as 1967, the then Minister for Immigration, Billy Snedden, suggested that:

> We must have a single culture—if immigration implied multi-cultural activities within Australian society, then it was not the type Australia wanted. I am quite determined that we should have a monoculture, with everyone living in the same way, understanding each other, and sharing the same aspirations. We don't want pluralism.
>
> (in Bullivant 1984, p. 44)

Support for assimilation was not restricted to politicians, Martin (1978, p. 36) found that a wide range of professional workers including teachers and social workers defined European migrants as assimilable. This definition confirmed the continuity of Anglo-Australian identity and also indicated that migrants as individuals should come to share this identity by shedding their own cultural traditions.

Education as an agent of assimilation

A major political instrument that helped implement the policy of assimilation in the post-war years, and thus preserve the Anglo-Australian hegemony, was the education system. The normal school programs were largely ethnocentric, and made no concessions to the particular needs and backgrounds of migrants. Martin argues that educational bureaucracies

> expressed the temper of the times in refusing to confront the fact that the presence of migrants of non-English-speaking origin had in fact changed the nature of the schools and the scope of their own role.
>
> (Martin 1978, p. 133)

The insistence that special educational provisions were unnecessary for immigrant children, including those who could not speak English, reflected the Anglo-conformist assumptions of the policy makers. Migrant children and adults alike were thus left to 'sink or swim', to pick up the 'Australian' way of doing things by 'sitting next to Nelly' as it were—that is, to become assimilated, through osmosis, into a homogeneous Australian culture. Martin observes that:

> This indifference was based on the conviction that the success of migrant adaptation depended 'fundamentally, not on structures and policies, but on the goodwill of *individual* migrants and *individual* Australians' and that 'it would be contrary to the prevailing egalitarian values and detrimental to assimilation for migrants, as migrants, to be given unique privileges or consideration of any kind' (Martin 1972a, p. 14).
>
> (Martin 1976, p. 2)

The assimilationist ideology was thus implemented in schools by deliberately ignoring the very presence of non-English-speaking migrants. The teacher-dominated classrooms emphasised learning English, discipline, and conformity, and yet the educational bureaucracies did little to provide resources that could help immigrant children overcome their disadvantages (Bullivant 1981a, p. 181). In this way, assimilation was indeed a policy that was ludicrously cheap to the State. The State exercised its power through what Bachrach and Barach (1970) refer to as the politics of 'non-decisions and inaction'. Anglo-Australian hegemony was thus based more on the routine application of effectively unchallenged assumptions than on any manifest dominance of one interest or policy over others in an open conflict.

So extensive was the tendency to pursue the practice of consciously not making decisions that educational bureaucracies throughout Australia either refused to keep, or else suppressed, the information dealing with the inadequate response of teaching institutions to the migrant presence. Martin points out that for almost 25 years after World War II, all departments of education deliberately refrained from collecting adequate data on the distribution of migrant pupils, their knowledge of English, their academic performance, and their learning and psychological difficulties (Martin 1978, p. 85). The reason given for this refusal to collect statistics was that, in an egalitarian society, all children—Anglo-Australian and migrants alike—had to be treated on an equal footing; any attempt to make distinctions was considered divisive. By controlling information in this way, educational administrators and policy makers were able to exercise their power through neutralisation and marginalisation of potentially contentious issues. They were also able to contain any resistance or contestation from the immigrant communities.

Assimilation under attack

Practical and moral criticisms

By the end of the 1960s, the policy of assimilation began to be increasingly subjected to critical scrutiny. The bases for these criticisms were both practical and moral.

At a practical level, a number of research studies (for example, Kunz 1971; Martin 1972; and Kovacs & Cropley 1975) provided evidence to show that the policy of assimilation was simply not working—that the non-English-speaking immigrants were neither willing nor able to discard their language, culture, and ethnic identities. A study conducted by Jupp (1966) forcibly challenged the then widespread assumption of assimilability, i.e. that once migrants had acquired the politico-legal status of an 'Australian', their cultural perceptions and modes of social behaviour would change accordingly. Jupp argued that, even after naturalisation, non-English-speaking migrants continued to feel isolated, inarticulate, and politically impotent, alienated, and frustrated at not being included in the decision-making processes in a country that had promised them democracy.

Critics of the policy of assimilation also objected to it on moral grounds. Assimilation was seen to be morally reprehensible because it denied the right of a group of human beings to retain their own languages and cultures (Grassby 1973). It was claimed that this denial amounted to institutional discrimination and prejudice against the non-English-speaking migrants. It was argued that, in a society that claimed to be egalitarian, there was no place for a policy that enforced Anglo-conformity and hence denied the significance of immigrant cultures.

During the early 1960s, policy makers confidently asserted that while the first generation was 'lost', second-generation migrants would become culturally Australian. But by the end of the 1960s, this assertion proved to be demonstrably untrue. This realisation, as Jakubowicz (1984) argues, exposed a crisis of legitimation for the Federal Government:

> If equality would not automatically flow to Australian-born children of non-English-speaking immigrants, then their commitment to the system that had offered a refuge to their parents might be threatened. Constant recitation of 'I love a sunburnt country' was no replacement for the dim futures facing tens of thousands of children classed as slow learners because of their ethnic backgrounds and language skills.
>
> (Jakubowicz 1984, p. 19)

A developing crisis in ethnic relations

This growing sense of crisis in ethnic relations was accompanied by a whole range of academic studies that indicated that the economic disadvantages that migrants faced were exacerbated by cultural, linguistic, and socio-legal barriers to their participation in Australian society.

A major research study, *People in Poverty: A Melbourne Study*, clearly demonstrated that all groups of non-English-speaking migrants had a higher proportion of poor people than the population as a whole (Henderson et al. 1970, p. 126). This study found that because of their concentration in the manufacturing and building industries, southern European immigrants lived predominantly in metropolitan areas where, despite their low incomes, they faced a high cost of living. Subsequent studies conducted by Henderson showed that upward mobility for immigrants was limited, and that migrants who came to unskilled jobs tended to remain in them (Henderson Report 1974). The Jackson Report (1975) provided further evidence of the structural inequalities that existed in Australia. It showed that, in manufacturing industries, the dirtiest, the least skilled, and the most menial tasks were performed by immigrants, and that there was an exceedingly high rate of industrial accidents among immigrants, attributable largely to the differences in language and cultural expectations.

It was apparent that, despite impressions to the contrary, social inequalities were reproduced through successive generations. In 1976, a report sponsored by the Australian Population and Immigration Council emphasised the systematic disadvantage that migrants faced, even after the initial settlement period:

> The outstanding impression gained by the Committee in its analysis of the survey is that migrants' disadvantages often persist well past the initial settlement period and that there are many migrants long resident in the country whose welfare is cause for concern and action.
>
> (Australian Population and Immigration Council 1976, p. iii)

Ethnocentrism

Migrant disadvantage was not limited to the economic sphere. A number of studies showed racism and prejudice against migrants in Australia to be widespread. In a broadly representative paper, Beswick and Hills (1972) identified strong elements of ethnocentrism in Australian society. Ethnocentrism is, as a form of racism, a phenomenon that involves a group having 'hostile attitudes regarding outgroups ... and submissive attitudes to ingroups' (Adorno et al. 1950, p. 150); it is an attitude that attributes superior moral qualities to one's own culture and society—implying that any culture that differs significantly is debased and unworthy. Ethnocentrism occurs at both individual and institutional levels. At an individual level, ethnocentrism manifests itself most clearly when a person is subjected to discrimination on the basis of cultural differences. But at an institutional level, it is acted out through forms of hegemonic control that permeate language itself, becoming embedded in popular beliefs, values, and other generalisations. In education, ethnocentricity may be contained within what Bernstein (1977) refers to as the three message systems of the school. That is, ethnocentricity may be structured into the curriculum (what counts as knowledge), the pedagogy (what counts as valid transmission of knowledge), and evaluation (what counts as valid realisation of knowledge).

The policy of assimilation was consciously ethnocentric. It rested explicitly on an ethnocentric conception of society, an assumption that the cultural forms of non-English-speaking migrants were somehow inferior. It implied, moreover, that to assimilate, for migrants, was to discard voluntarily, or to be forced to discard, all that which culturally defined their social existence. However, to assimilate, for Anglo-Australians, was to remain the same. Assimilation meant, therefore, that the existing political and economic structures favoured the Anglo-Australians implicitly.

The migrants who were imported to Australia were promised democracy and equality of opportunity. Many of them had left Europe precisely because the political imperatives there had become intolerable. The political rhetoric in Australia had suggested to these migrants that through assimilation they could most readily gain the full advantage of participating in Australian life and could compete for resources on an equal basis. But this myth of meritocracy ignored the fact that migrants faced considerable structural barriers to participation that were the result of an unequal distribution of power. It placed the responsibility for overcoming the circumstances of disadvantage squarely on the shoulders of the individual migrant. The assimilationist policy thus served an ideological purpose. As Foster points out:

> By placing the onus on the immigrants to 'become' Australians, any failure on their part to do so could be sheeted home to immigrants themselves without any consideration of other structural factors such as unemployability through ill-health suffered as a consequence of war. Equality under this ideology meant quite simply that no concessions were to be made for migrants so that they would not be advantaged in comparison with Australians. This had the effect of ensuring that the existing class and status group structures would not be disturbed.
>
> (Foster 1981, p. 238)

A legitimation crisis for the State

By the late 1960s, the contradictions in the policy of assimilation were overtly demonstrable to Anglo-Australians and migrant groups alike. The maintenance and reproduction of Anglo-Australian hegemony was no longer possible through the blunt instrument of assimilation. The Federal Government suffered a crisis of legitimation; it not only came under great pressure from a variety of professional groups—including teachers and educational administrators—for a redefinition of the migrant presence and migrant problems but it also began to face increasing militancy among immigrant workers and the young Australians whose parents were non-English-speaking migrants.

Martin (1978, 1981) points out that amongst the factors that brought about the challenge to the assimilability thesis at the end of the 1960s was the growing and visible disjunction between public assumptions about the assimilability of migrants and its actual experience. She argues:

> Diverse groups of people working in established structures came to perceive this disjunction as a threat to their own interests and identities and tried to press for re-definitions: shop-stewards frustrated by migrant indifference or hostility to their unions; teachers unable to get through to migrant students and hampered in the rest of their work because of the presence of migrants in their classes; welfare and medical personnel who saw their inability to communicate with migrant clients and patients as undermining their professional role; and partisans of many colours, not necessarily directly associated with migrants but convinced that high migrant intakes were helping to destroy the city environment, making insupportable demands on resources and undermining the quality of life in general.
>
> (Martin 1978, p. 208)

In the Anglo-Australian mind, the migrant presence in Australia had become a 'problem', a problem that educational institutions had to confront directly. Teachers, now equipped with the rhetoric of child-centered education and greater community participation in education, clearly saw a major contradiction between the policy of Anglo-conformity and their professional role in relation to non-English-speaking children in their classrooms.

Given that many immigrants had stated their desire to provide better educational opportunities to their children as the major reason for migration to Australia, they found Australian schools generally disappointing and not meeting their needs and aspirations (see Meade & Martin 1979). This disappointment, coupled with concern at other forms of discrimination, led immigrant community leaders to emerge finally from their long political isolation. Significantly for the policy makers, the strike at Ford's

Broadmeadow plant in 1973 demonstrated the volatility of immigrant workers (see Connell 1977).

Armed with a range of academic studies indicating the nature and scope of migrant disadvantage, a series of migrant worker conferences were held in the early 1970s in Melbourne and Sydney, which raised important questions about the role and position of migrant workers. Collins (1975, p. 126) argues that an outcome of these conferences was the recognition that the existence of 'cheap' migrant labour had served to maintain a class hierarchy in Australia, and that the struggle of the migrant working class to improve its conditions could not be separated from the broader class struggle against the instruments of exploitation. The possibility of a strengthened working class clearly represented a danger to hegemony and class domination.

Notably, the crisis in ethnic relations during the early part of the 1970s occurred at the same time as, and arguably within the context of, the broader crisis facing capitalist economies, referred to by O'Connor (1973) as 'the fiscal crisis of the state' (see Watkins 1984). O'Connor argues that, in late capitalism, the State plays a crucial role in facilitating capital accumulation by restructuring social policies so that sources of conflict are eradicated and social harmony is maintained. In attempting to create the social conditions for the accumulation of capital, the State seeks to maintain its image of 'legitimacy' and to retain the allegiance of poorer sectors of the community. According to O'Connor, no sphere of State intervention can be said to be neutral with regard to the 'productive circuit of capital', and all social policies—education, welfare, culture, transport, etc.—are 'implicated in capitalist accumulation' (O'Connor 1981, p. 121).

The legitimation crisis in ethnic relations in Australia may be put in the context of O'Connor's analysis. Given the importance of migrant labour, migrant discontent with the Australian cultural scene generally, and with the policy of assimilation in particular, had serious implications for Australian capitalism. It foreshadowed heightened social tensions and a diminished acquiesence of migrants to the Australian system. The State therefore saw its task as reformulating a policy in relation to ethnic welfare that had the effect of diffusing conflict and at the same time reproducing social structures necessary for capital accumulation. But in attempting to formulate such a policy, the State also found itself on the horns of a dilemma; on the one hand, it wanted a compliant and loyal migrant workforce and to this end it had to abandon the policy of assimilation, but on the other hand, the predominantly Anglo-Australian electorate wished its cultural hegemony to be continued. Given this legitimation crisis in ethnic relations, the State had to devise a policy that arrested migrant militancy, and, at the same time, pacified an increasingly restless Anglo-Australian majority. In the next section, it is argued that multiculturalism as a policy can be represented as the State's resolution of this dilemma, and more broadly, of the legitimation crisis in ethnic relations.

The development of multiculturalism

Integration

The State's response to the legitimation crises in ethnic relations was to seek an alternative policy that was not as objectionable to the migrant community, a policy that recognised that the idea of Anglo-Australian cultural superiority was no longer acceptable to non-English-speaking migrants, whose number in Australia in the early 1970s approached some three million. What was required was a policy that had built into it a more liberal and humanitarian concept of cultural tolerance. Equally important was the need to devise this policy within the framework of the political structures in which power relations were not altered. The restructured policy, hence, had to meet two competing requirements. On the one hand, it had to have a moral face; that is, it had to be seen by migrant groups to be making significant cultural concessions. On the other hand, the political hegemony of the Anglo-Australians had to be preserved too.

The State's initial resolution of this dilemma came in the form of an integrationist policy. The policy of integration that the State pursued in the early 1970s was to a large extent borrowed from the United States of America. Partly in response to widespread black militancy, the United States Government of President Lyndon Johnson had abandoned the racist assimilationist policy in favour of what Glazer and Moynihan (1970) have referred to as the 'melting pot' ideology. The central objective of the melting pot, or the integrationist, policy was to create an American society in which different cultural groups, including the Anglo-Saxons, participated fully and equally in the nation's social, political, and economic institutions. No longer was Anglo-conformity considered a condition of becoming an 'American'; all cultural groups could live with each other in a climate of mutual accommodation. Notably, this liberal policy had all the theoretical and moral problems generally associated with liberalism. That is, it sought equal participation from various ethnic groups, while leaving intact the political structures that implicitly discouraged such participation. Integrationist policies thus attempted to shift the emphasis of policy away from social and cultural assimilation, towards political integration.

In Australia, integrationist ideologies were clearly evident in the pronouncements of federal and state ministers of immigration about the need to bring non-English-speaking migrants into the mainstream of Australian political and social life (see Bullivant 1981a and Martin 1978). At a more practical level, these policies were implemented largely through educational measures that were concerned with remedial intervention as a major strategy in bringing about greater ethnic participation in Australian cultural life. It was thought that ethnic political integration was only possible when the migrant children (and adults) had acquired the ability to communicate in English.

It was the Federal Government that intervened most directly to promote integration through the Child Migrant Education Program (CMEP). CMEP, introduced in 1970, as Martin has pointed out, was 'explicitly based on the definition of child migrant education as a problem of communication, located in the individual migrant child' (Martin 1978, p. 113). Among other resources, CMEP provided for part-time teachers taking children into withdrawal classes for English as a second language, for teacher in-service on migrant 'problems', and for adult migrant education. While the Federal Liberal Government of the time made grandiose rhetorical claims about CMEP, in financial terms, it treated migrant education as a very low priority indeed, with only $16 million allocated for the program for a four-year period (Foster 1983, p. 428). Significantly, the program was publicised to Australians in such integrationist metaphors as 'the migrants fitting in to benefit the host country', 'the migrants' problems', and 'successful integration' (Department of Immigration 1972). The use of these metaphors served the function of reassuring the Anglo-Australians that, while migrants had to change their cultural outlook, the hosts' life-style would not be greatly affected.

Furthermore, these rhetorical claims also made it clear that integration was considered necessary for the continued development of Australian capitalism:

> The ability of migrants to communicate is fundamental to their successful integration. Migrant education cannot be divorced from migrant welfare. The development of the migrant education program is evidence of the Government's intention to develop migrant education and welfare activities to secure the fullest economic and social advantages of migration for Australia.
> (Department of Immigration 1972, p. 23).

What is apparent from this and other such claims is that the shift in policy from assimilation to integration was motivated largely to keep the migrant workforce compliant and to thus maximise the economic benefits that migration had brought to Australian capitalism. The policy of integration implied that while migrants were no longer expected to assimilate into the dominant cultural forms, they nevertheless had to integrate into the existing political structures. While it may have seemed to many migrants that, through equal educational, social, and economic opportunities, they would have been able to renegotiate their position within the various dominant power groups, the reality of their predicament turned out to be acutely different.

It became increasingly apparent that CMEP was formulated in terms of a qualified cultural diversity. The conception of equal opportunity suggested by the integrationist policies was opportunity defined as access or treatment, not outcome (see Smith 1985). The same formal conditions for access to social rewards were supposedly applicable, but the structural barriers migrants faced meant that they remained both economically and politically disadvantaged. Seen in this light, integrationist ideology implied that cultural diversity was tolerable only so long as it neither impeded progress towards political integration nor explicitly challenged the dominance of Anglo-Australian cultural assumptions. The distribution of 'cultural capital' (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977) remained stratified.

The celebration of multiculturalism

Within a few years of their introduction, both CMEP and the integrationist policy were generally seen to be inadequate responses to the migrant presence in Australia. Ethnic community leaders viewed integration with a great deal of suspicion, and regarded it as mere 'tokenism', an initiative that offered 'too little too late' (Martin 1978, ch. 2). The election of the

Whitlam Labor Government in 1972 heralded a new approach to ethnic issues. Whitlam's first Immigration Minister, Al Grassby, is popularly credited with being the public figure who first introduced the term 'multiculturalism' into the Australian cultural debate. Grassby enthusiastically celebrated Australia's cultural diversity and emphasised the contributions that ethnic groups had made to Australia's communal development. Somewhat romantically, he implored Australians 'to develop a cohesive "family of the nation" in which citizenship, however acquired, confers equality of opportunity and treatment on all who hold it, without distinction or preference . . .' (in Bullivant 1981a, p. 184).

Seminal contributions that Grassby made to the construction of the notion of multiculturalism were further extended by a number of government and semi-government agencies, including the federal and state departments of education. Many of these agencies of the State seized upon the idea of multiculturalism as a kind of panacea to the many ills of society that had supposedly resulted from the migrant presence. One such agency, the Australian Ethnic Affairs Council, was set up in 1977 to advise the Minister of Immigration on a variety of issues relating to the welfare of migrants in Australia. Its membership consisted mainly of ethnic leaders who had succeeded already in moving up in socio-economic status and for whom political integration was already complete. As Jakubowicz (1984) points out, these leaders were the ethnic petty bourgeoisie, who held Utopian visions about the need to preserve old cultures. They allowed themselves to 'play a critical role as the "ethnic communities" in the co-option of multi-culturalism into the service of the state' (p. 20).

In one of its first reports, *Australia as a Multicultural Society*, the Australian Ethnic Affairs Council (1977) strongly advocated a multicultural approach to ethnic issues. In particular, it argued for cultural identity, equality, and social cohesion as the three main values central to multiculturalism. To its credit, the report recognised the complexities involved in translating these ideals into practice:

> It is important, however, that we should not give the impression that the relation between equality, cultural identity and social cohesion is a simple matter. On the contrary, decisions about policies and programs involve a continuous process of weighing one of these values against another and assessing how the pursuit of one promotes or jeopardises the pursuit of another.
>
> (Australian Ethnic Affairs Council 1977, p. 7)

Three important points should be made regarding the thrust of this report. The first is that, by emphasising 'social cohesion', the report accepted the integrationist assumption that the cultural identity of the immigrants was to be maintained within the framework of existing political and economic structures. It suggested specifically that the goal of social cohesion implied 'accepted institutional arrangements for allocating social resources and for dealing with conflict over what are social resources and over what the basis for such allocation should be' (Australian Ethnic Affairs Council 1977, p. 4). Under the rubric of social cohesion, the report thus presented no challenge to the culturally stratified and economically inequitable social and political system. The report's emphasis on equality, moreover, was on 'equal access to social resources', and this also overlooked the economic circumstances in which migrants found themselves.

The second point regarding the thrust of the report concerns its political analysis that if multiculturalism were not accepted as a policy then Australian society would face 'unacceptable alternatives' (Australian Ethnic Affairs Council 1977, p. 7). Implicit in this reference to 'unacceptable alternatives' was the fear that an increasingly volatile immigrant community could no longer be expected to remain a docile workforce, especially in times of high unemployment, when migrants are most at risk.

The third important point to make about the report is that it explicitly rejected the notion that there was a necessary connection between multiculturalism and 'the way in which, or the degree to which, ethnic minorities have access to decision making and political power' (Australian Ethnic Affairs Council 1977, p. 6). The conservative nature of the report is clearly evident in its conclusion that 'ethnicity is irrelevant to political access' (p. 6).

In view of these comments, it is clear that the writers of the report were involved in a fine juggling act. At one level, they wished to pacify a politically restless migrant community, but at the same time, they wanted to retain the existing cultural and political structures.

The Galbally Report – underlying assumptions

Multiculturalism became an official government policy following the publication of the report of the Review of Post-arrival Programs and Services for Migrants (1978), *Migrant Services and Programs*, known widely as the Galbally Report. Galbally was commissioned to 'examine and report on the effectiveness of the Commonwealth's programs and services for those who have migrated to Australia, including programs and services provided by non-government organisations which receive Commonwealth assistance, and shall identify any areas of need or duplication of programs or services' (Galbally Report 1978, p. 1). The ideological underpinnings of the Galbally Report paralleled the philosophical orientation of the Australian Ethnic Affairs Council (1977) report. The Galbally Report (1978, pp. 3–4) concluded that it was 'necessary for the Commonwealth Government to change the direction of its involvement in the provision of programs and services for migrants and to take further steps to encourage multiculturalism'.

The main principles that guided the Galbally Committee in the formulation of its recommendations were expressed as follows:

> 1. All members of our society must have equal opportunity to realise their full potential and must have equal access to programs and services.
> 2. Every person should be able to maintain his or her culture without prejudice or disadvantage and should be encouraged to understand and embrace other cultures.
> 3. Needs of migrants should, in general, be met by programs and services available to the whole community but special services and programs are necessary at present to ensure equality of access and provision.
> 4. Services and programs should be designed and operated in full consultation with clients, and self-help should be encouraged as much as possible with a view to helping migrants become self-reliant quickly.
>
> (Galbally Report 1978, p. 4)

Among many other recommendations, which argued for increased levels of funding in the area of migrant services and which were to cost the

Federal Government no more than $50 million, the Galbally Report suggested that the federal and state governments assume a higher profile in promoting a multicultural attitude among Australians (p. 107). This task was to be performed partly by the Institute of Multicultural Affairs and the upgraded ethnic radio and television programs. More importantly, however, schools were seen as a key agent for encouraging 'a multicultural attitude in Australian society by fostering the retention of the cultural heritage of different ethnic groups and promoting intercultural understanding' (Galbally Report 1978, pp. 11–12).

Multicultural education was thus viewed as the cornerstone of the government's policy of multiculturalism. In view of the general argument of this monograph, it is important to note that the Galbally Report's recommendations arose specifically out of a problem paradigm. The Galbally Committee recognised ethnic relations in Australia as being 'at a critical stage' and feared heightened social tensions. Migrant presence and discontent were assumed to be a critical problem that demanded State action. The problem-solving orientation that the Galbally Committee adopted meant therefore that it saw its main task in terms of the need to diffuse political conflict.

The Galbally Report's solution to the migrant 'problems' was hailed as a major achievement. Its general thrust and recommendations were accepted by both major political parties. And the Report continues to be accepted as the major reference point for the theoretical location of multiculturalism in Australia. However, the Report masks a number of assumptions that need to be examined more closely.

To begin with, the Galbally Report's conservative orientation is clear in its assertion that different cultural traditions are to be maintained within the framework of the values of the broader Australian institutions. Its proposals are predicated on assumptions about Australian society that are not questioned. The Report stresses the desirability of fostering ethnic cultures when it argues that 'migrants have the right to maintain their cultural and racial identity and that it is clearly in the best interests of our nation that they should be encouraged and assisted to do so if they wish' (Galbally Report 1978, p. 104). However, it is equally important to note the qualification the Report adds as an imperative. The maintenance of ethnic cultures is to be encouraged:

> *Provided* that ethnic identity is not stressed at the expense of society at large, but is interwoven into the fabric of our nationhood by the process of multicultural interaction, then the community as a whole will benefit substantially and its democratic nature will be reinforced.
>
> (Galbally Report 1978, p. 104, emphasis added)

Yet another assumption upon which the Galbally Report is based is that multiculturalism is concerned simply with changing present prejudiced attitudes. As Foster (1981, p. 364) has pointed out, for the Galbally Committee 'multiculturalism is not a fact with social consequences, but simply an attitude to be encouraged'. Education is singled out as the institution that can bring about such a change in attitude. But a major difficulty with this assumption is that while social and economic structures remain unchanged, it is unrealistic to presume that attitudes can change through learning about cultures alone. Nowhere does the Report confront the questions of structural changes in society that must accompany an educational policy designed to influence attitudes.

Lewins (1980) has rightly argued that the Galbally Report ignores two key dimensions of the reality of ethnic community life in Australia. One is that it lacks a full understanding of why ethnic groups form, persist, and maintain their ethnicity. The other is that it overlooks the question of the distribution of power in Australia and does not come to grips with the role of conflict between migrant groups and Anglo-Australians in Australian social life. By failing to address the issue of the political nature of ethnic relations, the Report is left with no other analytical tool than a romantic notion of ethnicity to explain migrant experiences in Australia.

The Galbally Report's analysis of migrant problems and its recommended solutions matched perfectly the Federal Government's perceptions. Prime Minister Fraser embraced the Galbally Report enthusiastically. With a relatively small financial outlay involved, the State promised to implement all the recommendations of the Galbally Report immediately. The Report was seized upon by the State because it legitimised the Government's thinking on migrant issues, but more importantly, because it had the potential for diffusing the emerging crisis in ethnic relations.

As a result of the recommendations of the Galbally Report (1978, p. 107), the Federal Government, in 1979, provided $5 million for a period of three years to develop multicultural education programs. To distribute this money, the Schools Commission worked closely with committees that each state had formed to help implement multiculturalism in schools. The major portion of the money allocated to migrant services and programs as a result of the Galbally Report was spent by existing institutions such as government bodies and schools. This way of distributing funds implied that, as Martin has pointed out, these institutions continued to possess the power to define migrant problems and to control migrant situations (Martin 1978, pp. 82–3).

In view of this observation, it is not surprising that multicultural education has, in practice, meant a whole variety of things—ranging from English as a second language to various bilingual programs—and that to a great extent very little has changed. According to the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs:

> The dominant conclusion emerging from this Review of agencies and programs in the multicultural education area is that activity, effort and commitment of resources is severely circumscribed, by the lack of any sustained organisational focus or coherence.
>
> (Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs 1980, p. 130)

Foster (1983, p. 436) claims that the goal of multiculturalism has not penetrated into schools; there is no evidence of a re-ordering of priorities or a re-allocation of resources within school curricula. As a result of a study, Foster found that the commonest multicultural education program was still the teaching of English as a second language. The low participation in multicultural education by schools indicates, so it seems, that multiculturalism, like so many other liberal reforms in education, has failed to penetrate the solid defences of the status quo. However, at the rhetorical level, it continues to serve an important ideological purpose in legitimising the current economic and political structures and in diffusing social conflict that might result from the increased politicisation of ethnic groups.

Multicultural education as an ideology

Multicultural education has now become entrenched in Australian cultural debate. Successive federal governments since Whitlam have created and sustained practices that specifically recognise, and implicitly encourage, ethnic diversity. Multiculturalism has gained widespread academic support (Jupp 1984). There can be little doubt, moreover, that its promotion through ethnic radio and television has had some effect on popular consciousness. One way or another, the State has been successful in legitimising the multicultural ideology. To call multiculturalism an ideology is to suggest that its construction and popularisation have served to legitimise a certain distorted form of consciousness brought about by the dominance of Anglo-Australian ruling-class interests. It is to suggest that not only has multicultural rhetoric been incorporated to support particular social and economic interests, but it has also obscured and mystified the legitimate interests of non-English-speaking migrants in Australia. It is to a more detailed discussion of how multicultural education serves ideological functions that we now turn.

Ambiguity as an ideological force

The first point to be made about the ideological character of multicultural education concerns the ambiguity surrounding the notion of multiculturalism. Why has the term found such passive acceptance in so many quarters? An entirely plausible explanation is that the term is so broadly used that it accommodates many competing and often irreconcilable political positions. Birrell (1978, p. 135) has argued that the multicultural model is not one model but 'a catchword' for many conceptions of society on a broad level. The various interpretations of multicultural education reflect implicitly different visions of society, and different conceptions of alternative futures. Hence in discussing multiculturalism, individuals and State agencies can attach different meanings to the same term. There is, moreover, no clear delineation of the consequences of multiculturalism if the values underlying such a concept were to be manifested in human behaviour. Given this ambiguity, advocacy of multiculturalism tends to mask very real conflicts among political philosophies and value systems.

Kringas and Lewins (1981) have delineated three different conceptions of multiculturalism. The first of these is 'demographic multiculturalism', a viewpoint that simply 'acknowledges the diversity of ethnic populations in Australia, often in numerical terms, by noticing but not valuing this diversity' (Kringas & Lewins 1981, p. 9). According to Kringas and Lewins, demographic multiculturalism suggests a persistence of Anglo-conformist thinking.

The second view of multiculturalism is termed 'holistic multiculturalism', a liberal conception that regards '"mutual understanding and tolerance . . . within a context of unity and diversity" (Jayasuriya 1977, p. 55) as characterising the sort of relationships which can and should exist between Australians and ethnics' (Kringas & Lewins 1981, p. 9). Holistic multiculturalism suggests a reconciling of the needs of the 'host' society and its ethnic constituents by stressing the value of the wholeness and the welfare of the entire society and the capacity of existing structures to meet the special needs of ethnics.

The third conception delineated by Kringas and Lewins is 'political multiculturalism'. This view emphasises the role of political processes in Australian ethnic relations and stresses the need to examine the questions of political access and power distribution. Clearly these three views represent three different conceptions of social relations and political processes. They also imply different educational practices.

Smolicz (1981) identifies three possible types of multicultural policies in education, namely 'transitional', 'residual', and 'stable'. 'Transitional multiculturalism' takes the form of providing instruction in ethnic languages and cultures, but only as a kind of temporary measure that would ensure a more effective Anglo-conformity in the long term. By 'residual multiculturalism', Smolicz means a policy that is directed towards respecting ethnic cultures in a plural society, but only within a framework of the social and economic perspective of the broader society. Smolicz rejects both transitional and residual multiculturalism because as policies they serve to retain 'ethnic hegemony in a cultural discourse' in favour of the dominant Anglo-Celtic group in Australia. In contrast, he favours 'stable multiculturalism' as a policy, which he characterises by 'a specific set of shared values including a positive evaluation of ethnic diversity'. Smolicz argues that all three types of multicultural policies can be located in Australian schools.

Research conducted by Hannan (1983) reveals that there are several distinct meanings of the term 'multiculturalism' operative in schools. Among the policies and practices that are referred to as multicultural are the following:

> 1. Where a multicultural curriculum is seen to be one which helps migrant children and the children of migrant families to fit into the general society . . .
> 2. Where a school program is thought to become multicultural by planning a number of discrete activities, some of which are outside the curriculum such as 'ethnic nights' or 'international day' . . .
> 3. Where a multicultural curriculum is described as an overall attitude to the subject matter and organisation of the school . . .
> 4. Where a multicultural curriculum is seen as a substitute for Community Language Programs, because it can reach everyone in English and provide them with an understanding of different cultures . . .
> 5. Where a multicultural program is seen as a necessary support and complement to a Community Language Program . . .
> 6. Where a multicultural program is seen as the introduction of a set of values to the conventional areas of the curriculum, thereby changing their content.
>
> (Hannan 1983, pp. 43, 44, 45, 46)

Evidently there are no clear guidelines as to what might constitute multicultural education. The crucial point that should be made here is that this ambiguity serves an important ideological function. The lack of conceptual clarification appears to be politically quite 'functional' in that it allows for all those involved in educational decision making to use the term in their own idiosyncratic way and still feel justified in claiming to provide multicultural education to their constituents. Lingard (1982, p. 74) illustrates quite clearly how in Queensland the 'all-encompassing nature of the concept "multicultural education"' has allowed 'easy subversion, particularly when its implementation has to be refracted through state bureaucracies'. Given this generalisability, inherently assimilatory and conservative practices can readily masquerade as multicultural education. Moreover, the ambiguity surrounding the notion of multicultural education may have the added ideological consequence of diffusing and obscuring more basic political disagreements that its proponents may have regarding current economic bases of society, that is, the current bases of production, distribution, and consumption.

The State's official interpretations of multiculturalism are contained in such documents as the Galbally Report (1978), the Kaldor Report (1981) and the Zubrzycki Report (1982). Each of these Reports emphasises the ideals of cultural identity, equality of opportunity and access, and social cohesion as the key elements of the notion of multiculturalism. Each Report also stresses the importance of educational institutions in promoting these ideals.

Cultural Identity

According to the Zubrzycki Report (1982, p. 17), multiculturalism implies that we should aim to achieve an Australian society 'in which all people have the freedom to express their cultural identity'. This goal is a significant shift away from the earlier assimilationist ideology that required migrants to shed their cultural traditions. The Zubrzycki Report recognises that the legacy of assimilation has meant that residual prejudice against minority cultures in Australia has been compounded. To overcome this prejudice, it recommends that educational programs should promote 'inter-cultural understanding, tolerance of and respect for cultural patterns other than one's own' (Zubrzycki Report 1982, p. 18). The Galbally Report (1978, p. 3), similarly, speaks of the 'encouragement' of a multicultural attitude. More specifically, the Kaldor Report (1981) suggests intercultural studies, studies in migrant issues, studies in social communication, and language studies as the relevant educational programs for the attainment of the goal of intercultural understanding and tolerance.

Prejudice

The authors of these Reports thus believe that the major source of the crisis in ethnic relations is the existence of prejudiced attitudes. Of course, the existence of racist attitudes has been, for the past two hundred years, a persistent feature of Australian social life. In their book *Race Relations in Australia*, Yarwood and Knowling (1982) provide an excellent account of the way racism has penetrated into almost all Australian cultural institutions. In the past, the State's response to racism has been generally one of indifference, though in some cases the State has actually encouraged both overt and covert racist behaviour. The systematic extermination of the Tasmanian Aborigines is perhaps the most graphic example of Australia's racist past. The authors of the Galbally, Kaldor, and Zubrzycki Reports believe that the solution to the problem of racism in Australian society lies in the promotion of multiculturalism. Their advocacy of multiculturalism rests on the assumption that educative programs will help solve the problems of discrimination and prejudice. This assumption must be challenged. The problem of prejudice and discrimination in Australian society is much more deeply rooted than the Reports' functional analyses suggest. Prejudices are not a manifestation of the phenomenological experiences of individuals. They are, as Castles and Kosack (1973) show, causally linked to conflict over economic and social interests.

Castles and Kosack (1973, ch. 14) reject various versions of the conventional thesis, rooted in social psychology, that prejudiced attitudes are irrational pathological phenomena that are a function of an individual's inadequate personality. They argue that the sociological thesis—that it is the social institutions that determine attitudes—is more accurate.

Castles and Kosack extend this analysis of attitudes by describing the functions of prejudice in late capitalism. According to these authors, the primary function of prejudice against immigrants is to conceal and legitimise the exploitation of their labour by alleging that they are congenitally inferior. In this way, as is apparent in the case of South Africa, for example, prejudice obviously serves the interests of the ruling class. The second function of prejudice Castles and Kosack describe concerns the attitudes of indigenous workers towards the capitalist social order. Indigenous workers' prejudice is a consequence of their insecurity and fear of competition. Castles and Kosack maintain that:

> Usually the real causes of this hostility towards immigrants are not understood by the working-class people concerned. Instead they rationalize their feelings by saying that immigrants are dirty, bring in disease, chase women, and start fights. Even when the risk of competition for jobs and housing is named as one of the problems connected with immigration, this tends to lead not to criticism of the socio-economic system which produces such insecurity, but rather to antipathy towards the immigrants themselves. Immigrant workers therefore take on the function of scapegoats for the deficiencies of capitalist society, which is unable to provide adequate living conditions and to guarantee security to the whole of the working population.
>
> (Castles & Kosack 1973, p. 459)

A third function of prejudice is related to the structure of the working class and the class consciousness of indigenous workers. Castles and Kosack argue that:

> Where workers hold strong prejudice against their immigrant colleagues (and particularly when there is fear of competition), they tend to support discriminatory measures taken by employers and governments to ensure that immigrant workers remain at the bottom of the labour market. The high degree of exploitation of immigrants is seen not as a cause for solidarity, but as a benefit to the indigenous workers. The objective split in the working class . . . thus finds its subjective counterpart: there is a split in working-class consciousness.
>
> (Castles & Kosack 1973, p. 459)

These three functions of prejudice therefore clearly serve to preserve the status quo by 'firstly, legitimating the exploitation of immigrants, secondly, diverting workers' attention from the true causes of their insecure position, thirdly, splitting the labour movement and weakening class consciousness' (Castles & Kosack 1973, p. 460).

Now if Castles and Kosack are correct in their analysis of the nature of prejudice, then multicultural education programs for promoting intercultural understanding and reducing levels of discrimination appear to be misplaced. As de Lepervanche (1984, p. 194) points out, 'education *per se* will not lead to the removal of prejudice and discrimination or to the institution of equal opportunity'. If prejudice is a product of socio-economic conditions, then we cannot expect to change prejudicial attitudes simply by encouraging cultural tolerance in classrooms. Prejudices cannot be reduced unless we also attend to the economic and social conditions that help produce them.

Prejudice does not simply manifest itself in explicit racist attitudes or the use of deliberate emotive or inflammatory language. More insiduously, it consists in what Hall (1980) describes as 'inferential racism', a more pervasive and subtle form of racism that is based upon taken-for-granted, commonsense assumptions. Nor do all forms of racism rest on conscious intentions. Racism, when located in policies and entrenched practices, goes beyond simple acts of discrimination on the basis of colour or ethnicity—it is found built into the internal mechanisms of various social and political structures. According to another researcher, Spears (1978), institutional racism is not overt; it is structured into political and social institutions, arising not from wilful acts of prejudiced individuals but as covert acts of indifference and ommission. Given this broader notion of racism, it is difficult to envisage how multicultural education programs that focus simply on intercultural understanding in the classroom can ever result in reducing levels of prejudice. What is required to make the nature of institutional prejudice explicit is a systematic critique of the socio-political structures that produce and reproduce prejudice in the first place. What is needed to reduce levels of prejudice in society is a reconstruction of the politico-economic structure that promotes prejudice for its own preservation.

Cultural tolerance

Among the arguments supporting multiculturalism is the view that through education diverse migrant cultures should be fostered, since all individuals have a right to preserve their culture. An extreme expression of this view can be found in Jeffcoate (1979). Jeffcoate insists that no matter how peculiar some cultural traditions may seem, educational institutions in a multicultural society must not be judgmental about these traditions—that all cultural views have equal validity.

This extreme view of cultural tolerance can be easily challenged, for it implies a certain moral relativism that cannot be sustained through a critical philosophical examination. As Porter argues, 'not all cultures have equal claims on our moral support. Some cultures treat human beings in profoundly inhumane ways' (1975, p. 300). When we are asked by the proponents of multiculturalism to respect the cultural traditions of various ethnic groups, are we also expected to respect such things as the Hindu caste system, or the treatment of women in Islam, or indeed the practice of enforced marriages among Australian Aborigines? De Lepervanche notes a morally unacceptable consequence for migrant women of this extreme moral relativism:

> Having lost what little financial independence they might have had, those unemployed women from ethnic communities that uphold extreme patriarchal values are especially vulnerable to both class oppression and sexist

> discrimination. Certainly, Australian society is male dominated too, but many women from rural backgrounds in other societies (from which Australia has recruited immigrants) are even more subjugated than Australians. In many cases, these women are throughout their lives subservient to men—first to their fathers and brothers and later to their husbands; and the ethnic communities themselves are also dominated by males. The continued celebration of ethnicity by governments and ethnic organizations may well prove an added burden for these women.
>
> (de Lepervanche 1984, p. 208)

The reproduction of cultural traits that are systematically discriminatory against subgroups within that culture has to be contested. Cultural traditions are continuously changing in light of demonstrations that some principles of social life are more morally supportable than others. Cultural artifacts like dance, folklore, cuisine, music, crafts, and the like will survive because people enjoy them and because they add variety to the cultural landscape, but the suggestion that cultural values that are inappropriate for human liberation should be preserved is nothing short of moral corruption.

Apart from the confusion inherent in its simplistic articulation, the idea that ethnic groups maintain their cultural identity is fundamentally ideological. As Collins (1978) points out, the encouragement of a culturally divided workforce to celebrate its differences has political implications. The celebration of ethnic differences serves only to divide the working class: in competition over jobs and social benefits, ethnic groups become increasingly suspicious of each other. Here we find the roots of prejudice and racism developing. In a political context, ethnic boundaries are strengthened at the expense of working-class solidarity. Emphasis on the celebration of ethnic differences also has the consequence of diverting attention away from structural class inequalities that currently exist in Australian society. As de Lepervanche observes:

> If we concentrate on drawing cultural boundaries too clearly there is the danger, in a class society of unequals, of isolating those who are occupationally segmented and culturally or racially distinct from others in a similar social position.
>
> (de Lepervanche 1984, p. 208)

Equality of opportunity and access

Indeed, contrary to what many proponents of multiculturalism might suggest, the celebration of ethnicity as an ideal may, in fact, run counter to the goal of equality of opportunity, the second of the three ideals identified as the key elements of the notion of multiculturalism. Bullivant (1981b) highlights this possibility by referring to it as the pluralist dilemma in education. For Bullivant, the dilemma has to do with promoting equality of opportunity as a political concern, while at the same time advocating a cultural plurality of private life that may result in inhibiting the achievement of the former goal. Bullivant argues that:

> The distinction between life styles and life chances is at the heart of the difficulties over formulating educational programmes for multiculturalism or cultural pluralism. The latter has to do with access to power and equality of opportunity, but this fact is obscured by programmes that stress life styles.
>
> (Bullivant 1981b, p. 6)

The 'spaghetti and dance' approach to multiculturalism fails to address the critical issues of migrant life chances. An approach that highlights life-styles may promote ethnic self-identity and enhance migrant self-concepts, but it does not do anything about migrant life chances, since it does not address the issue of social inequalities. This point is forcibly made by Jayasuriya (1983):

> The simple and compelling point is that while an emphasis on the private domain (typified by aspects of cultural life such as food, language, religious observances, family life, and recreational pastimes) may help to preserve ethnic identity, give emotional security and enhance the self-esteem of individual ethnic group members, it does not necessarily assist in helping migrant or ethnic minorities to cope with 'the political realities of the nation state'. In other words, the legitimate aspirations of migrants as members of minority groups for a fair share of the resources and social rewards of society at large—the public domain of life—may be impeded by an excessive and exclusive concern with the 'privatised' aspects of social and cultural life.
> (Jayasuriya 1983, p. 26)

Jayasuriya's enthusiasm for the goal of equality of opportunity is, by and large, shared by official theoreticians of multiculturalism. The Zubrzycki Report, for example, argues that:

> Equality of opportunity is an essential part of the concept of multiculturalism. Indeed, cultural diversity by itself would be a hollow achievement if there were no equal opportunities for occupational advancement or for obtaining access to positions where important decisions affecting the Australian community are made. All Australians, including minority groups, should have an opportunity to 'get into the act'
> (Zubrzycki Report 1982, pp. 21-2).

However, the Zubrzycki Report views the notion of equality of opportunity somewhat differently from Jayasuriya. While Jayasuriya views equality in the same way as the Karmel Report (1973) defined it—as 'equality of outcomes'—the Zubrzycki Report sees equality of opportunity in terms of providing greater access, so that immigrants are better equipped to compete for occupational advancement and participate in the Australian political process. The Zubrzycki Report recommends that 'people should be given an opportunity to work to overcome any barriers', and also emphasises the need to 'modify structural features in Australian institutions so as to allow people to compete on their merits' (Zubrzycki Report 1982, p. 22). The Report nevertheless wants to restrict such structural modification to a limited remediation of existing institutions. In the Zubrzycki Report, there is a complete absence of any questioning of the dominant political, ideological, and economic order—a questioning that is essential for an understanding of the nature of structural inequalities in Australian society. There is, moreover, an explicit acceptance of the insignificance of conflict as a structural consequence and condition of the way in which the social relations of production and reproduction are organised and legitimised in society. The theoretical framework in which the Zubrzycki Report understands the notion of equality of opportunity thus involves an implicit acceptance of current political structures. However, to accept without any challenge the political structures that are, in fact, the very source of inequalities that migrants face in Australia is to make sure that any progress towards greater equality of opportunity is inevitably limited and, indeed only notional. Without a radical critique of the economic and social institutions that promote migrant inequalities, only minor reforms, which are necessarily internal to the existing political structures, are possible.

More fundamentally, however, the reformist notion of equality of opportunity serves to legitimise existing inequalities and to perpetuate the myth that liberal reforms promoting the values of tolerance and co-operation would somehow lead to greater equality of opportunity and a fairer distribution of economic wealth. As Mullard explains:

> On a theoretical level equal opportunity for all can only exist in a society where there prevails, among other things, a general acceptance of the dominant values and beliefs. Where this does not exist, equal opportunity is dependent upon the degree of mutual tolerance to be found. But given the necessity in the first place of relying on mutual tolerance—that racism exists—it is highly likely that the degree of equal opportunity to be attained at any one time by any one group will correlate quite closely with that group's orientation towards a society's dominant value and belief system. If it rejects this system, equal opportunities of access to key positions in the power structure where social or political change can be effected will be denied; if it accepts, equal opportunity of access will possibly be granted with the understanding that the exisiting system of beliefs will be upheld.
>
> (Mullard 1982, p. 128)

In other words, given the structural inequalities that exist in Australian society, equal opportunity in practice means equal opportunity only for persons whose ideas and values conform with those of the dominant Anglo-Australian culture—those who possess real power.

On a more practical educational level, the provision of equal opportunities is already defined in terms of the goals of education in Australian schools. For migrant pupils, this means accelerated mastery of English language and the absorption of Anglo-Australian values in order to achieve academically, i.e. pass HSC examinations, with a view to entering a vocation or higher education. According to the reformist view, equal educational opportunity tends to be interpreted in the school setting as the provision of more services and resources (which often means compensatory instruction) so that Anglo-Australians and migrants alike have an 'equal' chance of achieving the competitive middle-class academic objectives already established by the schools. To view equal opportunity in this way is to confirm that, as Mullard points out, 'those who desire social and academic achievement need foremost to conform, to accept, if only passively, the school ethos before they can usefully gain from the supposed equal oportunities provided' (Mullard 1982, p. 128).

The arguments presented here show clearly that there is considerable tension between the goals of the maintenance of cultural traditions and the provision of greater equality of educational opportunity. Yet in an educational context, some proponents of multiculturalism see a necessary link between these two ideals. It is sometimes argued (for example, by Lippman 1977 and Jeffcoate 1979) that pride in one's cultural tradition leads to the enhancement of self-concept, which in turn can contribute to improved educational performance. In recent years, it has become increasingly fashionable to argue that the educational failure of migrant and working-class children is due to poor self-concept and self-esteem, and that if this is treated, they will achieve better in school. Compensatory programs emphasising cultural traditions, which help students improve their self-concepts, are thus regarded as contributing to the provision of greater equality of educational opportunity.

This is a highly dubious argument based on mistaken theoretical assumptions. The enhancement of self-concept of members of low-status groups can, as Porter (1975, p. 302) has shown, serve a contrary end. By placing emphasis on the development of self-concept, the State can pretend to be compensating for low status without actually doing anything about the real causes of migrant inequalities. By focusing on self-esteem, schools can manage to ignore the vast body of evidence showing that working-class and migrant families have much less access to power, to resources of every kind, than middle-class children. Emphasis on 'self-concept' thus becomes a way of evading the real and uncomfortable issues of class and privilege in Australian society.

Social cohesion

Nowhere is the State's determination to maintain existing political and economic structures, within the framework of which multicultural educational programs are to be placed, more apparent than in the emphasis it places on the need to have unity and social cohesion in Australian society.

Having advocated cultural diversity in the strongest possible terms, the Kaldor Report (1981) confronts a dilemma. With its promotion of possibly conflicting value systems, there arises the distinct possibility of inter-ethnic friction. The Kaldor Report therefore asks, 'how can multicultural education avoid fragmentation, division and separatism?' (p. 7). The Report's answer to this dilemma lies in embracing a form of cultural pluralism that is consistent with the values and institutional arrangements that the Report considers to be 'uniquely Australian'. Social cohesion and unity are hence goals that the Report sees as 'being of central concern and consistent with, rather than contradictory to, the ideals of intercultural understanding and improved communication' (Kaldor Report 1981, p. 8). The report maintains that:

> There must, of course, be an assumption of acceptance by all groups of some institutions and values which have, over the history of the Commonwealth of Australia, emerged as fundamental to Australian public life. It is important to identify these in the context of multicultural education. The Federal Constitution, the Australian legal system, parliamentary democracy, equality before the law, equal access to social resources and the English language are among the important institutions and cultural values.
>
> (Kaldor Report 1981, p. 8)

The Zubrzycki Report (1982, p. 16) also emphasises the need for all Australians to demonstrate allegiance to the 'central institutions' of Australian society. The Zubrzycki Report insists that while the origin of Australian institutions is 'an incidental result of history; their central position in Australian society is an objective fact of life' (p. 16). From this premise, the Report concludes that 'multiculturalism must be based on support for a common core of institutions, rights and obligations' (p. 15); and that a socially cohesive Australia requires a foundational political and legal framework in which the existing judicial and parliamentary institutions are preserved.

It was argued in earlier sections that the existing political and economic structures in Australian society are conceptually linked to the capitalist mode of production. We live in a society organised around a system of production that depends for its continued existence on the maintenance and reproduction of certain inequalities. What the production of wealth in Australia today means is that some individuals or groups of individuals own and control what is owned at the expense of those who produce or assist in producing their products for them. Following O'Connor (1973), it was stressed that the State is not neutral with respect to the competing interests of labour and capital. The State implicitly facilitates the accumulation of capital by maintaining social conditions that are conducive to it. Given this function, the State has a vested interest in maintaining the current way of producing wealth. That is, the existing political and economic structures are constrained by, and ultimately directed by, the demands of capital.

In view of the State's interests, dictated by the demands of capital, in maintaining and reproducing inequalities, the Kaldor and Zubrzycki Reports' emphasis on social cohesion can be viewed in a different light. The goal of unity and social cohesion now appears as a means of co-option and control. As with the 'melting-pot' ideology, the ultimate objective of multiculturalism remains political integration: cultural diversity is tolerable only so long as it neither impedes progress towards political co-option nor explicitly challenges the assumptions upon which capitalism is based. Ultimate conformity to a discriminatory political system becomes a pre-condition of a stable and culturally harmonious society.

Viewed from this perspective, the goals of social cohesion and equality of opportunity are fundamentally contradictory. To require all Australians to subscribe to the existing political and economic values of Australian society, which are demonstrably linked to the capitalist mode of production, is to rule out any possibility of providing any effective equality of opportunity. The interests of capital cannot be served by promoting real equality of opportunity, for capitalism rests on creating and sustaining divisions.

There is, moreover, considerable tension between the notions of social cohesion and cultural diversity. Official versions of multiculturalism imply that cultural values and beliefs can in fact be separated from the values and beliefs that are political and economic. Based on this assumption, immigrants are asked to celebrate their cultural differences, but at the same time conform to the existing political and economic values in Australian society. Arguably, the distinction between cultural and political values is false. Cultural behaviour is very much a consequence of the political and economic values one holds. Also the expression of cultural behaviour is necessarily limited by the demands of political and economic structures. The very presence of the existing legal, economic, and other institutional structural constraints means that immigrants are not able to celebrate their ethnicity with the kind of freedom that is suggested by the proponents of multiculturalism.

Beyond multiculturalism

It has been argued in this monograph that the popular notions of multiculturalism, from Grassby to Galbally through to Zubrzycki, are rooted in an ideology that legitimises the existing political and economic structures in Australian society. Multiculturalism is predicated on assumptions about Australian society that it does not challenge. The rhetoric of multiculturalism gives the appearance of being a liberationist policy, yet, in reality, it is an instrument of social control. Through it, a possible crisis in ethnic relations is contained. It provides protection for the dominant economic, political, and social order by diffusing and obscuring issues of structural inequalities in Australia.

Multicultural education in Australia, then, has basically meant the cooption of increasingly alienated ethnic groups into a political system dedicated implicitly to the maintenance of social inequalities. Immigrants have been asked to celebrate their ethnic identities, which when transported to Australia have become severed from their historical locations. As Jakubowicz (1984, p. 17) points out, 'ethnicity as ideology mediates Australian class relations, by reifying the history of peoples into a static category', which is then used in mystifying rationality and masking underlying class interests. Multicultural education has thus become the instrument of social control and stability, rather than change.

Radical pedagogy

An educational policy more appropriate for changing the social position of immigrants would involve a more radical reappraisal of our society's materialist and racist culture, which continues to be transmitted by schools in Australia. We would need to understand how class relations are produced and reproduced in our schools. Such an understanding may result in a practical commitment to a reconstruction of the existing economic and political structures that promote social inequalities.

The reality of society outside the school is much more far-reaching than the school's reality; and multicultural education through 'ethnicised' curricula cannot compensate for the structural disadvantages that migrant children face. A more liberationist curriculum would recognise the intimate connection that exists between schools and society. It is only through a critical understanding of this connection that we could hope to achieve a more egalitarian society in which differences between Anglo-Australians and migrants are not so structurally profound.

It has to be admitted that schools alone cannot transform the nature of society. The schooling process takes place in the context of an implicit contradiction between its goal of developing in children literacy, autonomy, creativity, and compassion and the social reality of emphasising conformity, obedience, routine, and competition (D'Urso 1979). This contradiction is linked to the issue of how schools function as institutions concerned with the reproduction of those aspects of culture that meet the demands of the capitalist State. A number of sociologists (e.g. Bowles & Gintis 1976 and Bourdieu & Passeron 1977) have attempted to make explicit the nature of this contradiction. They have argued that, in Western democracies, schools face two competing requirements: on the one hand, through the schooling process, the State strives to obtain legitimacy and stability for the existing socio-political order, but on the other hand, it affords citizens the right to change any existing social arrangements. It is within the framework of this reality that we confront the question of how we, as educators, might respond to the challenge of devising a social role for schools consistent with the ideals of democracy and equality of opportunity.

The challenge is taken up most enthusiastically by Wood (1984). In contrast to such deterministic pessimism as Bowles and Gintis (1976) represent, Wood is largely optimistic about the potential of schools in resisting the capitalist hegemony and assuming a social role devoted to human liberation and fulfilment. Wood's opposition to the reproduction theory suggested by such scholars as Bowles and Gintis is that they assume an all too passive notion of human beings. Recapturing human agency without losing sight of the notion of structural influences, Wood believes that, notwithstanding the argument that schools alone cannot alter existing social, political, and economic relationships, educators can play a distinct and vital social role by developing in students a critical understanding of the structures of oppression and by resisting the functions of schools that help reproduce the unequal social order.

'Civic courage'

Central to the social role in schools that Wood ascribes to educators is the requirement that they display themselves, and instil in students, a sense of 'civic courage'. Wood borrows the notion of civic courage from Giroux (1983), who sees it as implying a willingness on the part of teachers and students to act as if they were living in a democratic society, a society that is responsive to the needs of all, and not just of a privileged few. According to Wood, the development of civic courage involves teaching for a critical literacy, that is, a familiarity with the basic academic skills obtained within a course of studies that embraces a critical understanding of diverse cultural heritages and patterns of cultural reproduction. In promoting such an education, Wood follows Gramsci (1971) who maintained that education must produce people who could both master the skills of intellectual production and use them in engaging the forces of history in active critical self-consciousness. For Gramsci, creation of a potential counter-ideology requires that the oppressed people be able to manipulate linguistic and analytical symbols in ways that enable them to challenge the dominant structures. Beyond the development of critical literacy, Wood argues that:

> If students are to develop the civic courage that makes it possible for them to act democratically, it is necessary that they understand their own histories. When students become aware of the worth of their own histories, they can come to value their own perceptions and insights. They will not have to rely upon the history of the dominant culture to validate their experiences and truths. Rather, they can look to themselves as useful members of a cultural tradition that empowers them to speak with their own voices. This has indeed been the experience of minorities in this country as they have strived to recover a sense of their own worth within an understanding of their value to the culture at large. Teachers need to incorporate such a historical perspective within the curriculum for all children, so that this sense of self-worth will permeate their social actions.
>
> (Wood 1984, p. 235)

Based on the kind of directions suggested by Wood, education that was appropriate for migrant students in Australia would certainly incorporate a study of diverse ethnic cultures. However, such a study of cultures would be radically different from the kind proposed by those advocating multiculturalism in the liberal tradition. Radical pedagogy dictates that awareness of cultures be located in its uniquely Australian context. Students should thus critically examine the nature of the unequal relationship that has existed between migrant groups and the dominant culture, and how ethnicity as a category has mediated in reproducing and legitimising the unequal allocation of power and privilege. Viewed from this perspective, an education that promotes awareness of cultural histories could serve as a radicalising force in the development of students. Such a suggestion is entirely consistent with a view of multiculturalism proposed by McConnochie and Kapferer (1981), who argue that:

> All children should have a sophisticated awareness of the political, economic and social determinants of oppression and privilege in Australian society, and indeed, we believe that such an awareness is essential if the goals of multiculturalism are to be attained. Such an awareness is built on a clear and critical understanding of the nature of Australian history, of the nature of class conflict within Australian society, and of the external nature of the determinants of success and failure in Australian society. A sophisticated appreciation of cultural 'otherness', and positive retention of cultural identity is not possible without this awareness.
>
> (McConnochie & Kapferer 1981, p. 56)

The framework of an educational policy suggested here would thus reject the cultural and so-called ethnic basis of the existing policy, something which has led to the relatively permanent perception of non-English-speaking migrants as 'problems'. Instead, the new content of education would reflect more accurately the source of the problems which migrants face in Australian society—as the unequal distribution of opportunities and power. The source of the problems would then be located in the existing political and economic relationships rather than in such things as differences in cultural attitudes.

The emphasis on ethnic histories, customs, religions, music, languages, and so on in current multicultural educational programs has, as has been pointed out, led to the celebration of differences. This cultural fragmentation approach is, as Mullard (1982) points out, based on the assumption that differences between migrant groups are more significant than the similarities. Yet arguably, in terms of political and economic relationships, common experiences and similarities are more profound. It is only through highlighting similarities of cultural experiences that migrants, as well as other disadvantaged groups, can, by bringing together their related interests, produce a certain solidarity against the structural and symbolic forces that promote inequalities.

As well as transforming the content of education, a reformulation of liberationist policies would also require substantial changes to organisational practices. If the problems of inequality are to be tackled seriously then those administrative features of school that tend to suppress critical and creative education, and therefore inhibit the development of civic courage, would have to be challenged. What must be recognised is that the fight against racism and other forms of social inequality requires a democratisation of education. In practice, this would involve the establishing of a radically different relationship between schools and communities than that which is characterised by the policies of an administrative hierarchy that are simply imposed upon communities, who have had no say in formulating them.

References

Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1969), *The Authoritarian Personality*, W. W. Norton, New York.

Appleyard, R. T. (1972), 'Immigration and national development', in H. Roberts (ed.), *Australia's Immigration Policy*, University of Western Australia, Perth.

Australian Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs (1982), *Multiculturalism for all Australians: Our Developing Nationhood*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (Zubrzycki Report).

Australian Ethnic Affairs Council (1977), *Australia as a Multicultural Society*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Australian Ethnic Affairs Council, Committee on Multicultural Education (1981), *Perspectives on Multicultural Education*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (Kaldor Report).

Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs (1980), *Review of Multicultural and Migrant Education*, AIMA, Melbourne.

Australian Population and Immigration Council (1976), *A Decade of Migrant Settlement: Report on the 1973 Immigration Survey*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Bachrach, P., & Barach, M. S. (1970), *Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice*, Oxford University Press, New York.

Bernstein, B. (1977), *Class, Codes and Control*, vol. 3 *Towards a Theory of Educational Transmissions*, 2nd edn, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

Beswick, D. G., & Hills, M. D. (1972), 'A survey of ethno-centrism in Australia', *Australian Journal of Psychology* 24(2), 153–63.

Birrell, R., & Birrell, T. (1981), *An Issue of People: Population and Australian Society* (Australian Studies), Longman Chesire, Melbourne.

Birrell, T. (1978), 'Migration and the dilemmas of multiculturalism', in R. Birrell & C. Hay (eds), *The Immigration Issue in Australia*, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Vic. (Reprinted in this volume as Reading 3.)

Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J.-C. (1977), *Reproduction in Education and Culture*, Sage, London.

Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (1976), *Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life*, Basic Books, New York.

Bullivant, B. M. (1981a), *The Pluralist Dilemma in Education: Six Case Studies*, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney.

Bullivant, B. M. (1981b), *Race, Ethnicity and Curriculum*, Macmillan, Melbourne.

Bullivant, B. M. (1984), *Pluralism: Cultural Maintenance and Evolution*, Multi-lingual Matters, Clevedon, England.

Castles, S., & Kosack, G. (1973), *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press, London.

Collins, J. (1975), 'The political economy of post-war immigration', in E. L. Wheelwright & K. Buckley (eds), *Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism*, vol. 1, ANZ Book Co., Sydney.

Collins, J. (1976), 'Migrants: The political void', in H. Meyer & T. H. Nelson (eds), *Australian Politics: A Fourth Reader*, Cheshire, Melbourne.

Collins, J. (1978), 'Fragmentation of the working class', in E. L. Wheelwright & K. Buckley (eds), *Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism*, vol. 3, ANZ Book Co., Sydney.

Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1974), *Poverty in Australia*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (Henderson Report).

Committee to Advise on Policies for Manufacturing Industry (1975), *Policies for the Development of Manufacturing Industry*, vol. 1 *Report to the Prime Minister by the Committee to Advise on Policies for Manufacturing Industry*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (Jackson Report).

Connell, R. W. (1977), *Ruling Class, Ruling Culture: Studies of Conflict, Power and Hegemony in Australian Life*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

de Lepervanche, M. (1984), 'Immigrants and ethnic groups', in S. Encel & L. Bryson (eds), *Australian Society: Introductory Essays*, 4th edn, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne.

Department of Immigration (1972), *Migrant Education Programme 1970–1*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

D'Urso, S. (1974), 'Hidden realities within schooling', *Australian Journal of Social Issues* 9(2), pp. 108–17.

Education Department of Victoria (1983), *Ministerial Papers Nos 1–4*, Education Department, Melbourne.

Foster, L. E. (1981), *Australian Education: A Sociological Perspective*, Prentice-Hall, Sydney.

Foster, L. E. (1983), 'The politics of educational knowledge', in R. K. Browne & L. E. Foster (eds), *Sociology of Education*, 3rd edn, Macmillan, Melbourne.

Galbally Report, see Review of Post-arrival Programs and Services for Migrants (1978).

Giroux, H. (1983), *Theory and Resistence in Education: A Pedagogy for the Opposition*, Bergin and Garvey, South Hadley, Mass.

Glazer, N., & Moynihan (1970), *Beyond the Melting Pot*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Gramsci, A. (1971), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, trs. Q. Hoare & G. N. Smith, Lawrence and Wishart, New York.

Grassby, A. J. (1973), *A Multicultural Society for the Future*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Hall, S. (1980), 'Teaching race', *Multiracial Education* 9(1), 3–13.

Hannan, L. (1983), 'Problems and issues for teachers making decisions on curriculum', in B. Falk & J. Harris (eds), *Unity and Diversity: Multicultural Education in Australia*, Australian College of Education, Melbourne.

Henderson, R. F., Harcourt, H., & Harper, R. J. (1970), *People in Poverty: A Melbourne Study*, Cheshire, Melbourne.

Henderson Report, see Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1974).

democratisation of education. In practice, this would involve the establishing of a radically different relationship between schools and communities than that which is characterised by the policies of an administrative hierarchy that are simply imposed upon communities, who have had no say in formulating them.

References

Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1969), *The Authoritarian Personality*, W. W. Norton, New York.

Appleyard, R. T. (1972), 'Immigration and national development', in H. Roberts (ed.), *Australia's Immigration Policy*, University of Western Australia, Perth.

Australian Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs (1982), *Multiculturalism for all Australians: Our Developing Nationhood*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (Zubrzycki Report).

Australian Ethnic Affairs Council (1977), *Australia as a Multicultural Society*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Australian Ethnic Affairs Council, Committee on Multicultural Education (1981), *Perspectives on Multicultural Education*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (Kaldor Report).

Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs (1980), *Review of Multicultural and Migrant Education*, AIMA, Melbourne.

Australian Population and Immigration Council (1976), *A Decade of Migrant Settlement: Report on the 1973 Immigration Survey*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Bachrach, P., & Barach, M. S. (1970), *Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice*, Oxford University Press, New York.

Bernstein, B. (1977), *Class, Codes and Control*, vol. 3 *Towards a Theory of Educational Transmissions*, 2nd edn, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

Beswick, D. G., & Hills, M. D. (1972), 'A survey of ethno-centrism in Australia', *Australian Journal of Psychology* 24(2), 153–63.

Birrell, R., & Birrell, T. (1981), *An Issue of People: Population and Australian Society* (Australian Studies), Longman Chesire, Melbourne.

Birrell, T. (1978), 'Migration and the dilemmas of multiculturalism', in R. Birrell & C. Hay (eds), *The Immigration Issue in Australia*, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Vic. (Reprinted in this volume as Reading 3.)

Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J.-C. (1977), *Reproduction in Education and Culture*, Sage, London.

Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (1976), *Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life*, Basic Books, New York.

Bullivant, B. M. (1981a), *The Pluralist Dilemma in Education: Six Case Studies*, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney.

Bullivant, B. M. (1981b), *Race, Ethnicity and Curriculum*, Macmillan, Melbourne.

Bullivant, B. M. (1984), *Pluralism: Cultural Maintenance and Evolution*, Multi-lingual Matters, Clevedon, England.

Castles, S., & Kosack, G. (1973), *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press, London.

Collins, J. (1975), 'The political economy of post-war immigration', in E. L. Wheelwright & K. Buckley (eds), *Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism*, vol. 1, ANZ Book Co., Sydney.

Collins, J. (1976), 'Migrants: The political void', in H. Meyer & T. H. Nelson (eds), *Australian Politics: A Fourth Reader*, Cheshire, Melbourne.

Collins, J. (1978), 'Fragmentation of the working class', in E. L. Wheelwright & K. Buckley (eds), *Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism*, vol. 3, ANZ Book Co., Sydney.

Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1974), *Poverty in Australia*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (Henderson Report).

Committee to Advise on Policies for Manufacturing Industry (1975), *Policies for the Development of Manufacturing Industry*, vol. 1 *Report to the Prime Minister by the Committee to Advise on Policies for Manufacturing Industry*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (Jackson Report).

Connell, R. W. (1977), *Ruling Class, Ruling Culture: Studies of Conflict, Power and Hegemony in Australian Life*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

de Lepervanche, M. (1984), 'Immigrants and ethnic groups', in S. Encel & L. Bryson (eds), *Australian Society: Introductory Essays*, 4th edn, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne.

Department of Immigration (1972), *Migrant Education Programme 1970–1*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

D'Urso, S. (1974), 'Hidden realities within schooling', *Australian Journal of Social Issues* 9(2), pp. 108–17.

Education Department of Victoria (1983), *Ministerial Papers Nos 1–4*, Education Department, Melbourne.

Foster, L. E. (1981), *Australian Education: A Sociological Perspective*, Prentice-Hall, Sydney.

Foster, L. E. (1983), 'The politics of educational knowledge', in R. K. Browne & L. E. Foster (eds), *Sociology of Education*, 3rd edn, Macmillan, Melbourne.

Galbally Report, see Review of Post-arrival Programs and Services for Migrants (1978).

Giroux, H. (1983), *Theory and Resistence in Education: A Pedagogy for the Opposition*, Bergin and Garvey, South Hadley, Mass.

Glazer, N., & Moynihan (1970), *Beyond the Melting Pot*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Gramsci, A. (1971), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, trs. Q. Hoare & G. N. Smith, Lawrence and Wishart, New York.

Grassby, A. J. (1973), *A Multicultural Society for the Future*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Hall, S. (1980), 'Teaching race', *Multiracial Education* 9(1), 3–13.

Hannan, L. (1983), 'Problems and issues for teachers making decisions on curriculum', in B. Falk & J. Harris (eds), *Unity and Diversity: Multicultural Education in Australia*, Australian College of Education, Melbourne.

Henderson, R. F., Harcourt, H., & Harper, R. J. (1970), *People in Poverty: A Melbourne Study*, Cheshire, Melbourne.

Henderson Report, see Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1974).

Hill, B. V. (1975), 'What's "open" about open education?', in D. Nyberg (ed.), *The Philosophy of Open Education*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

Immigration Advisory Council, Committee on Social Patterns (J. Zubrzycki, Chairman) (1973), *Inquiry into the Departure of Settlers from Australia: Final Report, July 1973*, Parl. Paper No. 226, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Interim Committee for the Australian Schools Commission (1973), *Schools in Australia*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (Karmel Report).

Jackson Report, see Committee to Advise on Policies for Manufacturing Industry (1975).

Jakubowicz, A. (1984), 'State and ethnicity: Multi-culturalism as ideology', in J. Jupp (ed.), *Ethnic Politics in Australia*, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney. (Reprinted in this volume as Reading 1.)

Jayasuriya, D. L. (1977), 'Rethinking Australian education in relation to social change: The need for an appraisal based on cultural pluralism', in M. Bowen (ed.), *Australia 2000: The Ethnic Impact*, University of New England Publishing Unit, Armidale, NSW.

Jayasuriya, D. L. (1983), 'The facts, policies and rhetoric of multiculturalism', *Australian Society* 2(6), 23–7.

Jeffcoate, R. (1979), *Positive Image: Towards a Multiracial Curriculum*, Chameleon Books, London.

Jupp, J. (1966), *Arrivals and Departures*, Cheshire-Lansdowne, Melbourne.

Jupp, J. (ed.) (1984), *Ethnic Politics in Australia*, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney.

Kaldor Report, see Australian Ethnic Affairs Council (1981).

Karmel Report, see Interim Committee for the Australian Schools Commission (1973).

Kovacs, M. L., & Cropley, A. J. (1975), *Immigrants and Society: Alienation and Assimilation*, McGraw-Hill, Sydney.

Kringas, P., & Lewins, F. (1981), *Why Ethnic Schools? Selected Case Studies*, ANU Press, Canberra.

Kunz, E. F. (1971), 'Some basic determinants of post-war naturalization in Australia', *Australia and New Zealand Journal of Sociology* 7(2), 38–57.

Lewins, F. (1980), 'The Galbally Report: A theoretician's framework', *Babel* 16(1), 18–24.

Lingard, R. (1982), 'Multicultural education in Queensland: The assimilation of an ideal', in R. Young, M. Pusey & R. Bates (eds), *Australian Educational Policy: Issues and Critique*, Deakin University, Vic.

Lippman, L. (1977), *The Aim is Understanding: Educational Techniques for a Multicultural Society*, ANZ Book Co., Sydney.

McConnochie, K. R., & Kapferer, J. (1981), 'Consensus, conflict and multicultural education', in J. Sherwood (ed.), *Multicultural Education: Issues and Innovation*, Creative Research, Perth.

Martin, J. I. (1972a), *Migrants: Equality and Ideology* (Meredith Memorial Lectures), La Trobe University, Bundoora, Vic.

Martin J. I. (1972b), *Community and Identity: Refugee Groups in Adelaide*, ANU Press, Canberrra.

Martin, J. I. (1976), 'The education of migrant children in Australia', in C. A. Price & J. I. Martin (eds), *Australian Immigration: A Bibliography and Digest*, Number 3, Part 2, Department of Demography, ANU, Canberra.

Martin, J. I. (1978), *The Migrant Presence*, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney.

Martin, J. I. (1981), *The Ethnic Dimension*, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney.

Marx, K. (1918), *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1 *The Process of Capitalist Production*, tr. S. Moore & E. Aveling, ed. F. Engels, Charles H. Kerr, Chicago.

Matthews, P. W. (1979), 'Multiculturalism and multicultural education: Towards an Australian orientation to the curriculum', no. 367, *CHOMI Reprints*, Melbourne.

Meade, P., & Martin, J. I. (1979), *The Educational Experience of Sydney High School Students: A Comparative Study of Migrant Studies of Non-English Speaking Origin and Students whose Parents were Born in an English Speaking Country*, Report No. 1, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Mullard, C. (1982), 'Multiracial education in Britain: From assimilation to cultural pluralism', in J. Tierney, *Race, Migration and Schooling*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, London.

O'Connor, J. (1973), *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*, St. Martin's Press, New York.

O'Connor, J. (1981), 'Accumulation crisis: the problem and its setting', *Contemporary Crises* 5, 109–25.

Porter, J. (1975), 'Pluralism in Canadian perspective', in N. Glazer & D. P. Moynihan (eds), *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Price, C. A. (1983), 'Multicultural Australia: Demographic background', in B. Falk & J. Harris (eds), *Unity in Diversity: Multicultural Education in Australia*, Australian College of Education, Melbourne, 6–25.

Prunty, J. J. (1984), *A Critical Reformulation of Educational Policy Analysis* (ESA842 Policy Development and Analysis), Deakin University, Vic.

Review of Post-arrival Programs and Services for Migrants (1978), *Migrant Services and Programs*, vol. 1, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (Galbally Report).

Sherwood, J. (1984), 'Multiculturalism: Including or excluding Aborigines', in D. J. Phillips & J. Houston (eds), *Australian Multicultural Society*, Drummond, Melbourne.

Smith, R. A. (1985), *The Inequality Debate: An Interpretive Essay* (ESA842 Policy Development and Analysis), Deakin University, Vic.

Smolicz, J. J. (1981), 'Cultural pluralism and educational policy: In search of stable multiculturalism', *Australian Journal of Education* 25(2), 121–45.

Spears, A. K. (1978), 'Institutionalized racism and the education of blacks', *Anthropology and Education Quarterly* 9(2), 219–39.

Watkins, P. E. (1984), *Youth, Schooling, and Work: Policy and Transition* (ESA842 Policy Development and Analysis), Deakin University, Vic.

Wilkinson, P. et al. (eds) (1981), *Education for a Multicultural Society: A Kit for Educators*, Clearing House on Migration Issues, Melbourne.

Wood, G.H. (1984), 'Schooling in a democracy: Transformation or reproduction?', *Educational Theory* 34(3), 219-39. (Reprinted in this volume as Reading 4.)

Yarwood, A.T., & Knowling, M.J. (1982), *Race Relations in Australia: A History*, Methuen, Sydney.

Zubrzycki, J. (1983), 'Multiculturalism—An unstoppable tide', *Age*, 26 January, p. 13.

Zubrzycki Report, see Australian Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs (1982).

Readings



1

State and ethnicity: Multiculturalism as ideology

A. Jakubowicz

'Multiculturalism' has emerged rapidly in Australian political and cultural debate over the past decade, yet little attention has been focused on the location of the term in dynamic analysis of ideology in Australian society. Indeed, except for critical reviews and 'think pieces' by committed academics such as Jeannie Martin (1979) or Chipman (1978), most academic debate has dealt with the concept within variations of the sociology of knowledge tradition (Lewins, 1979 and Jean Martin, 1978).

It is not difficult to trace the first appearance of 'Multiculturalism' in Australian public life through the work of Grassby, nor to follow the distinction made by Lewins of normative versus descriptive usages of the term. Yet the debate is clouded by the nature of the word's use as a key element in a moral crusade, to the point where it now almost ceases to have anything more than emotive content (see Price with Pyne, 1977: 350).

'Multiculturalism' is located in the progression ascribed by Gordon (1964), from Anglo-conformity, to 'melting-pot' to cultural pluralism. Gordon argued strongly in support of cultural pluralism as a means of preventing what he described as structural pluralism. The concept of culture implicit in this was one of a collection of language and ethnic-origin based behaviours which did not require autonomous or conflicting 'social structures'. That is, cultural pluralism as public policy was seen as a means of preventing the hegemonic control by any one ethnic group of the political and economic life of a society, thus triggering autonomous and break-away moves in these areas by subordinate ethnic groups. Such 'breaks' would create, it was feared, a disintegration of overall social relations and a fragmentation of allegiances to 'society as a whole'. Such fears were a reflection of the activities of Black, Spanish-American and White

Ethnic 'blacklash' groups, which disrupted mainstream American life in the mid and late 1960s. These activities were interpreted as political expressions of *cultural* oppression, by many American sociologists (Gordon, 1964; Newman, 1973; Glazer and Moynihan, 1970). Little, if any attempt was made to locate these social movements in a politico-economic context except in so far as they were seen as protests against conditions of poverty in an affluent society. Action by the American state in its War on Poverty (Higgins, 1978), was essentially politically reintegrative in focus, seeking to cool out 'hot spots' by the organisational co-option of the less radical leaders (in the case of Black and Spanish groups) or the withdrawal from confrontational politics (The Boston Bussing Conflict).

Part of the ideological response to such conflicts contained components of cultural analysis (as evidenced by the lingering influence of Lewis' culture of poverty thesis (Lewis, 1961). Culture was interpreted in rather traditional anthropological terms, or through the frameworks offered by middle range theory, heavily influenced by functionalist explanations. Functionalism as used in this context constrained 'culture' to a reactive group formulation of values to societal pressures. Culture was the ideational/symbolic means of interpreting the individual's social position so as to allow survival. Urban ethnography, symbolic interactionism and the Schutzian tradition in the sociology of knowledge provided the intellectual tools to manage and explain social conflict in which ethnicity was perceived as a major causal element.

The relationship between ethnicity and social class in both theoretical and empirical analyses requires careful explication. At the very least, the rejection of the idealised notion of culture rooted in the 'ethnicity' model requires a carefully theorised presentation of what the relationships are for which 'culture' is proposed as an appropriate label. While not wishing to enter the culture/ideology debate in detail, it is necessary to posit three premises upon which the present argument will be based. 'Culture' refers first, to a premise that consciousness is a distinctive and distinguishable process, that is, that the individuals are subjects of their own actions. Secondly, consciousness expresses social relations between individuals and between groups and classes as they are experienced and formulated by participants. Thirdly, a theorised specific history is necessary to understand consciousness at any moment (Johnson, 1979: 60). 'Culture', prescribed as 'ethnicity', accepts at most the first two of these premises, and tends to halt at a group or socio-economic status group formulation of the structure of social relations (Marjoribanks, 1980: 11; Gordon, 1978: 136). Thus in most cases a theoretical primacy is accorded to 'ethnicity', however ill-defined the term may be, and however idealised and ahistorical is the referent.

In the Australian context, the relationship between the concepts of class and ethnicity have rarely been formulated. Indeed, almost no Australian research is rooted in any type of class problematic and ethnicity is taken as 'given' (Price with Pyne, 1977: 349-50). Rather, 'ethnicity' took on a first cause role, so that it required little other than cultural history as explanation of its form and concept (Hraba, 1979: passim).

This problematic bled over into the Australian context, carried through the work of intellectuals such as Price, Zubrycki and Martin, and articulated more forcefully in the public arena by Grassby. This is not the place to analyse the volte-face in Labor's immigrant settlement policy from the early days of Arthur Calwell. Suffice it to note that migrants were grouped with aborigines, women and other culturally oppressed and structurally disadvantaged groups in Labor's 1972 election manifesto. The settlement experience of immigrants was thus thrown for the first time into the national arena as an election issue.

Jean Martin has documented the changing position of migrants in the social consciousness of government in her work *The Migrant Presence*. It traces the move from Anglo-conformity (assimiliationism) to a version of melting pot (integrationism), to the definition of 'the migrant problem' as a distinct set of experiences to be 'solved' by government. As early as 1971 Martin had demanded the recognition of Australia as a culturally pluralist society in her address to the A.I.P.S. conference (Martin, 1971). Yet the demand for recognition of diversity has in part been met by what Chipman has referred to as the 'Multicultural Myth' (Chipman, 1978), or assertions about Australia, which he claims 'is not a multicultural society and is unlikely to become one'. He does, however, see multiculturalism as a political and ideological term, albeit of 'the radical left' (1978: 53).

The relationship between political change and ideology is contentious. That there is some relationship, is obvious. What it is, and how it works in practice, is far less so. It is clear that political struggle is not simply about value conflict, though the essence of orthodox multiculturalism is exactly that. Values have a location in cultural relations, which themselves require an analysis of the historic specificity of the complex class relations which are contemporary capitalist society in Australia. Thompson's attempt to develop a clearer understanding of this general relationship, in his debate with Kolakowski, throws an important shaft of illumination on an area often avoided or obfuscated. Commenting on how political organisms relate to ideology, Thompson rejects the notion of social forces as imperfect 'vehicles' for values. Rather,

> Political organisms select from the available stock of ideas [below is suggested how the stock of ideas on multiculturalism has emerged] those which best serve their interests and justify (or mystify) their functions, and hence reduce ideas *to* ideology; and they often do this very perfectly. Social forces do not 'happen' to be the 'vehicle' for ideology and values; they shape ideas *into* ideology, they are idea-selective and value-selective. The ideology and the social forces are sometimes coincident in strength; sometimes forces select for themselves an inadequate ideology, and sometimes . . . an ideology proves stronger than the social forces which were its matrix and outlives it. . . . While such ideological consciousness certainly falsifies universals and mystifies rationality, it can be a very forcible and 'true' consciousness of the particular interests who espouse it, a necessary mask, a necessary set of concept for their own systematized exploitation of other groups, and a powerful source of self-delusion and rhetoric, which is in its own right, a potent social force (Thompson, 1978: 177-179).

An understanding of 'multiculturalism' and of the politics of ethnicity in Australia demands a very clear analysis of the role of the state in contemporary Australian capitalist society and its participation in the reproduction of social relations and ideology.

The debate on the State is a complex and detailed interchange, and in recent years a great deal of material has emerged which seeks to define the parameters within which state/class relations occur. Erik Olin Wright in his analysis and discussion, *Class, Crisis, and the State*, has developed a detailed examination of modes of determination, that is, the manner in which economic relations relate to state action and affect the operations of various state apparatuses. In a discussion of multiculturalism, the focus of which has been attempts by various social forces to affect state action, in education, health, welfare, 'culture', and social policy, the relationship between ethnicity and social class operates as a basic matrix against which the relations of social classes as mediated through/transformed by the state can be explored.

The following analysis uses Wright's typology, and is further instructed by analyses developed by Gough (1979) and Bolger, Corrigan, Docking and Frost (1981).

Wright (1978) has proposed six modes of determination which, he argues, act as 'distinct relationships of determination among the structural categories . . . and between those categories and the appearances of empirical investigation'. These modes he has labelled:

(1) Structural limitation—economic structures set limits on the possible forms of political and ideological structures, but do not necessitate particular forms.

(2) Selection—a second order limiting, within limits in specific historical conjunctures.

(3) Reproduction/non-reproduction—a process which prevents the reproduced structure from changing 'in certain fundamental ways', which would threaten the basis of the reproducing structure.

(4) Limits of functional compatability—the limit to which state structures can retain their traditional form when faced by the development of fundamentally contradictory economic forms.

(5) Transformation—a dialectical process of development in which forms structurally change, e.g. from feudalism to capitalism.

(6) Mediation—a mediating variable fundamentally alters the relationship between other interacting variables (Wright, 1978: 15-26).

The most useful mode for the purpose of this analysis is that of mediation. It is posited that ethnicity as ideology mediates Australian class relations, by reifying the history of peoples into a static category of theoretical labelling, which is then used in the way Thompson has previously suggested. While the argument hereunder affirms the importance of cultural histories to an understanding of individual/group experience, these histories are invalidated and rendered undialectical by the imposition on them of the category of ethnicity. It is the invalidation of the class history of ethnic Australians and the reconstruction of their experience and histories in their countries of origin and in Australia as totally cultural (that is, specifically non-political, non-class based and in that sense ahistorical) that is the effective outcome of multiculturalism as ideology. The state in Australia has engaged in such a task, be it under the terminology of assimilation, integration or multiculturalism. Fundamentally these 'policies' represent successive stages of reconstructing Australian class relations to maintain hegemony and class domination, though each stage has its specific historic dimension that frames a particular ideological package as the appropriate formulation at a particular time.

The state forms in Australia have, of course, their own particular and peculiar histories. The political and legal distinctions between Federal and State actions, the changing power relationships between these separate institutional loci, and the contest for ideological supremacy amongst state forms are ample evidence of this. Yet these divisions are overlaid by a more important compatability or coalescence of interest, that is the maintenance and reproduction of Anglo-Celtic bourgeois hegemony.

Again, this is not the place to trace the development and formation of the bourgeoisie, nor the role of racism and xenophobia in Australian working class history. The genocide of the Australian Aborigines, the political and economic subjugation of Kanaka and Chinese workers, and the historic outbreaks of anti-Mediterranean xenophobia, are all well documented. These acts *need* to be seen as part of a two centuries-old process, by which the emergence of an Australian 'culture' was indissolubly linked with the preservation of Anglo values, and later the co-option and incorporation of Celtic components. (Viz: the Catholic education system as a final trade-off for loyalty to a political system rooted in Westminster, or the essentially conservative influence of Irish Catholicism as a political tradition in the Australian Labor Party.)

We have now the main historical and social components of the politics of ethnicity—(as distinct from ethnic politics). That is, historically Australian class relations have been included in a set of conflicts over race, religion and ethnicity. The analysis of the politics of ethnicity therefore includes a discussion of the class relations experienced by non-Anglo Australians, and a critique of the response by the organs of the state to their perception/reconstruction of these relations.

The massive demographic and social impact of millions of post-war immigrants, whose 'assimilation' into Australian society became demonstrably problematic by the late 1960s, led to the creation of the assimilationist perspective (which has, of course, had its critics, though these have argued essentially on moral or political grounds). 'Assimilationism' was wrong in the views of such critics, because it denied the right of human beings to retain their own cultural forms, and ignored the very real barriers to entry and discrimination that existed for non-English speaking migrants. While these were potent imperatives, they alone were not successful in ending 'assimilationism'. Assimilationism was eroded, not because it was morally wrong, but because it did not 'work'. That is, the assimilationist doctrine failed to achieve the goals it was intended to implement, those of cultural, normative and economic integration of immigrants into a unitary Australian society. Despite the assertions of the 1960 Dovey report, that migrant children were assimilating, the studies carried out in the late 1960s and the political pressure for the national Child Migrant Education Programme indicated that hundreds of thousands of Australian-born children were entering school unable to converse adequately in English. While assimilationists would confidently, if callously, assert in the 1950s and 1960s that even if the first generation was lost, their children would be Australian, by the end of that latter decade this was demonstrably untrue.

This realisation exposed a crisis of legitimation for the Federal Government. If equality would not automatically flow to Australian-born children of non-English speaking immigrants, then their commitment to the system that had offered a refuge to their parents might be threatened. Constant recitation of 'I love a sunburnt country' was no replacement for the dim futures facing tens of thousands of children classed as slow learners because of their ethnic background and language skills. The limitations of the C.M.E.P. were further illustrated by the surge of academic studies of poverty and disadvantage that the extended Henderson Inquiry was to sponsor in the mid 1970s. The work of Cox and Martin (1975), of Sackville (1976), Jakubowicz and Buckley (1974), of Fitzgerald (1976) and Henderson himself (1975), demonstrated that to be a migrant of non-English speaking background was enough to significantly increase one's chances of being poor. This economic disadvantage was further exacerbated by cultural, linguistic, and socio-legal barriers to participation in Australian society. The 'migrant problem' as Jean Martin so vividly described it, had emerged as a distinct issue requiring responses by both the Australian Government and the States.

Grassby's period as Immigration Minister heightened both the awareness of the 'problems of migrants' and 'the migrant problem'[1] and provided the basis of the 'unity-in-diversity' theme that was to dominate the ideological debate for the next decade. Essentially Grassby was espousing a liberationist philosophy, demanding recognition of the contribution of migrants to the Australian mainstream, and asserting their 'Australianess' had equal validity. Grassby was attempting to confront the dominance, if not hegemony, of the Anglo-Celtic cultural tradition. His programme for a 'Family of the Nation', while eschewing any class analysis, sought to construct an integrated Australian 'culture' based partly on pluralist survival and expansion of separate cultures. While failing to identify the experience of migrants in Australia as part of the new Australian 'culture', he did argue that every migrant culture had value, so that Australia would become or was already in the process of becoming a multicultural society around a shared core of basic democratic norms and values that were specifically Australian. But Grassby did not and could not define this core in other than normative terms, and drew back from a class analysis of Australian society. Harmony and unity became the lynch-pin of an Australian working-class party.

It was left to academics on the Left such as Collins (1975, 1976), and de Lepervanche (1975) to raise more serious questions about the position of immigrants in Australia. These intellectual critiques were paralleled by the spurt of migrant workers' conferences. For working class migrant activists, their role in the Australian working class became a critical issue. As they quite correctly asserted, migrants formed a large part of the Australian working class, yet there was organisational resistance to their participation and ignorance of their needs amongst Anglo-Celtic dominated working class groups such as the trade unions. The Broadmeadows strike of Ford workers in 1973 was a classic indication of this contradiction. This was the uncontrollable and unforseen consequence of 25 years of assimilationist practice in the industrial sphere, and it sharpened the recognition amongst conservative politicians of the volatility of migrant workers.

Georgiou, later to be a confidant of Prime Minister Fraser and later still to be the first Director of the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs, noted in a study of Greek factory workers in Melbourne (Georgiou, 1973) that migrant workers had an instrumental rather than political view of trade unions. His comments were limited to the emergent labour aristocracy, skilled workers, foremen and supervisors with many years residence in Australia and a stake in the system.

This ethnic labour aristocracy and the ethnic petty bourgeoisie were to play a critical role as the 'ethnic communities' in the co-option of multiculturalism into the service of the state. The liberationist philosophy of the early 1970s began to be sanitised and incorporated into the mechanisms of ideological hegemony and legitimation. 'Ethnicity' as a social construct was linked to 'multiculturalism', partly as a means of asserting geographic derivation over social class as the most meaningful category of social analysis.

Grassby's defeat in 1974 allowed the Labor Party to move away from the 'ethnic' dimension. Cameron, as the Minister for Labour and Immigration, argued that the migration programme was essentially about manpower planning, and that all Australian Government instrumentalities should be able to handle demands from immigrant residents. Thus Labor began to require mainstream institutions to adapt to the reality of a multi-lingual and multicultural society. However, in its haste to assert rationality, Labor tended to alienate part of the ethnic petty bourgeoisie.

This group had gradually moved up in socioeconomic status, relocating residentially in the classic, swinging mid-urban electorates, and becoming an increasing proportion of the key voting population. Grassby had raised the expectations of these groups in particular, by recognising their ethnicity not as a ghetto-linked stigma, but as a force for national change. With his political demise, and the dissolution of the Immigration Department as 'their' instrument for articulation, these key groups were effectively isolated once more, except for the use of the Australian Assistance Plan and radio 3ZZ in Melbourne. For there were very real barriers to their full participation; if the assimilationist ethic had been excised from public government policy, it was still a very real social force. It was during the period immediately following Grassby's departure that MacKellar and other Liberal politicians began to make a strong play for 'the ethnic leadership'. The ethnic petty bourgeoisie were the people who most felt the cultural rejection of their class peers, for whom social status was most important (Wirth, 1928; Gordon, 1964; Glazer and Moynihan, 1970, 1975), and who most strongly demanded social recognition. They could find this recognition in their asserted ethnicity, in the 'thing' that made them different. Conservative politicians recognised this, and through Liberal Party Ethnic Councils and second generation activists such as Georgiou, a practice emerged of cultivating these 'leaders' and incorporating their concerns.

This had two major outcomes. First, it consciously denied the territory of ethnicity to migrant working class organisations and activists, who were at any rate, in two minds about their goals. Italian organisations such as F.I.L.E.F.,[2] for instance, argued that Italian workers in Australia owed a loyalty to the working class struggle in Italy and should return to engage in that struggle, but while in Australia, were part of the Australian working class, and had a part to play in its struggles as well.

Secondly, it provided a socially conservative group dependent on the favours of government for social status, who would be discomforted by having to criticise publicly government action. Thus critical statements about government action by organisations such as the Ethnic Communities Councils, would be met by Ministerial statements recognising that they were not the only voices of the ethnic communities.

The return of the Liberal Party to national power in 1975 provided an opportunity to develop the co-optionist strategies available in the catch-all of multiculturalism. The Department of Immigration was re-established with an extended brief to cover ethnic affairs. A special unit was established in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to develop policy priorities and vet the activities of the Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Department. This unit worked closely with Georgiou, and later with Galbally following his appointment by the Prime Minister as Chairman of the Post-Arrival and Settlement Services Inquiry. There rapidly developed an overall strategy linked to dual concerns, of reformism—confronting the entrenched Anglo-Celtic control of the cultural system—and social control—a consistent ideological assertion of the unity of Australian society. This was to be later articulated by the Australian Ethnic Affairs Council as 'social cohesion, equality of access and cultural identity' (A.E.A.C., 1977: 4).

MacKellar made himself personally available to 'ethnic leaders', and within the limits of Ministerial powers, exerted considerable personal influence on behalf of his 'clients'. This was less an attempt to bypass the Anglo-Celtic bureaucracy than a means of developing a politico-cultural form which would maintain the patron-client role between the Minister and the 'leaders' and maintain the power and influence of the latter group in their own communities.

This political style, to be institutionalised through the creation of Ethnic Affairs Units based in State capitals, allowed the political and bureaucratic leadership an ear on the ground, and militated against mass organisation forms in favour of elite ethnic communities structures.

It is evident that many of the policy initiatives taken by the Australian Government, such as the Galbally impetus grants, the Independent and Multicultural Broadcasting Corporation, the Institute for Multicultural Affairs and the revamped Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs contain contradictory elements. Multiculturalism emerged in part due to the failure of assimilationist and integrationist perspectives to maintain social cohesion and guarantee equality of opportunity, while sustaining overall Anglo-Celtic bourgeois hegemony. That is, in Wright's terms, there had been an increasing strain on the functional compatibility of these ideological forms and the structural and cultural reality of a 'polyethnic' social base. 'Migrantness' was emerging as a mediating variable in class relations in Australian society.

This mediation both threatened the traditional power of Australian cultural form, and provided an opportunity for the state to intervene in class relations. Such intervention might prevent the emergence of a more unified Australian working class, which would share class allegiances while internally recognising and responding to ethnic differences and needs (see Collins 1976). The implicit potential of multiculturalism to assert the priority of ethnicity over class, marked its transformation into a means of social control.[3] At the same time it does, of course, threaten Anglo-Celtic cultural superiority, but an adaption to that threat does not necessitate any lessening of bourgeois hegemony. Rather, it allows for the realignment of the bounds of that hegemony, by allowing new avenues for access. It may also cause occasional discomfort to those on the receiving end of it, but it also creates a third ring for the three ring circus of Australian political life. This third ring provides an arena cut off from the mainstream Anglo-phones, where ethnic politics can be carried on.

The major spring for the multicultural strategy is necessarily to be found in the Galbally Report. Its presentation by the Prime Minister (rather than the Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Minister) in a number of languages, and its overarching impact on policy and programmes in many Federal Departments, for which it has become like Holy Writ,[4] has created a new industry. This 'ethnic affairs' industry is to some extent, reminiscent of the Poverty Industry of the 1960s in the U.S.A. and the U.K., or the race relations industry (Higgins, 1978; Bourne, 1980).

Yet the recognition of the political potential of 'ethnics' was not only found amongst formally conservative politicians. The return of the Labor Party to government in N.S.W. in 1976 also provided the stimulus for a State programme on ethnic affairs. While the Federal government had extended its responsibility for migrants to five years after first settlement (through the Australian Legal Aid Office) and through the Galbally Report to a much longer time perspective,[5] the State government had until 1976 fairly much restricted its operations to facilitating the recruitment of migrants to particular localities and state based employers. There had been Health Commission initiatives but these were of limited impact.

The establishment of an Ethnic Affairs Branch in the Premier's Department and the later creation of the Ethnic Affairs Commission, indicated the importance of the ethnic issue as perceived by the Premier. Wran, like Fraser, took a personal interest in a field that only a decade before had had no State presence, and a low ranking in the Federal hierarchy.

How then was the experience of migrants perceived by these two major pieces of public policy investigation? How did the difference between political parties manifest itself, albeit within the confines of different Federal constitutional prerogatives?

The Galbally Committee of Review of Post-Arrival Programmes and Services for Migrants was established in September 1977, to examine the effectiveness and degree of overlap of Commonwealth or Commonwealth funded responses to the changing needs of migrants. The Review *Report* of April 1978, noted that a critical point had been reached, and that it was 'necessary' for the Government to change the direction of its programmes and services. The principles on which the Review reported included:

(1) equal opportunity and equal access;

(2) the right to maintain culture;

(3) the needs of migrants should be met by mainstream services, but special provision 'at present' to ensure (1) above;

(4) full consultation with clients, and self-help as priority.

The greatest difficulties, according to the *Report*, related to lack of English language skills, which were demonstrated in isolation and employment, and were most strongly experienced amongst those not effectively reached by existing programmes.

It is therefore important to note the Report's coverage of employment related issues. Its proposals are predicated on assumptions about Australian society which are unquestioned. Essentially, the Report assumes that Australia is a democratic and egalitarian society in which non-English speaking migrants are disadvantaged. The 'problem' therefore is to develop means of removing this disadvantage, thus ensuring migrant workers have effective recognition of their skills, equal access to the job market, industrial health and safety materials and appropriate child care. Yet the research by Collins, for instance, indicates quite clearly (Collins, 1975) that non-English speaking working class migrants are concentrated specifically in those areas which are most at risk in the current economic reconstruction. Thus statements such as 'we believe the main causes of unemployment amongst migrants are the same as for Australian-born workers' (Galbally, 1978: 91) are open to serious question. The role of migrants in the unskilled, labour intensive sectors of Australian industry has been critical. Migrant women, in particular, are heavily over-represented in these sectors, and these sectors are exactly those with the most insecure futures (e.g. textiles, white goods, electronics assembly). The Report places the emphasis for solving the employment problems of migrants as defined, on better multi-lingual communication, on-the-job English classes, and special retraining programmes. It also insisted on trade union involvement in informing migrants (particularly women) of their rights as workers.

In general, the Galbally Report and the programmes which flowed from it, indicate a number of key political perspectives—

(1) a rolling programme to concentrate the control of 'multicultural Australia' into a triad of closely linked and politically directed institutions—the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, the Independent and Multicultural Broadcasting Corporation and the Institute for Multicultural Affairs;

(2) the maintenance of low level funding of client organisations and the reinforcement of the client-patron relationship between politically acceptable ethnic organisations and the state;

(3) an emphasis on self-help (that is, the voluntary subsidy of state welfare responsibilities);

(4) the continuing definition of English language as a major 'problem';

(5) the assertion of the acceptability of all 'ethnic cultures', even if such cultures might contain elements which are anti-democratic and oppressive (e.g. of women);

(6) the emerging and de-facto establishment of boundaries to the legitimacy of cultural behaviours (e.g. the overt exclusion of homeland-focused political activity by groups as being an acceptable element of their 'culture').

Such moves, and the manner of their implementation, are an indication of a reassessment by the state of the opportunities for intervention during a period of heightened class conflict. They reflect the consideration of the potential of 'multiculturalism' as a widely acceptable ideological label within which specific activities of social control and the maintenance of 'social cohesion' are possible. In the sphere of Federal state action, multiculturalism no longer contains a major liberationist perspective. There is a very real sense in which state structures in the field of ethnic affairs, both politically and organisationally, such as the Ministry of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs have almost by default developed an opportunistic response to the changing base of social relations. Such a response may reflect an awareness by key agents of the state of its role in maintaining those conditions of social reproduction which benefit the bourgeoisie, and minimise the transformational potential of class analysis and class struggle.

An analysis in these terms provides the basis for an examination of the first product of the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs, *Review of Multicultural and Migrant Education*. This Review, released just prior to the 1980 Federal elections, identified multiculturalism as a bipartisan state policy 'responding to the needs and aspirations of ethnic groups'. The Review suggests multiculturalism in education contains three strands—English language learning, community languages, and studies of ethnic and cultural diversity in Australia. It is therefore more correctly a review of cultural issues in migrant education, eschewing broader definitions of even this ideologically constrained term such as those of Ford and Ford (1979).

While there is little to question within the Review's covers, it demonstrates the use of the explanatory category 'ethnicity' as the major element in responding to the needs and aspirations of ethnic groups. Admittedly, if these 'groups' (a strange social category), are defined by government in terms of their ethnicity, then a response in these terms is scarcely surprising. Yet even on its own terms, the Review fails to comment on the migrant education projects stimulated by the Disadvantaged Schools Programme, nor on other programmes in schools which affect the educational future of migrant children. Essentially, the Review reinforces the politically acceptable dichotomy between economic disadvantage, in which some migrants may share, and cultural discrimination which is ethnically specific and independent of class divisions within 'ethnic groups'. This is not to argue that cultural discrimination is not an issue affecting ethnic minorities of all class backgrounds, but rather to indicate the way in which cultural issues are given priority in order to avoid and diffuse class-based issues.

Did the N.S.W. State Government, under a Labor administration, define the issues differently and pursue programmes based on a different problematic?

The N.S.W. Government established the Ethnic Affairs Commission in 1976, and at the same time, vested an Ethnic Affairs Division in the Premier's Department. By June 1978, the E.A.C.'s major report, *Participation*, was presented to the Premier. It was much longer and more detailed than the Galbally Report, understandably so, given the effective absence of previous action by the State government. *Participation* sponsored a series of short research projects, particularly into unemployment, workers' compensation and health and welfare services.

The major principle for the Report was contained in its title: 'the fundamental issue (is) that right of minority groups to achieve total participation in the Australian and New South Wales political and social systems . . . to find solutions to their problems'. It, too, asserts that culture as defined in the report 'excludes value judgments' about the legitimacy of particular cultures in the Australian context. (In 1980, the Commission Chairman did note that such a position created dilemmas—'the consistency between Government aims and policies in one area of Government intervention—say in the field of removal of sexism, and in other areas—such as allowing communities and individuals to retain their allegiances, beliefs and behavioural norms' (Totaro, 1980: 103).

A brief outline of the Commission's identification of employment-related issues provides an opportunity to compare the Federal and State perspectives. 'The biggest single challenge ahead of our society is to ensure that unemployment does not become endemic . . .' (E.A.C., 1978: 2), the Report notes in its introduction. The Report then focuses a major part of the 'Immigrant in the Workplace' on 'blue collar' immigrants in certain industries and sectors, particularly manufacturing and construction. (For instance, some two-thirds of Yugoslavs are in these industries.) Discussing technological change, the Report points out that over the past decade, 'there has been a significant decrease in the number of new jobs being created. This has tended to occur in industries which have traditionally employed immigrant labour' (E.A.C., 1978: 163).

While the E.A.C. analysis differs from the Galbally commentary, the recommended solutions essentially conform to the Federal perception. Thus, programme recommendations include retraining schemes, English language training, recognition of overseas qualifications, and only differ from Galbally by proposing studies of potentially redundant occupations, and the development of small work co-operatives.

We are presented then with two 'problematics' as defined by the state structures, at the State and Federal levels, in a critical area related to production. The intentions proposed, while formally based on divergent analyses, in practice coalesce. Such coalescence suggests that the limitations on state action, be it at the national or regional level, are affected by conditions other than those implicit in the content of the 'issues' themselves. The role of the state in the system-wide conditions for the maintenance of the relations of production constrain any state action in this field. It is significant that the more conservative nature of Federal policies provides a more diffuse basic analysis, but a tougher and more sophisticated ideological programme of legitimation. Against this, the regional analysis of the N.S.W. state is more 'realistic', yet the programme proposals and the ideological 'dilemmas' to which such analyses lead are more problematic for the state.

Indeed, the limited budget of the E.A.C. is an indication of its comparative failure to become central in the legitimation processes of the N.S.W. state's operations, compared with the growing power of the multicultural triarchy at the Federal level.

The Ethnic Affairs Commission has adopted a gradualist and reformist strategy, gingerly testing the perceived limits of acceptable change. It has accommodated itself to the labyrinthine machinations of the N.S.W. Public Service, withdrawing from conflict or confrontation. Indeed in the field of *cultural* discrimination and disadvantage, the Anti-Discrimination Board has a far sharper profile, its more aggressive stance delivering results far beyond those of the Commission. In a sense, by its concentration on the cultural manifestations[6] rather than structural and class bases of ethnic minority oppression, the Commission has guaranteed its peripheral status in the state apparatus.

The growing demand for equality and respect by immigrant communities over the past fifteen years was crystallised in the early 1970s as 'ethnic rights'. Initially the term contained significant elements of class analysis and cross-cultural class demands. The imposition of multiculturalism over the demand for ethnic rights, was in part constructed by intellectuals who rejected a class analysis, and replaced it with concerns for cultural pluralism. This emphasis on pluralism had forbears in the U.S.A. and the U.K. cultural responses to black and immigrant working class action, mediated through liberal ethnic intellectuals and the petty bourgeoisie of minority groups.

In the Australian context, state action began at the Federal level in support for the cultural liberation of ethnic minorities. Over time such concerns were submerged in politically astute analyses of the changing base of Australian political life, and in a period of heightened class struggle and economic restructuring, the opportunity to use ethnicity to mediate and diffuse class conflict.

Although political parties might espouse different definitions of the 'problem', while sharing a general centre ground, state action is constrained by its systemic role irrespective of the political party in control. The state is structurally limited in the ways it can intervene, though the selection of strategies can, in part, be affected by political philosophy. However, there are fundamental constraints which reflect the role of the state generically in the maintenance of the relations of production and the reproduction of social relations. In part, state action is geared to preventing other than a marginal transformation of social relations, while utilising the potential of ethnicity to mediate class conflict and legitimise bourgeois hegemony.

The implications of this analysis are significant at a number of levels. For empirical research, it requires the testing of hypotheses that use a Marxian class theory as part of the matrix within which much research occurs. It requires a re-working of the research enterprise as one in co-operation with the subjects of research, aimed towards enhancing their potential for action on their own behalf. It requires a systematic examination of Australian working-class organisations to identify those processes which exclude participation by the ethnic working class.

'Ethnicity' has become a major locus of class struggle, an avenue used by the dominant forces in Australia to both fragment the working class and reinforce the ranks of conservatism and class domination. Multiculturalism has become an ideology that maintains directions within the working class, either consciously or not. Culture should be understood as a process of creating, improving and recreating meanings in a dynamic social framework, in which the relationship to the means of production is the most basic matrix. The realisation of the early potential of multiculturalism as a liberating process can only occur when it is integrated into a struggle for cultural liberation of all working class Australians, whatever their 'ethnic' background or international histories, and with recognition of this cultural diversity.[7]

FOOTNOTES

1. 'The problems of migrants' are the problems experienced by immigrants in their contact with the Australian socio-political and economic systems. 'The migrant problem' is that problem posed for Australian institutions from the existence of a large non-English speaking and heavily working-class population.
2. Federazione Italiana Lavoratori Emigrati e Famiglie.
3. The realisation of this potential can be found in a number of discussions, the most startling example of which is the A.I.M.A. Review of Migrant and Multicultural Education, discussed below.
4. Thus almost every Federal Department now has a Galbally team, operating under the appropriate recommendation number, e.g.: Adult Migrant Education—Galbally 10.
5. In terms of direct special services, 'migrant' status is now limited to 6 months after arrival in Australia, following the changes to the Health Benefit System announced by MacKellar, as Federal Health Minister, in May 1981.
6. This is most evident in the chaos associated with the essentially directionless activities of the Commission's Grants' Committee, and the membership of the Commission itself reflects many of the most conservative interests in the ethnic communities.
7. A more detailed development of this argument can be found in: A. Jakubowicz, 'Equality and the Objective'. In B. O'Meagher (ed.), *The Socialist Objective: Labor and Socialism*. Hale and Iremonger, forthcoming (1981).

REFERENCES

Australian Ethnic Affairs Council
1977 *Australia as a Multicultural Society*. Canberra: A.G.P.S.
Bolger, S., P. Corrigan, J. Docking and N. Frost
1981 *Towards Socialist Welfare Work*. London: Macmillan.
Bourne, J.
1980 'Cheerleaders and Ombudsmen: the Sociology of race relations in Britain'. *Race and Class*, XXI (Spring): 4.

Chipman, L.
1978 'Multicultural Myth'. *Quadrant*, 22 3, (March): 50-55.
Collins, J.
1975 'The Political Economy of Post-War Immigration'. In E. Wheelwright and K. Buckley (eds), *Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism*, Vol. 1. Sydney: A.N.Z. Book Co.
1976 'Migrants: The Political Void'. In H. Mayer and H. Nelson (eds), *Australian Politics, a Fourth Reader*. Melbourne: Cheshire.
Cox D. and J. Martin
1975 *Welfare of Migrants*. Canberra: A.G.P.S.
de Lepervanche, M.
1978 'Australian Immigrants, 1788-1940: Desired and Unwanted'. In E. Wheelwright and K. Buckley (eds), *Essays in The Political Economy of Australian Capitalism*, Vol. 1. Sydney: A.N.Z. Book Co.
Ethnic Affairs Commission
1978 *Participation: Report to the Premier*. Sydney: Ethnic Affairs Commission.
Fitzgerald, R.
1976 *Poverty and Education in Australia*. Canberra: A.G.P.S.
Ford, J. and G. Ford
1979 'Poly-ethnic, multicultural education'. *Research Studies on Education for a Multicultural Society*, Curriculum Occasional Papers, No. 80/4. Canberra: Curriculum Development Centre.
Galbally, R. (Chair)
1978 *Migrant Services and Programmes: Report of the Review of Post-Arrival Programmes and Services for Migrants*. Canberra: A.G.P.S.
Georgiou, P.
1973 'Migrants, Unionism and Society'. *A.N.Z. Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 9: 32-51.
Glazer, N. and D. Moynihan
1970 *Beyond the Melting Pot* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.
Glazer, N. and D. Moynihan (eds)
1975 *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.
Gordon, M.
1964 *Assimilation in American Life*. N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
1978 *Human Nature, Class and Ethnicity*. N.Y.: O.U.P.
Gough, I.
1979 *The Political Economy of the Welfare State*. London: Macmillan.
Henderson, R.
1975 *Poverty in Australia: First Main Report*. Canberra: A.G.P.S.
Higgins, J.
1978 *The Poverty Business: Britain and America*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Hraba, J.
1979 *American Ethnicity*. Hasca: Peacock.
Jakubowicz, A. and B. Buckley
1975 *Migrants and the Legal System*. Canberra: A.G.P.S.
Johnson, R.
1979 'Histories of Culture/Theories of Ideology: Notes on an Impasse'. In M. Barrett *et al*. (eds), *Ideology and Cultural Production*. London: Croom Helm.
Lewins, F.
1979 'Multiculturalism and Ideology'. A.N.U. Mimeo.
Marjoribanks, K.
1980 *Ethnic Families and Children's Achievements*. Sydney: George Allen and Unwin.
Martin, Jean
1971 'Migration and Social Pluralism'. In J. Wilkes (ed.), *How Many Australians?: Immigration and Growth*. Proceedings of 37th Summer School, Australian Institute of Political Science. Sydney: Angus and Robertson.
1978 *The Migrant Presence*. Sydney: George Allen and Unwin.

Martin, Jeannie
1979 'The Transition from School to Work'. In A. Jakubowicz (ed.), *Multicultural Education and the Expectations of Immigrant Parents*. University of Wollongong.
Newman, W.
1973 *American Pluralism*. New York: Harper and Row.
Price, C. with P. Pyne
1977 'The Immigrants'. In A. Davies, S. Encel and M. Berry (eds), *Australian Society* (3rd ed). Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
Sackville, R.
1976 *Poverty and the Law*. Canberra: A.G.P.S.
Thompson, E.
1978 'An Open Letter to Lesley Kalakowski'. In E. P. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory*. London: Merlin.
Wirth, L.
1928 *The Ghetto*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wright, E. O.
1978 *Class, Crisis and The State*. London: New Left Books.

Source: A. Jakubowicz, 'State and ethnicity: Multiculturalism as ideology', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, vol. 17, no. 3, 1981, pp. 4–13. Reprinted in J. Jupp (ed.), *Ethnic Politics in Australia*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1984.

2

Racism in society and schools: History, policy, and practice

Chris Mullard

Racism is not only a permanent, structural, ideological, and political feature of British society, but it is also a permanent feature of our educational system in general and of our schools in particular. Despite the often quoted assertion from teachers that 'schools are colour-blind in a colour conscious world' or that 'race is not and *should* not become an issue in schools', the actual reality in schools is often quite different.[1] Such assertions alone, as Dhondy points out, tend to confirm rather than reject the complex manifestations of racism inside as well as outside the institution of the school.[2]

For simply:

> "To be professedly anti-racist and not to be influenced by the actions and interests of the population that faces the brunt of racism *is* racist."[3]

The purpose of this paper is then not only to show why racism is an institutionalised feature of *both* society and schools, but it is also to suggest why our racial history and, more recently, multicultural education policies and practices, are implicitly racist. In brief the two specific aims of this paper are to introduce an historical and essentially sociological framework for the understanding of racism in society and schools, and to evaluate critically within this framework the educational response to racism.

In the first part of the paper I shall attempt to define 'racism', and to sketch out the social history and institutional context and specificities of racism in relation to the development of modern capitalism. Within the parameters of a body of mostly sociological literature which views the school and the wider educational system as part of the social and institutional structure of modern Britain, I shall take up the theme that the school exists in and reflects in its ethos, structure, and culture, racist society.[4] Then locating the development of multicultural education within the framework established, I shall argue that multicultural education not only tends to be conceived within a dominant and racist tradition but, perhaps, even more importantly, that the assumptions on which it appears to be based tend, together with the way in which the specific (multicultural) pedagogical relationship is strongly framed, to legitimise such a tradition and possess the effect of containing black resistance.[5]

Defining Racism

One of the first things to emphasise about the concept of racism is that there exists as many definitions in the literature as there do specialists and experts in the field. But over the last two decades at least three distinctive schools or approaches towards the defining of racism have emerged.

Some sociologists like Banton reserve the term racism for the description of a specific doctrine or coherent set of beliefs and ideas which historically informed and governed the nature of social actions.[6] They appear to base their definition on two assertions to be found in the work of Knox, Gobineau, and Nott and Gliddon, all published between 1850 and 1854.[7] They are, firstly, that people's culture and psychological characteristics are genetically determined; and, secondly, that the genetic determinants are grouped in patterns that can be identified with human races in the old morphological sense that envisaged the existence of pure races.[8]

From this base Banton and the implicitly liberal school of race relations research he represents goes on to define racism:

> "As the doctrine that a man's behaviour is determined by stabie inherited characters deriving from separate racial stocks having distinctive attributes and usually considered to stand to one another in relations of superiority and inferiority."[9]

Whilst such a conceptualisation accentuates the ideational and psychological aspects of racism, it however tends to discount the role structural factors might play in the formation of racist ideology. It bolsters Ruth Benedict's well known definition that 'racism is the dogma that one ethnic group is condemned by nature to congenital inferiority and another group is destined to congenital superiority' without incorporating the very obvious notion of power and power relations that is integrally a part of her exposition of racism.[10] Further, Banton's definition makes it extremely difficult to define precisely the criterion of racialism and to distinguish this as Banton attempts to do, as•the practice of the doctrine, from either other political policies or other forms of racial expression and conceptualisation such as *ethnocentrism.*[11]

An indication of this difficulty and of the political and ideological problems associated with the way Banton and others characterise and define racism can be seen in the former's view on both the conceptual designation of Enoch Powell's speeches and, by implication, the socio-political phenomenon of *Powellism.*[12] Isolating three of Powell's speeches in particular and commenting on how some writers in the late 1960s had started to describe the changing manifestations of racism, Banton remarks:

> "Some commentators have spoken of the 'changing nature of racism', but this is justified only if one defines it in terms of its function. I argue that if we label the new culturally based doctrines 'racist' we may mislead people. To call them 'racialist' is much preferable, but not an ideal solution. In my view these new arguments and sentiments are more accurately classified as forms of ethnocentrism."[13]

If racism can only be applied to a biologically determined set of ideas and beliefs or, to use Van den Berghe's formulation, if 'we can speak properly of racism *only* when group differences in physical traits are considered a determinant of social behaviour and moral or intellectual qualities', then the only clearly demarcated field that remains for research is simply the study of ideas.[14] For, as soon as politicians and others change their style of theorising, the problem of racism as defined by Banton and others will inevitably disappear. Or as Rex has put it: as soon as they repudiate the existence of any trace of biological determinism in their thoughts and policies what they might say, do, and represent can not be defined as racist.[15]

In contrast to the astructural basis of Banton's definition, the second approach, which broadly arises from a classical Marxist analysis of the history of capitalism, seeks to focus mainly on structural considerations. Those who work within this tradition tend in one way or another and with various degrees of analytical and conceptual sophistication to reduce all theoretical definitions of racism to mere epiphenomena that stem from structural sources.[16] As noted by Gabriel and Ben-Tovim:

> "In general terms, then, the object of Marxist race theory has been concerned with locating racism, as one set of an infinitude of ideological forms, both in terms of some conception of the economic or mode of production (e.g. segregation, discrimination, genocide) referred to as racialist."[17]

Within such a framework, racism is thus a structurally convenient form of ideology. Or to be slightly more specific: firstly, capitalism requires stratification on racist lines as a result of a series of specifically *economic* requirements or exigencies; and, secondly, capitalism requires racism as a justification for certain forms of *political* practice that may or may not correspond to economic requirements.[18] If this is the case then it would appear that racism as characterised by many Marxist scholars usefully performs the ideological function of diverting the proletariat from arriving at a full understanding of their common experience, situation, and structural position under capitalist modes of production and the social formation this engenders. What is therefore required in order for the proletariat to fulfill its revolutionary potential is the subsumption of race into *class*, racialisation into class exploitation. Whether this is achieved through the construction of conceptual categories such as the 'sub-proletariat' or 'underclass' or through the reconstruction of the history of capitalism which locates the development of racist ideology *within* the development of capital, the essential features of a Marxist definition of racism remain unchanged.[19] Racism is an ideological form that arises from a *specific* mode of production and a *specific* set of economic and social relations that characterises this specific mode of production. It functions ideologically as a set of racial ideas and beliefs that help to legitimise and stabilise dominant social and economic relations and hence the substructure of which they form an integral part.

Whilst such a structurally located definition possesses a number of analytical advantages over any definition that merely sees racism as a set of ideas and beliefs based upon what Banton calls a 'scientific mistake', and whilst it might appear highly appropriate to the understanding of a particular aspect of the history of capitalism and colonialism, it nevertheless exhibits and incorporates a number of fundamental empirical inconsistencies.[20]

Firstly, racism can neither be socially nor historically dated with the earliest forms of (mercantile) capitalism. As an apparently quasi-autonomous set of ideas and beliefs in some ancient, 'classical' societies (e.g. in Greece at the time of Pericles) and even as a structurally located set of ideas and beliefs in, for instance, pre-colonised India, it existed not only in European pre-capitalist societies but also in non-European 'hydraulic' societies and those, like India, in which a whole system of social differentiation was based upon 'colour' or colour-creed.[21] Secondly, although there existed with the emergence of mercantile capitalism both a transformation and incorporation of pre-capitalist and pre-feudal racial notions and beliefs, there appears to be little historical and other evidence to suggest that the relations established and legitimated with reference to race were and are *identical* with those established and legitimated with reference to class. Thirdly, race cannot be readily subsumed under class without distorting at least four centuries of British history in order to liken slave labour with wage labour; in short race as a socio-cultural category has appeared historically to be relatively independent of class. Fourthly, the over emphasis on structural factors to be found in the general Marxist definition of racism in effect minimises the quasi-independent existence of competing belief and meaning systems. Politically, this is to suggest that with the destruction of capitalism, the end of racist structures, practices, and beliefs will inevitably follow; an assertion that in essence contradicts the political significance and social role of ideology in 'socialist' societies. Fifthly, and implicitly related to the last point, the definition on a theoretical level tends to confuse and conflate ideology with power and in so doing severely curtails and undermines the relative autonomy and historical existence of supra-structural changes in ideology. Finally, whilst Althusser attempts to rescue the Marxist tradition from this kind of theoretical excess and over-determinant thinking, the insistence however on a form of theoretical enclosure which binds economic production to social reproduction, economism, is, in the last instance, a presentation of a paradigmatic dogma *for* a presentation of analysis and explanation: it wipes out black historical and social experience altogether and theoretically allows for rationalisations rather than explanations of the presence of institutionalised working class racism.[22]

But to deny the importance of both types of definition in the formulation of a third would be as equally dogmatic and naive. Simply, both types of definition need to be brought together into one which encompasses the two-way interplay between theoretical and structural factors and which alludes to the relative autonomy of the functioning of racism as an ideology.

This can be done if we can speak of racism, as *both* a structural and ideological form, in terms of a race relations structure in which the inequalities and differentiation inherent in the wider social structure are related to physical and cultural criteria of an ascriptive kind and are rationalised in terms of deterministic belief systems which tend to make reference to biological science.[23]

From this working definition and within the limited context of this paper, we can, in agreement with Rex, list the following six non-metropolitan and three metropolitan race relations situations which have corresponded with the emergence and development of modern capitalism.[24]

Non-Metropolitan

1. Frontier situations, in which a politically organised group, with an advanced technology and education, encounters another such group whose levels of technology are lower.
2. The particular form of the social relations of production, which is to be found on slave plantations, and in the societies that come into existence immediately after the abolition of slavery.
3. Situations of class conflict in the Marxist, and in the rather wider Weberian, sense, where there is a confrontation of groups possessing differing degrees of market power.
4. Estate and caste systems, in which groups enjoying differing degrees of prestige and of legal rights take on a corporate character and may become occupationally specialised.
5. Situations in which esteem and prestige are not accorded to corporate groups, as such, but are thought of as providing a basis for a continuum, so that any one individual may be thought of as having more or less prestige.
6. Situations of cultural pluralism, such that a number of distinguishable groups interact for limited (e.g. economic) purposes but continue to lead separate communal lives.

Metropolitan

7. Urban situations in which a complex system of stratification based upon several of the factors mentioned above exists.
8. Situations in which a particular group of outsiders is called upon to perform a role which, although essential to the social and economic life of the society, is in conflict with its value system, or is thought to be beneath the dignity of the society's own members.
9. Situations, which, in times of crisis, a group that is culturally or physically distinguishable is blamed for the existence of a threat to the society's wellbeing, i.e. scapegoat situations. This process is often connected with the structural situation under 8 above.[25]

Given that these situations are implicitly racist or, more accurately, situations in which racism in its structural and ideological form is to be found, the major question that needs to be raised before it is possible to review the school and/or education as an institution of social reproduction in a racist society can be put quite simply: how and why did these situations arise in the first place?

Racism in Society

In order to understand this question it is necessary to sketch out briefly just how Britain, in particular, colonised and underdeveloped the Third World.[26] A significant starting point for such a sketch might be the following words:

> "What is Empire but the predominance of Race", exlaimed Lord Roseberry the Liberal Imperialist in 1900. 'How marvellous it all is! Do we not hail, in this, less the energy and fortune of a race than the supereme direction of the Almighty'."[27]

Although interpretations of Christian belief and theology – mainly Protestant and Calvinist – helped, as will be shown in a moment, to justify racist practices, the actual economic and political motivation to develop new markets, extract raw materials, and generate capital came not from the Almighty but from the political necessity to secure and maintain British independence from and dominance over continental Europe from the late 16th to the late 19th century. As Williams and Rodney in particular point out, the annexation, domination, colonial control of nearly two thirds of the world and the subjugation of the majority of non-European peoples was achieved on behalf of the birth and development of capitalism.[28] The transition and restructuring of the British economy during the first two of four centuries of colonial oppression, and the maintenance of British political power in Europe required not only the creation of an economic surplus for the purposes of domestic investment but it also required, firstly, enough disposable capital to expend on non-profitable defence and other services, and, secondly, enough to export to build up the extractive base of colonial territories. This development of an enormously profitable capitalism (pre) necessitated the establishment of the institution of slavery and the creation of what Genovese and others describe as a plantation economy which reflected and reproduced in part if not in whole the dominant economic mode.[29] This in turn demanded via the triangular route the transportation of an estimated 15 million blacks from mainly the West coast of Africa and just as significantly the social redesignation of human beings into commodities and chattels – property to be bought and sold.[30]

Although direct physical contact with the institution of slavery and indeed the colonial territories and settlements only involved a minority of whites, as a dehumanised labour system that needed to be rationalised and as an efficient instrument for the production of surplus capital, it affected the *whole* of the British population. Not only was this the case in terms of the social costs entailed in affecting the ultimate transition of an agrarian to an industrial based economy in the early 19th century, the establishment of the wage packet or the 'free' white worker who could now sell his/her labour power, the rapid development of a larger and more prosperous middle class, but it was also so because of the historical longevity of this substantial chapter in British history and, because of the need to justify it to *all* social groups in society – or rather the need to involve and/or implicate all social groups, including the working class, in its justification.

It was part of this important process of justification that specifically racial interpretations of Christian theology were used to service the development and ethical acceptance of capitalism. The biblical search for sources and, to echo Weber, the rise of the Protestant ethic took on a racist dimension to help legitimise capitalism, colonial exploitation, and the specific labour systems engendered.[31] But as already noted the subjugation of blacks as slaves, contract and indentured labour, and the permanent ascription of inferior status were not solely rationalised by scriptural references. In fact these justificatory beliefs extended far beyond biblical verifications to be found, for instance, in the story of Ham or the graphical depiction of Satan.

They included:

1. Biological beliefs concerning racial types and classifications which in turn were in the 19th century redefined in terms of Mendel's genetical theories and located within the wider evolutionary theories of Darwin.
2. A system of colour symbolism which rather crudely associated white with good, virtue, chastity, purity of spirit, 'heaven'; and black with the very opposite attributes.
3. The miscegenation theories of Gobineau which warned that close contact and particularly intermarriage would eventually lead to the weakening of the dominant strain or race.[32]
4. Early theories on sexuality which sought to identify eroticism, virility, and general sexual prowess with the 'uncivilised' nature of man – the 'primitive'.
5. Cultural theories based on the assumption that only the superior white populations had ever developed a sophisticated technology and thus possessed the ordained right to control, govern, and subjugate those who possessed a 'non-advanced' technology.
6. Theories relating to intelligence and brain size, that developed from the extravagances of physical anthropology, and which, today, are detectable in the race/IQ debate based largely upon the work of Jensen and Eysenck.[33]

If these and other beliefs helped to justify racist practices, colonial domination and exploitation, and in fact tended, in one form or another, to be found in the race relations situations identified above, then it can be suggested here that with the post-war migration of blacks from the colonised world the popular image of blacks based on these beliefs was so implanted and institutionalised over four centuries in the minds of whites that racism and the overt expression of racial hostility became almost second nature: it became a part of everyday life, daily stated and largely unquestioned.

Black or white, no peoples can be torn away from their history, the historical and social context in which they define themselves or seek meaning for their existence. That racism had been an integral part of the British experience for more than four centuries and that it had become a part of popular culture – in the language, literature, music etc. – all helped to determine the white British response to black migration.[34] A response, as Daniels reported in 1967 and Smith a decade later, of 'massive and substantial discrimination' and institutionalised racist practices and policies; a response that led directly the passing of race-discriminatory immigration laws during the 1960s and 1970s.[35]

Whilst this somewhat brief, general, and, in places, oversimplified account of the development of racism in British society helps to demonstrate its crucial significance vis a vis the growth of British capitalism, it does not however speak directly to the question of how racism, or, more accurately, a racist culture is transmitted in society – a question we shall now address in the following two sections.

Racism in Schools

Schools, as one of several agencies of socialisation and cultural transmission, played historically an important role in the transmission of racist culture. The public schools in the 19th century prided themselves on producing gentlemen who would serve in the colonies, armed forces, government, and help to administer and manage the Empire. Along with some Oxbridge colleges they saw themselves as maintaining all that was 'Great British', producing an establishment that was schooled in the history, traditions, values, and norms of colonial and imperial Britain. Or, as Ottaway has put it:

> "They accepted the values of laissez.faire capitalism and free trade and believed that the greatest good came by the free exercise on the part of every individual of enlightened self-interest . . . . They served the traditional social needs of Christians and gentlemen, rulers, and civil servants . . . . The English Public School, with its aims and values taken from the society in which it grew strong, has been a model for secondary education ever since . . ."[36]

If the public schools produced the imperial rulers and educated the sons of the entrepreneurial captains of industry in the 19th century, then the Sunday, Church Board, Elementary, and, later, Secondary Schools, produced the grudging 'supporters' of both capitalism and racism. Not only is the history of mass Church-state education a history of the cultural demands of a capitalism increasingly dependent upon technological innovation for a more 'educated' and thus exploitable labour force, but it is also a history of the cultural transmission of ruling class ideology and hence conception and definition of all that is assumed to constitute legitimate knowledge.[37] It is a history concerned with as much the stability of Empire as with the stability of the domestic social order – a fact that was celebrated like Christmas and Easter with an annual school holiday: Empire Day. Although the curriculum was rudimentary, it was nevertheless through this that working class pupils learnt in part the values espoused in Kipling's poems, the knowledge that Britain controlled and profited from more colonial territories under similar systems of political control and exploitation than existed counties in England, the knowledge of their position under the middle and ruling classes but above those, to quote Kipling, 'Half-devil and half-child' natives toiling for the Mother Country in far off lands.[38]

Against this backcloth, to argue as some teachers and educationalists still do that schools somehow are clinically clean, protected from the consequences of their own historical role as one of the major social transmitters of racist culture, is at best a piece of liberal pipe-dreaming, and at worst an unknowingly ignorant defence of racism. Schools have always and will always belong *in* society: they have been in the past and they will continue to be in the future *of* society. Although many of us might wish to change them, they are nevertheless places, as Waller rightly informs us, where all the classic political and sociological concepts apply to life in the classroom – war, feud, litigation, conflict of ideals, victory, conciliation, compromise, conversion, accommodation, assimilation, and, he could have added, sexism and racism.[39] The World, as Searle argues and illustrates with samples of writings produced by pupils, does exist in the classroom.[40]

The other, largely sociological, assumptions that underpin the assertion here that racism is a permanent feature of our educational system in general and of our schools in particular, can be grouped and discussed under four headings. The first relates to what Parsons views as the *functions* of schools for society.[41] With a few minor reservations, we share his claim that schools as social systems are involved in several functions necessary for the maintenance and perpetuation of society. Whilst we reject the static nature of his systems approach and even his term 'function', we have to admit, however, that three of his so-called functions help to add some weight to our argument. Firstly, he points out that schools are undoubtedly concerned with the internalisation or learning of dominant social values and norms.[42] The implications that such a task, or, more accurately, *process*, possesses for the transmission of racist values in the form of the kind of deterministic and atomistic thinking that goes on in school has been well documented and argued by Syer.[43] Secondly, schools perform the significant job and process involved in the selection and allocation of human resources into the adult role system; and, thirdly, it undertakes the differentiation of the school class in terms of actual achievement and differential valuations of achievement.[44] More simply put, it decides for and on behalf of society the places and positions pupils should eventually occupy in society.

Related to this, the second major assumption that needs to be exposed here is that if we interpret and construe Parson's conception of functions to mean goals in the British context, then, as Levitas indicates, the social goals reflected in school structure, organisation, culture, and curricula closely approximate the goals of the ruling class.[45] However the ruling class or power elite is defined, the point we are making remains the same. Namely, that the reference point for schools for the interpretation of societal goals *vis a vis* race relations is in fact racist. As we shall see in a moment in our discussion on multicultural education, schools, like professional community relations organisations, are collectively forced, because of their historical location, social position, and cultural orientation towards the dominant institutional order, to identify their role and operate within the dominant racist value and political goal structure implicit in official policy on black immigration control. Furthermore, and within the framework of explicitly stated political and social objectives, they are obliged to work towards assimilation or integration in order to affect social cohesion and harmony and stabilise rather than radically change the existing social and political system.

The third set of assumptions we make refer to what is often identified as the informal culture of the school. The important point to realise here is that whilst the informal culture of the school is different in many fundamental respects to the beliefs, values, and norms held by adults, teachers inside and non-teachers outside the formal culture of the school, this does not really appear to be so in the case of race. More often than not the formal and informal cultures of the school converge and are supported by general societal culture. That is to say, institutionalised racist beliefs and attitudes know no white cultural or white sub-cultural boundaries: they exist and function in similar ways across all cultural and/or social groupings. Racial news in the media, racially conceived reasons for the lack of jobs for white school leavers and their parents, racially conceived explanations for poor housing, health care, welfare services, education, and racially conceived explanations and responses to classroom disorder and disruption combine across the structural variants of dominant white culture to produce common identifications of the allegedly real source of individual and group discontent – the blacks. If anything, racism in its structural and ideological forms and representations helps to produce an illusive class unity of purpose and response where really none exists at all.

The final set of assumptions concerns the teaching role performed in schools and incorporates many of the points just made. To reinterpret an interesting insight of Bernstein's, namely that all that schools can really do effectively is to teach, and to do that within a *context*, we need to ask not only the question of *how* but also that of *what* is taught and in *what* context is it taught?[46] Although theoretically, and especially at primary school level, schools might have some choice in what they teach and how they teach it, in practice it appears quite differently. How and in what context teachers teach is determined just as much by their own education and social background as it is by professional and extra-professional considerations, and what they teach is in itself socially constructed and packaged and thus turns out often to be what is expected of them – not just the teaching of the skills involved in reading, writing, and arithmetic but, more significantly, the teaching of a socially constructed and packaged knowledge required to achieve school and societal goals.[47] To quote the view of one but shared by many teachers, the real purpose of teaching and thus what and how it should be taught, is "to place and prepare for the full integration and absorption of all children, of all colours and creeds, into adult society." Whilst such a view is open to a radical or conformist interpretation it should be noted that within the context it and others were expressed, it is confined unquestionably to the latter category. It, along with many more similar expressions of the role of education and teaching in a multi-racial society, was reported by Townsend and Brittan in their 1973 study for the Schools Council.[48]

Multicultural Education

If what we have said so far, our analysis represents in some respects an accurate account of social and school reality – and, of course, like any other analysis it is open to critical questioning and rejection – then it might appear that to address now the whole question of multicultural education is tantamount to addressing an almost irresolvable contradiction. How in fact is it possible to talk about multicultural education in racist schools? How can we consider seriously such a topic within the framework of a racist society? In fact it is only possible to talk about it if we try to establish its historical and socio-political meaning. This requires, we would suggest, looking at how it has been formulated in official educational policy, how it has been interpreted and practiced by educationalists, and an attempt to establish its role and functions in racist society.

The first point that needs to be made and which we have developed at length elsewhere, is that the career of multicultural education started off from a point and within a context far removed from traditional educational concerns.[49] It evolved neither as an educational response to the needs of black pupils in white schools, nor as a positive response to the upsurge of racist events between 1958-1963.[50] But instead it evolved out of a series of political interpretations made about the threat blacks posed to the stability of liberal democratic and capitalist society. It was in effect a political response based upon the kind of racist assumptions discussed earlier to an imperative need to protect what Halsey in a somewhat speculative article termed 'the social and political fabric of our society'.[51] The presence of blacks in white cities, white schools, white factories appeared to trigger off and articulate in policy action the racial history, memory, and, possibly, guilt that had been dormant and culturally lodged and institutionally protected in ethnocentric definitions of self. The way in which a colonial society had always perceived itself and its historical role in the development of capitalism and Western civilisation suddenly but quite logically manifested itself in its identification of the problem as a *black problem*. As we can see from the very first official policy statement of any long-lasting significance, it was a response that was embedded in the notion that the social order and its assumed unitary value system needed to be protected at all costs.

The Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council propounded in its 1962/3 Report to the Home Secretary that:

> "A national system of education must aim at producing citizens who can take their place in society properly equipped to exercise rights and perform duties the same as those of other citizens. If their parents were brought up in another culture and another tradition, children should be encouraged to respect it, but a national system cannot be expected to perpetuate the different values of immigrant groups."[52]

What this and subsequent action effected was the redefinition of social and political goals into an educational policy of assimilation. In fact the whole history of assimilationist education policies which started at the beginning of the 1960s, peaked during the mid and late sixties with the infamous official 'dispersal' policy – DES Circular 7/65 – and gradually declined from public view but not popularity in the 1970s can be viewed in this way.[53] Although often justified in terms of the Plowden ideology of positive discrimination and compensatory education and, more recently, in terms of educational disadvantagement – bringing, for instance, the English of Asian pupils up to a standard so that they could achieve their full potential – multicultural education meant in content and process on the one hand cultural assimiliation and on the other a programme to encourage social and political complicity to dominant values, norms, and interpretations of reality.[54] In Birmingham in the 1960s Jenny Williams informs us that it meant in practice that teachers continued to see:

> "Their role as putting over a certain set of values (Christian), a code of behaviour (middle class), and a set of academic and job aspirations in which white collar jobs have higher prestige than manual, clean jobs than dirty . . ."[55]

And in the context of language teaching over a decade later, James critically informs us:

> "That a dose of systematic language teaching, preferrably carried out in the monastic security of a special class or centre, using the seemingly efficient sub-behaviourist 'direct method' of the 1950s, would act as a lubricant; the children would be fed into the educational machine on completion of this treatment without causing it to seize-up."[56]

And to take a final example, Levine and Doherty's review of past meanings of multicultural education makes it quite clear that in the past it has tended if anything "to deny validity to minority groups, to offer them a contract for second class citizenship."[57]

But to terminate our analysis at this point would in effect amount to missing the real import in all that has been said. For whilst the assimilationist model of multicultural education is conceived within a dominant order-conception of society and is indeed oriented more towards its socio-political protection than the real educational needs of black pupils, and whilst it is based upon racist assumptions, this in a sense only describes and reveals its structural location and orientation. Its pedagogic and ideological significance lies elsewhere. In its original conception and interpretation and in the degree it has penetrated, even saturated, educational thinking and practice, it has provided and defined the legitimate framework for most thought and action in most schools where there exists a relatively high percentage of black pupils. A reason for this, we would suggest, is that such a version of multicultural education and studies is able to make the link between school and societal goals, the racist school ethos and societal racism and, most importantly, it has been able to transpose an implicitly racist ideology, ethnicism, into the 'progressive' educational ideology of multiculturalism.

The reaction to some of the more observable racist features inherent in this model and conception of multicultural education which were partly encapsulated in Roy Jenkins's much quoted definition of *integration*, led to several things.[58] Local authorities slowly phased out their dispersal programmes and with the exception of Ealing they were officially abandoned altogether in 1973.[59] A degree of cultural sensitivity and the belief that ethnic groups should be encouraged to maintain their cultural traditions replaced the harsher mono-cultural directives embodied in assimilationist educational policy and practice. Black anger, frustration, and, ultimately, resistance in and outside the classroom spurred on teachers and others concerned with multicultural education and studies to introduce Black Studies and other 'ethnic-type' subjects into the official curriculum. As Street-Porter documents: "there was a mushrooming of courses and conferences to inform teachers about the homelands of black children and there was an increasing number of advisory posts created to deal with the problem of immigrant education".[60] Partly triggered off by Coard's brilliant paper, concern was expressed by black parents and some white teachers about the numbers of children of West Indian origin in ESN schools, and an increasing amount of money was spent not only on the special needs of these children but also on every conceivable – within a framework – activity in multicultural education.[61]

Whilst all this represented a reaction and some have argued a positive reaction to former policies, what was and still is occurring, we would suggest, was the change and refinement of means to reach in this era of supposed cultural sensitivity less publicly stated and acclaimed goals. The replacement of the assimilationist model with an integration-cultural pluralism model represents no real shift in either socio-political intent or educational direction. We have suggested elsewhere that where the second model differs from the first lies not in its social construction but rather in its social presentation.[62]

Simply:

> "Within the integration-cultural pluralism perspective political diversity is discouraged in favour of political integration: cultural diversity is tolerable so long as it neither impedes progress to political integration nor explicitly challenges the cultural assumptions of our Anglo-centric society. That is to say the political imperative of assimilation in this model is no longer, as construed in the early sixties, dependent upon complete cultural subjugation. . . . The racist assumptions, however, of cultural superiority . . . . still figure prominently in this second model. Though reformulated in terms of conditional cultural diversity, the first model manifests and reasserts itself in the second model in the emphasis placed on integration into *our* society, *our* way of life which in turn undervalues, even negatively values, other cultural traditions, norms, and mores . . ."[63]

Whilst we still accept this formulation and argument, it does now seem to us in this discussion that we somewhat underplayed the point that needs to be emphasised here. Namely that this second model and approach to multicultural education has the dual and additional effect of containing black resistance and keeping schools safe places to be in. The vision it holds out of an integrated and culturally plural society, the emphasis it places on changing the curriculum ostensibly to suit the needs of black pupils, the political energy and frustration it harnesses, and the political consciousness it distorts and redirects into seemingly 'radical' studies justified in terms of mainly psychological criteria – such as all that is contained in the idea of 'self-esteem' or 'positive image' – needs to be evaluated not within an educational but within a political framework.[64] Once this is achieved – and here we have only taken the first tentative steps towards such an evaluation – it might be revealed conclusively that this model in its articulated practices is none other than a more sophisticated form of social control which successfully attempts to distort and redefine the reality of racism in schools and society.

To accept integration on racist terms is, as Gus John points out;

> "To integrate with that which alienates and destroys you, rendering you less of a person. It is madness. To accept the challenge to join it and change it from within, when it refuses to accept that you are there in your fullness and refuses to acknowledge the results of interaction between you and it, is double madness."[65]

If then multicultural education policy and practice over the last two decades has helped to provide and legitimate a racist framework for thinking and action, contained resistance, and, assumptively, helped to reproduce the dominant ideological parameters for action, and, finally, if its practitioners are unaware of its racist history and apparent social consequences, then *what is to be done?*

Conclusion

Clearly the question just posed can be answered in many ways, but it would follow from our argument in respect to the social and political context of education that fundamental changes can only result from practices based upon a deeper understanding of racism and the role of multicultural education as, in the past, an effective instrument of control – as suggested here – or, in the future, as an effective instrument for creating the space and conditions for change. But even before the development of practices to help facilitate change can evolve, it is necessary to adopt a critical attitude towards existing policy, practice, and research in the field and to construct a broader historical, political, and sociological framework in which to locate and evaluate policy, practice, and research.

This paper should be seen as an attempt to make a small beginning in this direction; a direction that is based upon a view of the world that entails in its theorisation the past and present experience of black groups living in modern industrialised (capitalist and allegedly socialist) societies.

◇ ◇ ◇

Notes and References

1. See H.E.R. Townsend and E.M. Brittan, *Multiracial Education : Need and Innovation*, Schools Council Working Paper 50, Evans/Methuen, London, 1973, for further accounts of teachers' views on multicultural/racial education.

2. Farrukh Dhondy, 'Teaching Young Blacks', *Race Today*, vol. 10, No. 4, June, 1978.

3. *Ibid*, p.86 (our emphasis).

4. In the original version of this paper presented as a lecture to the PGCE students at the University of London Institute of Education on 26th October, 1979, this theme was developed in some detail. Here we have edited much of the material and used it to support the broader and more important argument we wish to develop in the pages that follow.

5. The concept of 'frame' employed here is that developed by Basil Bernstein. For a definition and elaboration of the concept see Basil Bernstein, 'On the classification and framing of educational knowledge' in *Class, Codes, and Control*, Volume 3, (Revised edition) Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1977.

6. Michael Banton, 'The Concept of Racism', in Sami Zubaida (ed), *Race and Racialism*, Tavistock Publications, London, 1970.

7. Robert Knox, *The Races of Men : A Fragment*, Renshaw, London, 1850; J.A. De Gobineau, *The Inequality of Human Races*, Heineman, London, 1915 (English translation of part of *Essai sur l'inegalite des Races Humaines*, Paris, 1853-54); and J.C. Nott and G.R. Gliddon, *Types of Mankind*, London, 1854. For a detailed account and interesting comment on the influence of their work *vis a vis* the development of a specific racial ideology and approach towards race relations see the following two books by Michael Banton : *Race Relations*, Tavistock, London, 1967, and *The Idea of Race*, Tavistock, London, 1977.

8. Michael Banton, 1970, *op cit*, p.17

9. *Ibid*, p.18

10. Ruth Benedict, *Race and Racism*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1942, p.97

11. John Rex makes a similar criticism in 'The Concept of Race in Sociological Theory' in Sami Zubaida (ed), 1970, *op cit*.

12. Michael Banton, 1970, *op cit*, pp 30-2.

13. *Ibid*, p.31

14. Pierre L. Van Den Berghe, *Race and Racism : A Comparative Perspective*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1967

15. John Rex, 1970, *op cit*, p.38

16. For a detailed though in many ways problematic account of the concept of racism in Marxist thought see John Gabriel and Gideon Ben-Tovim, 'Marxism and the Concept of Racism', *Economy and Society*, vol. 7, No. 2, May, 1978.

17. *Ibid*, p.120. For an understanding of the two general positions within the field see in particular Oliver Cromwell Cox, *Caste, Class, and Race : A Study in Racial Dynamics,* Monthly Review Press, New York, 1970, and E. Genovese, *In Red and Black*, Vantage Books, 1972, and *Roll Jordon Roll : The World the Slaves Made*, Andre Deutsch, London, 1974.

18. For an elaboration of this latter thesis within the context of political practice and struggle see the following two papers by A. Sivanandan, 'Race, Class, and the State : The British Experience', *Race and Class*, vol. xvii, No.4, 1976, and 'From Immigration Control to Induced Repatriation', *Race and Class*, vol. xx, No.1, Summer, 1978.

19. For a recent account of the concept of underclass/sub-proletariat see John Rex and Sally Tomlinson, *Colonial Immigrants in a British City : A Class Analysis*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979, in conjunction with Paul Gilroy, 'Managing the *Underclass*: A further Note on the Sociology of Race Relations in Britain', *Race and Class*, vol. xii, No.1, Summer, 1980.

20. Michael Banton, 1970, *op cit*, pp 24-28.

21. This is possibly one of the major weaknesses of the Marxist formulation of racism, for the specificity of racism to capitalism appears to be an essential feature of all Marxist theories of racism. Pre-capitalist forms of racism are either definitionally not admitted or, more usually, they are recast conceptually as forms of ethnocentrism.

22. See Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, New Left Books, London, 1977 and *Lenin and Philosophy* (particularly his essay on 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses'), New Left Books, London, 1977. To help safeguard against the excesses of the Althusserian approach, which is essentially a form of extravagant culturalism, it might also be useful to consult Simon Clarke and Terry Lovell *et al*, *One Dimensional Marxism : Althusser and the Politics of Culture*, Allison and Busby, London, 1980.

23. In general outline this formulation follows John Rex, 1970, *op cit*, pp.36-40.

24. *Ibid*, p.39. It should be noted that Rex draws quite heavily upon Cox's earlier conception and description of the seven major 'situations of race relations' to be found in Oliver Cromwell Cox, *Caste, Class, and Race: A Study in Social Dynamics*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1959, pp.353-391.

25. *Ibid*, pp.39-46.

26. For an account of the version of the underdevelopment thesis that informs this section see Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Bogle L'Ouverture, London, 1972.

27. Quoted in Hugh Tinker, *Race Conflict and the International Order*, Macmillan Press, 1977, p.17.

28. Walter Rodney, 1972 *op cit*, and Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1944.

29. E. Genovese, 1972, 1974, *op cit*.

30. For general descriptions of the institutions of slavery and in addition to the work of Genovese and Williams see also : Gilberto Freyre, *The Masters and the Slaves*, Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1964; Stanley M. Elkins, *Slavery : A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life*, University of Chicago Press, 1976; and particularly C.L.R. James, *The Black Jacobins : Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*, (Revised edition), Allison and Busby, London, 1980.

31. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Unwin University Books, London, 1971.

32. J. A. De Gobineau, 1915, *op cit.*

33. See especially A.R. Jensen, 'How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement', *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 39, 1969, and H.J. Eysenck, *Race, Intelligence and Education*, Temple Smith, London, 1971.

34. The examples that can be given here range from sayings such as 'Nigger in the woodpile', the pictorialisation of Sambo images in comics, national songs like 'Land of Hope and Glory'/'Rule Brittania', to the actual institution of the 'Golliwog', the national doll, a symbol of British imperialism and racial domination to be found in most homes up until the late 1950s and in many homes today.

35. W. Daniel, *Racial Discrimination in Britain*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968, and David J. Smith, *Racial Disadvantage in Britain*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1977.

36. A.K.C. Ottaway, *Education and Society : An Introduction to the Sociology of Education*, Routledge and Keegan Paul, London, 1962, pp.65-67.

37. This theme and particularly the whole question of what actually constitutes knowledge legitimate or otherwise, has formed a major concern of what has become termed the 'new' sociology of education. See in particular Michael Young's 'Introduction' to M.F.D. Young (ed.), *Knowledge and Control: New Directions for the Sociology of Education*, Collier Macmillan, London, 1971.

38. An interesting re-evaluation of Kipling as essentially a product of the social system of his day (particularly his school and India) can be found in Philip Mason, *Kipling : The Glass, the Shadow, and the Fire*, Harper and Row, London, 1975.

39. W. Waller, *The Sociology of Teaching*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1965.

40. Chris Searle, *The World in a Classroom*, Writers and Readers Publishing Co-operative, London, 1977.

41. Talcott Parsons, 'The School Class as a Social System', *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 29, No.4, 1959, but reproduced in A.H. Halsey, J. Floud and C.A. Anderson, *Education, Economy and Society*, Free Press, Glencoe, 1961.

42. *Ibid.*

43. Mike Syer, 'Racism, Ways of Thinking and School', in John Tierney (ed), *Race, Immigration and Schooling*; Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, forthcoming.

44. Talcott Parson, 1959, *op cit.*

45. Maurice Levitas, *Maxist Perspectives in the Sociology of Education*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pp.162-67.

46. See Basil Bernstein, 'A Critique of the Concept of Compensatory Education' in *Class, Codes and Control*, Volume 1, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1971.

47. For an important discussion of this theme within the framework developed by Michael Young and others see M.F.D. Young, *Knowledge and Control*, Collier Macmillan, London, 1971.

48. H.E.R. Townsend and E.M. Brittan, 1973, *op cit.*

49. Chris Mullard, 'Black Kids in White Schools : Multiracial Education in Britain', in John Tierney (ed), 1980, *op cit.*

50. *Ibid.* The events we have in mind opened with the Nottinghill 'riots', 1958, Nottingham 'riots', 1959, and closed with the passing and implementing of the 1961 Commonwealth Immigration Bill.

51. A.H. Halsey, 'Race Relations : The Lines to Think On', *New Society*, No. 390, 19th March, 1970, pp.472-4.

52. *Report by the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council*, (Cmnd 2266), HMSO, London, 1964, para. 10.

53. *The Education of Immigrants*, DES Circular, 7/65, London, June 1965.

54. For further expansion of this point see Chris Mullard, 1980, *op cit.*

55. Jenney Williams, Chapter 10, in John Rex and Robert Moore, *Race, Community, and Conflict : A Study of Sparkbrook*, Oxford University Press, London, 1967.

56. Alan James, 'Why Language Matters', *Multiracial School*, Summer, 1977.

57. J. Levine and S. Doherty, 'A Definition of Multicultural Education', in *Course Book PGCE/ATC/MTC*, University of London Institute of Education, London, 1979/80.

58. Roy Jenkins, *Address Given by the Home Secretary to a Meeting of Voluntary Liaison Committees*, NCCI, London, 1966. In it he defined integration as "not a flattering process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance".

59. It should be noted that whilst abandoned as an official DES policy, unofficial dispersal and 'bussing' still continues in several LEA areas.

60. Rosalind Street-Porter, *Race, Children and Cities*, The Open University Press, Milton Keynes, pp.80-1.

61. Bernard Coard, *How the West Indian Child is made Educationally Sub-Normal in the British School System : The Scandal of the Black Child in Schools in Britain.* New Beacon Books, London, 1971.

62. Chris Mullard, 1980, *op cit.*

63. *Ibid.*

64. For a 'liberal' and implicitly prejudiced articulation of the theory and practice involved in the creation of the so-called 'positive image' see Robert Jeffcoate, *Positive Image : Towards a Multiracial Curriculum*, Writers and Readers Publishing Co-operative, London, 1979.

65. Quoted in British Council of Churches, *The New Black Presence in Britain : A Christian Security*. BCC Publications, London, 1976.

Source: C. Mullard, *Racism in Society and Schools: History, Policy and Practice*, University of London Institute of Education, London, 1980, pp.3 24.

3

Migration and the dilemmas of multiculturalism

Tanya Birrell

In scholarly and political circles, the notion of 'multiculturalism' has recently come into such favour that it is about to take its place alongside motherhood. Unfortunately, whereas motherhood is patently achievable, multiculturalism as usually understood is not easily within reach. It is the purpose of this paper to explore the limits of such an approach and, specifically, to consider what implications these limits may have for future immigration programs and social policy decisions about new settlers in Australia.

The interest in multiculturalism as a model for relationships among various ethnic or national groups arose in response to the inadequacy of two pre-existing models: the Anglo-conformity (or assimilationist) approach and the 'melting pot' mode.

The original assumption about non-British immigrants to Australia was that they would become Australianised[1] and, eventually, indistinguishable from the native-born Anglo-Saxon population.[2] A similar view prevailed in the USA around the turn of the century when migrants were arriving in large numbers from Southern and Eastern Europe. However, this so-called 'Anglo-conformity' is not an appropriate model for either (or perhaps for any) society.

Firstly, it doesn't work. People do not shed their ethnicity either easily or willingly. The rather 'personal' institutions of family, marriage, religion and community are bound up with ethnicity. Through these institutions individuals are socialised, often carrying on the ethnic traditions, so that the ethnic identity and even ethnic community persists.

Moreover, it isn't fair. If Anglo-Saxon Australians are not obliged to relinquish their ethnic customs and rituals (e.g. surfing, football, the RSL), why should Italians, Greeks and Yugoslavs be obliged to relinquish theirs? No one anymore can justify this view as social justice.

An alternative approach, the 'Melting Pot' or 'Multiple Melting Pot' ideology[3] banishes the image of the uncompromising Anglo-Saxon demanding conformity to his culture in favour of an interchange of cultures (presumably a democratic one) and instead predicts and advocates a new ethnic synthesis (or several) made up of diverse cultures. There are the same problems with this view. Even with intermarriage, there is no guarantee that offspring will be ethnically 'brindle'. Moreover, is it fair to demand assimilation to the melted pot anymore than to Anglo-Saxon culture, even if the former is more eclectic?

So 'multiculturalism' was suggested as a new, just model of ethnic relations. It can be described as a situation in which

> . . . immigrants are able to retain, more or less intact for as long as they desire to do so, the basic values, beliefs, aspirations and life ways which characterise the society from which they have come, and to do this without any sense of disloyalty to or rejection of the receiving country and its culture. In turn, the modal personality of the immigrant's homeland is treated with respect by the members of the new country.[4]

87

The most famous Australian proponent of this view, Al Grassby, (former Australian Minister for Immigration) expressed the model as follows:

> The concept I prefer, the 'family of the nation', is one that ought to convey an immediate and concrete image to all. In a family the overall attachment to the common good need not impose a sameness on the outlook or activity of each member, or need those members deny their individuality and distinctiveness in order to seek a superficial and unnatural conformity. The important thing is that all are committed to the good of all. (Speech delivered by the Hon. A. J. Grassby on August 11, 1973. The entire text may be found in the ACTU's *Social Policy and Problems of the Workforce, Vol. 1*)[5]

Multiculturalism indeed sounds like the solution to inter-ethnic problems but it is better described at this stage as an ideology rather than an analysis. Advocates go straight from simple definitions to exhortations of tolerance and accommodation. These qualities are admirable and important, but the advocacy of multiculturalism needs a more hard-headed approach to accompany its 'let's all be nice to each other' rhetoric.

In fact, there are some basic problems with the multicultural model which make it difficult to accept this optimism. The first type of problem is that it neglects basic questions of social structure, power and the operation of social institutions. It does not take into account the issue of how much social cohesion is required to maintain social arrangements nor does it include consideration of the existing cleavages, structured inequalities and types of conflict among the host population itself. In other words, multiculturalism, while posed as an organising principle for the whole social *structure*, rests on the assumption that attitudes and individual actions are the major issue in achieving a fairer society.

The second problem of the multicultural model is that it tends to underestimate the inevitable problems of migration for the individuals involved. The claim is that if only other groups are recognised as culturally worthwhile and provision is made for the continuance of ethnic community practices, all other problems become manageable and exist only in the short term. The implication of this assumption is that the multiculturalist frame of reference contains an inherent bias in favour of large-scale and continuing immigration from a great range of culturally diverse sources. Yet, as I will argue, migration is an inherently disorienting and disrupting process and has costs which cannot be waived, even by tolerance and understanding. These two aspects, the structural and the individual, are certainly interwoven but for purposes of clarity, I will deal with them in turn.

Heterogeneous societies

Many contemporary societies are composed of more than one ethnic or cultural group. Canada, the US, the USSR, South Africa, Spain, New Zealand and Brazil are all culturally (or ethnically) heterogeneous to name a few. This situation of several cultures coexisting within the same economic and political boundaries is known as 'cultural pluralism'.[6] It is inevitably accompanied by 'social pluralism', the duplication of some social institutions (e.g. religion, family, community, leadership, even language) for each cultural group.[7] But one must concede that there are limits to both varieties of pluralism within one society, and not all groups in a plural society can be catered for institutionally. The point is that while many cultural groups do coexist in Australia, thus making Australia a 'multicultural' society, there is no equality among the various groups. Because the English settled the country in the first place, Anglo-Saxon cultural, social, legal, political and economic patterns dominate Australian society. There is no parity between Anglo-Saxon culture and, for example, Turkish culture, the former holds sway here and Turkish immigrants must conform at least minimally or risk retrenchment, ostracism and even gaol.

At base, the lack of equality between differing cultural groups rests on the domination of key institutions: the economy, the occupational system, the political process. At the highest level, a society (defined as a political-administrative unit) must have a unified institutional order. For example, a 'fair' legal system must have only one set of provisions which apply equally to all members of the society, regardless of ethnic belonging. Differential provisions either raise problems of jurisdiction (whether certain Aborigines should be subject to European or tribal law, for instance) or seem grossly unfair, especially for members of the groups not in power (South Africa is a good example). Unless group boundaries are rigidly defined and the groups kept separate—a situation unlikely ever to apply to Australia, there can be only one recognised legal code, not one which, for example, demands monogamy of some groups but permits polygamy for others. Only in relatively unimportant (that is, structurally unimportant) areas such as religion, inner family life, privately-spoken language, cuisine, festivals, etc. can *equalitarian* multiculturalism exist, provided, of course, that goodwill and tolerance abound. In the political and economic spheres, which are the most important in determining social arrangements, one group of principles must hold sway, whether they be the traditional Anglo-Saxon ones or some kind of 'melted pot' version.

Unfortunately, too much of the writing and speaking about cultural heterogeneity begs the questions which are raised by these considerations. Spokesmen for ethnic groups often advocate the preservation of ethnic community, identity and language but give little guidance about how these goals can be achieved while migrants and their families pursue mainstream rewards. Many academic writers maintain that cultural pluralism is a fact of life which should be respected and catered for but neglect to discuss the operation of power and dominance of the key institutions (Glazer[8], for example, discusses many of the former aspects with insight but does not identify class and power as major factors). Others recognise the issues as important but hedge the question by referring to some kind of unspecified balance between the host structures and ethnic practices. The following passage is an example:

> . . . traumatic experiences are not always inevitable and may be mitigated by the acceptance of *some degree* of cultural pluralism, especially in the areas of primary social relationships. This implies the need to respect and conserve ethnic family traditions, *in so far as they can be accommodated* within the Australian secondary institutions, such as the legal and educational systems. The law must clearly be the same for the whole country but it may and should be interpreted with *understanding and humanity*. Such tolerance, however, can ony emerge from an *appreciation* of the continued existence in Australia of very significant group cultural differences. And only an educational system may successfully convey both information and positive evaluation of this state of affairs.[9] (Italics mine.)

Writings of this sort, while stating valuable principles, are so ambiguous that there is slight chance that they would be useful in any policy decision. They do not address the problem of how much and what kind of cultural pluralism can exist, and they ignore the issue of how much and what kind of social (or structural) pluralism might be managed, especially at the secondary institutional level, considering instead only attitudinal factors. When policy issues are addressed it is common to find hopeful comments that migrant groups will retain the 'best' characteristics from their original cultures, but these characteristics are not specified nor is it clear who will decide which characteristics are the preferred ones. (See the APIC Green Paper[10], Chapter 7 as an example of semi-official mullings over these questions.)

In sum, there would appear to be structural limits to cultural diversity within a society but these limits are glossed over rather than conceded, pondered and studied.

Another structural issue which is important is the interaction of class and ethnic factors. Even when the most personal costs of acculturation are ignored and when a society allows the maximum degree of cultural diversity, there are still significant disadvantages to members of non-mainstream cultural backgrounds. Society is stratified not only in terms of ethnic belonging but also by class belonging, and these two dimensions often overlap. Members of the indigenous working class may be debarred from upward mobility because of sub-cultural characteristics (accents, manners, consumption styles) and social background (friendship circles, school background, membership in organisations and clubs). An informal system of nepotism and social sponsorship exists, especially at upper levels[11] based on class-culture demarcations. It is difficult for people of working class origin to break into the more elite positions because of their class 'sub-cultural' belonging, and therefore even less possible for those whose basic cultural identity and ethnic networks are further removed from the dominant white Anglo-Saxon, middle and upper class culture to reach positions of power and influence. The price of upward mobility is assimilation (assuming, again, acceptance from the incumbents of this group) and if one wishes to maintain ethnic allegiance, one must sacrifice some other opportunities.

The 'one big happy family' ideology ignores this reality of class and cultural dominance by those in a position to recruit and admit members to the elite. There is no apparent imperative to change the existing arrangements and lofty multicultural sentiments are hardly likely to effect such a change. Under such conditions, a conscientious maintenance of ethnic communities and social patterns may actually operate to the disadvantage of the ethnic group, at least in concrete respects. The persistence of ethnic identity and affiliation may be satisfying, but in continuing this affiliation members may lack the social knowledge required for mobility into positions controlled by the dominant group as well as the access to 'old boy' networks which seem to be important in patronage mobility. (See Gordon[12] for a discussion of the importance of primary group association and assimilation). The time and effort required to learn and maintain ethnic language and customs could inhibit the acquisition of skills and knowledge which, while in absolute terms are no better than ethnically valued ones, are nevertheless more useful in securing jobs, promotion, influence and the like.

Whether we like it or not, it remains the prerogative of the Anglo-Saxon hosts to decide what are the 'good' elements of other cultural traditions and this prerogative stems from their grip of power primarily in the economic and political areas.

But this unpleasant fact cannot be seen simply as a new reason to revive assimilationist ideas. Besides the structural issues there are also problems that individuals have to contend with. This brings us to the consideration of the immigration process as it has affected the migrants themselves and the question of how to deal with existing hardships among migrants.

The impact of migration on individuals

An implication of the multicultural model is that the experience of migration, even to a dissimilar culture, is not particularly difficult if the receiving society is tolerant of cultural diversity. However, for a variety of reasons including those structural ones just discussed, the migration process is costly to individuals in personal and social terms. The migrant suffers disruption in leaving family, friends and familiar surroundings and then must cope with a very different social milieu in which he must relearn a whole series of behaviour patterns and cues just to be able to manage daily life; a taxing process complicated by the physical disruption of relocation, job hunting, etc. This readjustment is stressful even in a society which doesn't discriminate against new arrivals, and is more onerous in a society like Australia where suspicion and hostility against immigrants, although rarely violent, is common. Settlement may not be as traumatic for a new arrival if the loneliness and disorientation are reduced by an existing ethnic community which can act as a buffer between the immigrant and the host culture[13] but many studies have shown that the immigration experience has measurable negative psychological and personal effects on immigrants[14].

In light of the structural problems discussed above, this raises serious questions about what measures can be taken to lighten this burden for immigrants. Little can be achieved by sweeping advocacy of pluralism, integration or multiculturalism. There needs to be a distinction between those areas which are critically important to the institutional order where *change* can well be contemplated but *diversity* will lead only to continued disadvantage for the newly arrived, and those areas which are not as important because they relate to personal and private activities. In the latter case, there can be great improvements in public understanding and acceptance but there must also be material support—ethnic media, housing, community centres, religious meeting places are as expensive as they are necessary.

The issue seems to be one of how ethnic diversity can be accommodated and supported at the primary group level while easing the disadvantages to immigrants from the Anglo-Saxon instititional dominance. Although I am arguing that the multicultural model does not help much here, and may in fact add to the problem by offering unrealisable solutions, that is not to say that another approach will present a solution either. Essentially, this problem of diversity and equality is not remediable, at least not in the short term.

The US experience as a case in point

One way of gaining some insight into what we might expect and perhaps even what we might avoid in the Australian case is to examine a situation with many similarities but which is at a later stage, or at least has had a longer history. The US provides such a comparison.

Colonised by the English, the US continued to draw large numbers of Anglo-Saxon immigrants well into the 19th century. During the early stages English immigration was also accompanied by an influx from Ireland, Holland, Germany, Sweden and other northern European contries but except for some small rural communities, the Anglo-Saxon ethos prevailed and underpinned the economic and political arrangements of the growing society. Certainly the elites were composed of those of English descent. At the end of the 19th century intakes became larger and a prodigious number of immigrants arrived, this time from more diverse sources including Poland, Italy, Greece and other Eastern and Southern European countries and the Middle East. These immigrants were viewed with some alarm and suspicion by the host population, but the assumption was that in time these people would come to be Americans in the Anglo-Saxon mould or would 'melt' into the ethnic soup which would still maintain an Anglo-Saxon flavour.

Clearly, the further a group was culturally from Anglo-Saxon patterns the less opportunity and the less power they had. Some groups utilised semi- or illegitimate sources of wealth and power but for most ethnic groups of Southern or Eastern European countries, the major avenues of mobility were blocked. It is unclear whether the lack of upward social mobility was attributable to ethnic or to class factors, particularly in the later stages. Ethnic prejudice was certainly salient in the early stages when acculturation was incomplete. Even if class background has become the prime factor determining a child's subsequent socioeconomic status as some evidence suggests[15], it is still true that non-Anglo-Saxon ethnicity and working class status are correlated even in the third generation so that the appearance of disadvantage to some ethnic groups remains.

Seventy years after the peak of this 'new' migration, ethnic identities still persist. In fact, there has been a recent resurgence of divisions along ethnic lines and many groups are now airing grievances in a truculent manner. There are two prongs to these complaints. One is the lack of dignity attributed to non-Anglo cultures. Those of Italian, Greek, Polish, Slovak and Middle Eastern descent feel deprecated and unacknowledged by the assumptions of the core culture.[16]

Terms like 'Dago' and 'Pollack' continue in common parlance as derogatory labels. Whole genera of jokes (Irish jokes, Polish jokes, Negro jokes) persist and their humour is based largely on stereotypical assumptions; nobody thinks they're funny if they become WASP jokes. This aspect of the grievances shows the persistance of inter-ethnic conflict and a status hierarchy based, in part, on ethnicity. It is also the kind of problem which might be aided by popularising the ideals of multiculturalism as described above.

However, it is the second prong of the complaint which is more serious and pervasive even though rarely articulated clearly, largely perhaps as the result of the dominant American equalitarian ideology or myth. Members of ethnic groups are claiming that giving up certain aspects of their former cultures in favour of some brand of Americanism has been personally and collectively costly, and yet they have not been compensated for this loss by acceptance, understanding or opportunity. The lack of mobility out of the working class and manual occupations of many ethnic groups has led to a sense of being cheated. The prevailing 'American Dream' may have prevented this being expressed in class terms, but the *fact* of their lack of mobility is recognised increasingly. The frustrations may be discussed in status and cultural terms, but the underlying issues are related to class mobility or the lack of it. One never hears a plea for cultural dignity for the German-Americans (although there certainly are negative stereotypes about this group), probably because this ethnic background has not been a barrier to socioeconomic mobility or political participation.

This issue has become especially salient in the past decade when the black population began agitating for civil rights and tangible government assistance. Many blue collar members (very often from ethnic communities) resisted the residential intrusion of the blacks and resented the monetary assistance offered by the governments. While the rhetoric was often one of racism and patriotism, it is inaccurate to view this simply as white 'backlash' or working class ethnic provincialism and bigotry. The black 'ethnic' group was being given preferential treatment, it appeared, over the white ethnic groups who saw themselves being passed over even though patently more deserving by the standards of frugality, sobriety, patriotism and hard work. In other words, it was a case of intergroup conflict over resources and mobility and group self-determination worked out in a fog of ideological posturing, with piety on all sides, including the WASP middle class.

This is not the kind of issue that can be resolved by kind thoughts and understanding. As long as ethnicity and class are correlated and where there is competition for class position, conflict is inevitable. The real point is not the blacks and white ethnics in conflict, but the white middle and upper class Anglos and Assimilates in power. In this context, equalitarian multiculturalism cannot be established.

The Australian situation

The history of Australian immigration is fairly similar to that of the US in its core cultures, Anglo-Saxon dominance, immigration source countries, cultural stereotypes and economic system. Moreover, non-English speaking migrants have been disproportionately concentrated in unskilled blue collar jobs and show every sign of remaining there[17] so that we can expect here, as in the US, that low socioeconomic position and non-Anglo-Saxon (or Northern European) ethnicity will continue to overlap. Nor are ethnic communities showing signs of disappearing into a homogenised general culture rather ethnic identity remains salient. There is also the potential for conflicts and misunderstandings among the various national groups and between ethnics and black minorities, especially if competition increases—for jobs, welfare, residential territory. In other words, all the signs in Australia point towards an outcome of conflict and tension if no changes in current policies occur.

Several measures can be taken, however, to minimise these problems. The most important is to alleviate inequalities in class terms (occupation, income and education). While this would not necessarily provide an ultimate solution to all the problems faced by migrants and their families, it would help to remove the greatest stigma from migrant status. It would also help to prevent ethnic status and low socioeconomic position from coinciding and thereby causing class friction along ethnic lines.

Language learning facilities are probably the most important service here, since language skills are essential for those seeking job mobility and promotion. Existing facilities are inadequate and cannot meet the extent of the need. Similarly, multilingual education for children of migrants needs expansion. In order to mount adequate programs, however, the number of people needing assistance and their linguistic diversity must remain small enough to be manageable. If there are too many people needing to learn English, the scheme becomes either too superficial to be really useful or it doesn't reach a great many of those wishing to participate. Likewise, if too many different language groups are represented, the need for duplication of services (interpreters, translations and the like) becomes overwhelming. Neither of these requirements is consistent with high non-English speaking immigration intakes or with the recruitment of immigrants from cultures not yet significantly represented in Australia. If Australia is to remedy the problems caused by past policies, it must reject high immigration intakes and recruitment from yet more diverse source countries.

Similar points can be made about the provision of other social services of special use to migrants: housing, media, education, job training. There are already a great many programs which we should view as 'Migrant's Compensation', as some kind of obligation to rectify the existing situation. So far there is little evidence of the development of these policies, but even a concerted effort can only be effective if the problem is not further compounded by adding to the number and heterogeneity of immigrants under the banner of multiculturalism.

It goes without saying that there should be great emphasis put on the recognition and appreciation of various cultural traditions and that this can be done through education and the mass media. It may even be possible to make official statements of this policy; why not a Bank Holdiay for the Chinese New Year? But this does not in any way solve the basic structural problems.

There are some people who would argue that Australia should still seek immigrants in large numbers and from diverse cultural sources. It might be claimed that to do otherwise is kow-towing to racism and that Australians should be forced into accommodating a multicultural society on the basis that it's good for the society as a whole and that ethnic diversity is a condition which improves the collective character. Again, this approach ignores the issues of power—and conflict. The costs of such a policy (and they are great) fall not upon the privileged Anglo-Saxon middle class but upon the existing working class and the migrants themselves. These latter groups must cope with disrupted schools, not the middle class who can either easily transfer their children to other schools (public or private) or make up educational deficiencies out of their own personal stock of educational capital. The middle class are not likely to experience either job competition from non-British migrants or disrupted working lives because of language barriers with workmates. The community and neighbourhood patterns of the middle class are not as likely to be upset by the arrival of foreigners with whom they find it difficult to interact. This can often be a serious disruption for working class people integrated into and dependent upon their neighbourhoods.

I am suspicious that much of the enthusiasm from members of the middle class that Australia is so much more cosmopolitan and better off because of non-British immigration reflects not a sincere appreciation of other cultures but rather of a greater range of catering facilities. We eat so much better, and besides it's nice to have one's own special Greek butcher and Italian fruiterer and Yugoslavian restauranteur! But these are largely patron-client relationships, hardly a model of equalitarian multiculturalism. No wonder many middle class members can be so horrified at expressions of cultural chauvinism. With no great threat to our privilege, it's easy to be broadminded. But this security depends on the fact that 'ethnic' usually means unskilled, uneducated and unprovided for.

Conclusion

All this is not to lament the post-war immigration to Australia or the resulting ethnic diversity. I would not choose a monocultural, Anglo-Saxon Australia because ethnic diversity *is* more interesting (and the food *is* better). But this is hardly grounds for recommending further large-scale immigration. The costs of immigration to date have been largely borne by the immigrants themselves who are not enjoying the social mobility and social services they are entitled to expect. It is to these groups that the government should turn its attention and not compound the problems of inter-ethnic relations by adding even more and diverse groups to the society and expecting them to fend for themselves as those who have already immigrated have been obliged to do. 'Multiculturalism' as it is so often described obscures these costs. The most useful counter measures are those which alleviate the economic disadvantages (in the broadest understanding of that term) suffered by the migrants who are already here. Not only is this central to the immigrant's welfare, but it is, in the long term, the only way to circumvent group conflicts and hostilities in the future.

References

1. Some Australians still argue this point of view forcefully but their view rests on muddled concepts of culture and society and seems to have, in many cases, a large component of good old-fashioned bigotry. At this level, the multicultural *ideology* is extremely important in promoting tolerance and understanding and as it applies to *attitudes* about ideology.
2. Price, C. (1966), 'The study of assimilation', in C. Price, *Australian Immigration: A Bibliography and Digest*, ANU Press, Canberra, p. A4.
3. *Ibid*, p. A3.
4. Kovacs, M. & Cropley, A. (1975), *Immigrants and Society*, McGraw-Hill, Sydney, p. 10.

5. Australian Council of Trade Unions (1977), *Social Policy and Problems of the Workforce*, ACTU, Melbourne, Vol.1.
6. van den Berghe, P. L. (1967), *Race and Racism*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, p. 133.
7. *Ibid*, p. 135.
8. Glazer, N. (1973), 'The issue of cultural pluralism in America today', in J. Ryan (ed.), *White Ethnics*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
9. Smolicz, J. (1977), 'Cultural differences and social relations'. Paper given at the University of New England, Seminar on 'Australia's Population—AD 2000', July.
10. Australian Population and Immigration Council (1977), *Immigration Policies and Australia's Population, A Green Paper*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
11. Encel, S. (1970), *Equality and Authority*, Cheshire, Melbourne, Chapter 8.
12. Gordon, M. M. (1964), *Assimilation in American Life*, Oxford University Press, New York.
13. Kovacs & Cropley, *op.cit.*, pp. 43, 46.
14. *Ibid*, p. 40.
15. Duncan, B. & Duncan, O. D. (1968), 'Minorities and the process of stratification', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 33, p. 356.
16. Novak, M. (1971), *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics*, Macmillan, New York. Sennett, R. & Cobb, J. (1972), *The Hidden Injuries of Class*, Knopf, New York. Greeley, A. (1970), *Why Can't They Be Like Us?* Dutton, New York.
17. Lever, C. (1975), *Migrants in the Australian Workforce*, La Trobe Sociology Paper No. 14, La Trobe University Sociology Department, July. Australian Population and Immigration Council, Social Studies Committee (1976), *A Decade of Migrant Settlement*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Source: T. Birrell, 'Migration and the dilemmas of multiculturalism', in R. Birrell & C. Hay (eds), *The Immigration Issue in Australia*, Department of Sociology, La Trobe University, Bundoora, 1978, pp. 133–47.

4

Schooling in a democracy: Transformation or reproduction?

George H. Wood

The social role of schooling in America's postindustrial capitalist democracy can only be contemplated within the implicit contradiction between the promise and reality of American education. The promise is that of educating the children of our society in ways that will aid in their development as literate, thoughtful, and perhaps even compassionate democratic citizens. The reality is schooling which emphasizes the routine, rewards rule-governed behavior, and values conformity over independence in reflecting our limited conception of democracy. This contradiction stems from the inconsistencies inherent in attempting to achieve a system of political equality (democracy) within the confines of a system of economic (and resultant cultural, social, and political) inequality (capitalism). How educators might work within this reality in order to achieve schooling's promise by establishing a definite social role for schools consistent with the ideals of democracy is the focus of this paper.

The current contradictory nature of schooling's promise and reality is probably best seen as the most recent expression of the quintessential educational paradox. Since Plato's great dialogues, philosophers and educators have grappled with the notion that while state-supported schools are, on one hand, expected to serve the state, such actions may not be possible if educators take seriously their obligation to meet the needs of a culture's children. Within our own context this paradox has been illuminated by the revisionist historians who argue that if the school is beholden to the industrial demands of the economy for docile, obedient, and low-paid laborers, it cannot possibly function to enhance the creative and liberational powers of the lower-class children expected to fill those positions.[1] Thus, when contemplating the social role of the school, that is, how the school functions as an institution (among many) concerned with the evolution of the culture within which it is located, educators seemingly must choose between the demands of the capitalist state and the needs of children. Yet, this paradoxial nature of public schooling is easily cast aside by a culture which is either able to meet the physical and spiritual needs of its population or oppress beyond dissent those who are expected to go without. However, during times of cultural stress the educational enterprise becomes the battleground for the hearts and minds of future generations.

---

[1] See S. Bowles and H. Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America* (New York: Basic Books, 1976); W. Feinberg, *Reason and Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations of Twentieth-Century Liberal Educational Policy* (New York: Wiley, 1975); W. Feinberg and H. Rosemont, eds., *War, Technology, and Education: Dissenting Essays in the Intellectual Foundations of American Education* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975); C. Greer, *The Great School Legend: A Revisionist Interpretation of American Public Education* (New York: Basic Books, 1972); C. Karier, P. Violas, and J. Spring, *Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973); C. Karier, ed., *Shaping the American Education State: 1900 to the Present* (New York: The Free Press, 1975); M. Katz, *The Irony of Early School Reform: Educational Innovation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); J. Spring, *Education and the Rise of the Corporate State* (New York: Longman, 1972).

This paradox becomes even more central to the educational enterprise in a democracy. On one hand, the state strives to obtain legitimacy and stability for the existing order. On the other hand, it embraces a creed that stipulates the right of citizens to alter any existing social arrangement. Children are caught in the middle of this ideological tug-of-war through the educational process. On one hand schooling is to make children fit the system, on the other it is to help children remake the system to fit them. Even this paradox can be overcome by a democratic culture if that culture provides for an equal, just, and plentiful social order. Yet when that existing order begins to deny the basic material and social goods to certain of its members, schooling is forced into deciding between the social order or the interests of each of its members.

George S. Counts epitomized this paradox when, over half a century ago, he challenged the educational community to consider whether or not the schools dare build a new social order.[2] His attempt to put into practice Marx's dictum from his *Theses on Feuerbach*, "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is to *change* it,"[3] was a response to the social dislocations of the Depression. Called into question was the very nature of the state, democratic rule, and its relationship to capitalism. Counts observed capitalism in its apparent death throes; glut accompanied by scarcity, hunger by plenty, insecurity by mastery over the physical environment. All accompanied by "an ideal of rugged individualism, evolved in a simple pioneering and agrarian order at a time when free land existed in abundance, used to justify a system which exploits pitilessly and without thought of the morrow the natural and human resources of the nation and the world."[4]

Counts's challenge to educators, his attempt at forcing them to recognize the paradoxical nature of the schooling enterprise, was destined to be a mere footnote in educational history. Capitalism, despite the dire predictions by its opponents, was able to survive in the albeit altered form of the welfare state. World War II provided the social glue needed to set aside the demands of women, minorities, and the poor in the name of national defense and an artificially stimulated economy. The contradictions of capitalism, and the structural limitations it placed upon democracy, faded into the pages of academic journals and Greenwich Village loft apartments.[5] Educators, either unable to generate the will to grapple with Counts's stark claims or unwilling to believe that capitalism and democracy were at best odd bedfellows, devoted themselves to methods and materials that would work through "life adjustment" to fit individuals to the existing reality rather than challenge that reality.[6]

The current social scene is one Counts would recognize immediately: the world economy seems locked into a glut/scarcity cycle that confounds all current economic wisdom; geopolitics follow a course which defies rationality — today the Middle East, the Falkland Islands, and Chad, tomorrow the possibility of the unthinkable; civic institutions seem stripped of all legitimacy by a legacy of public lying and deception that seems summarized by the term Watergate and a string of subsequent "gates"; psychological disorders abound in a society where children are expected to be merely small adults and adults behave like children;[7] public participation in governance declines, factories close, and membership in civic, political, or labor organizations follows a downward trend. In the face of all this, no one seems to believe that recovery is possible, and we seemingly lack the civic courage, talent, or willpower called upon in the 1930s and 1940s to overcome capitalism's latest heart attack. Once again, the irrationality of economic accumulation and concentration in a society which supposedly places a premium on political equality has become apparent. Educators are forced to face the paradox of their calling in deciding upon a social role for the schools.

---

[2] G. S. Counts, *Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?* (New York: Day, 1932).

[3] K. Marx, *Collected Works*, vol. 5 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), 5.

[4] Counts, *Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?*, 31.

[5] See M. Harrington, *Fragments of a Century* (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1973).

[6] See R. deLone, *Small Futures: Children, Inequality, and the Limits of Liberal Reform* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979); and Feinberg, *Reason and Rhetoric*.

[7] Two of the most interesting pieces in the area are C. Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Era of Diminishing Expectations* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979); and D. Elkind, *The Hurried Child* (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1981).

Counts suggested that a society in crisis might just turn to its teachers for guidance in the rebuilding process. While he recognized that schools usually supported the status quo, he was hopeful that, with the status quo generally discredited, schools and teachers could serve as a wellspring of social change. He argued that if teachers could muster the courage, a leaderless society might well be willing to accept their social leadership. The moral authority teachers have to take such a role lies in their representing "not the interests of any special class, but rather the common and abiding interests of the people [thus] teachers are under heavy social obligation to protect and further those interests."[8]

The way to further those interests was to reclaim and teach to students a vision of the good society, a vision worth quoting at length.

> A society fashioned in harmony with the American democratic tradition would combat all forces tending to produce social distinctions and classes; repress every form of privilege and economic parasitism; manifest a tender regard for the weak, the ignorant, and the unfortunate; place the heavier and more onerous social burdens on the backs of the strong; glory in every triumph of man in his timeless urge to express himself and to make the world more habitable; exalt human labor of hand and brain as the creator of all wealth and culture; provide adequate material and spiritual rewards for every kind of socially useful work; strive for genuine equality of opportunity among all races, sects, and occupations; regard as paramount the abiding interests of the great masses of the people; direct the powers of government to the elevation and the refinement of the life of the common man; transform or destroy all conventions, institutions, and special groups inimical to the underlying principles of democracy; and finally be prepared as a last resort, in either the defense or the realization of this purpose, to follow the method of revolution.[9]

Counts spoke at a time in which he believed historical conditions and the will of men were equally ripe for exploiting the contradictory nature of our capitalist democracy. A similar historical period is again upon us.

Following Counts, the argument herein is that there can be a definite, purposeful, and perhaps even radical social role for schools, or more precisely the educators within them, to play in our democracy. During the current period of cultural crisis and disarray, educators have the opportunity to exert some of the leadership necessary for a social rebirth. This will only be possible, however, if they can capture for themselves a vision of democracy and social life that celebrates rather than condemns the right of all individuals to self-governance. In so doing, they would be forced to side with children and the promise of education as opposed to the state and schooling's current reality. This paper is an attempt to locate legitimate grounds for educators to claim such a role and begin the discussion on how such a role would be reflected in educational practice. To do this, it is first necessary to locate the current social role played by schooling within the nexus of the state, our limited current conception of democracy, and the recent crescendo of criticism of public schooling. Next, the essence of what it means to live in a democracy, perhaps the essence of democracy itself, must be recaptured from the limitations placed upon it by capitalism, and a pedagogy which fulfills the promise of schooling within a democracy, in the face of its limited reality, must be spelled out and advocated within the political sphere of educational praxis. Finally, the limitations of such a proposal and the hope it bears for a better world will be discussed.

---

[8] Counts, *Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?*, 26.

[9] Ibid., 38.

SCHOOLING FOR A CORPORATE ORDER

An attempt to segregate the social role schools play from any other role, be it academic or vocational, is to ignore what we have come to see as the deeper meanings of school curriculum, organization, and methodology. Since Phillip Jackson's[10] pioneering look at life inside classrooms, an extensive number of theoretical and empirical studies have emerged to illuminate the social role schooling plays through the covert messages of the hidden curriculum. While the history and relative merits of such discourse have been extensively discussed,[11] it is worth reexamining what this material reveals, and often conceals, about the social role currently played by schools. To do this the most significant findings from hidden curriculum work will be discussed, and citizenship education, a deliberate attempt at establishing a social role for schools, will be examined within the hidden curriculum paradigm. How these understandings of the hidden curriculum illuminate the current limited conception of democracy within which schools and the larger society operate will then be considered. Finally, the way in which this rationality dominates current reform efforts will be explored and used as a stepping stone to exploring an alternative social role for schools — preparing children for their essential public, civic function of acting as democratic citizens.

The Hidden Curriculum

Not always hidden,[12] the covert messages of schooling penetrate the entire educational enterprise and provide what social role the school plays. Having moved beyond earlier discoveries of random instances of domination, intimidation, or indoctrination, work on the hidden curriculum has matured to linking the structures of schooling to the structures of society. These theories suggest that the state/child paradox has been resolved in favor of the state at the current moment. Schools, according to these theorists, reproduce the necessary human capital to maintain existing social relations. At the same time, they work to limit, even to prevent, questions from being raised or challenges from being launched against the prevailing order by those who would most benefit by a change. Such theorists have utilized Marx's concept of reproduction in understanding the role of the hidden curriculum: "Every social process of production is, at the same time, a process of reproduction. . . . Capitalist production, therefore . . . produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also produces and reproduces the capitalist relation, on the one side the capitalist, on the other the wage-labourer."[13]

Reproductive theories of education have worked to understand schooling in three ways.[14] Originating with Marx, it is not surprising that the first of the reproductive theories operated within an economic rationality. Beginning with the work of Bowles and Gintis, schooling's hidden messages were never again to be assumed to be random occurrences of social control. Their work, heavily influenced by the Marxist reproductive paradigms best represented by Althusser,[15] linked the form and substance of schooling to the capitalist productive model. As Giroux points out, "In this view, the underlying experience and relations of schooling are animated by the power of capital to provide different skills, attitudes, and values to students of different classes, races, and genders. In effect, schools mirror not only the social division of labor but also the wider society's class structure."[16] Thus, students in schools are provided with class-stratified knowledge and behavior which readily lends itself to an ideology celebrating obedience and docility as opposed to critical thought and action.

---

[10] P. W. Jackson, *Life in Classrooms* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968).

[11] See M. Apple, ed., *Cultural and Economic Reproduction in Education* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983); H. Giroux and D. Purpel, eds., *The Hidden Curriculum and Moral Education: Deception or Discovery?* (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan Publishing, 1983); H. Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education: A Pedagogy for the Opposition* (South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey, 1983); H. Giroux, "Theories of Reproduction and Resistance in the New Sociology of Education: A Critical Analysis," *Harvard Educational Review* 53, no. 3 (August 1983): 257-93; J. Karabel and A. H. Halsey, eds., *Power and Ideology in Education* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); M. Young and G. Whitty, eds., *Society, State and Society* (London: The Falmer Press, 1977).

[12] See E. Vallance, "Hiding the Hidden Curriculum," *Curriculum Theory Network* 4, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 1973/74): 5-21.

[13] K. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), 531-32.

[14] The following outline of reproductive theories of education draws heavily upon a prepublication manuscript supplied to me by Henry Giroux. His review of current reproductive and resistance theory in education has since been published by the *Harvard Educational Review* 53, no. 3 (August 1983), and is the single most comprehensive examination of this work to date. The reader wanting to pursue this topic further should consult Giroux's piece.

To facilitate such a process, Bowles and Gintis invoked what they termed the "correspondence principle." Resting upon Althusser's[17] law of reproduction in which superstructural institutions, such as the school, can only operate to reflect and recreate the economic structure of a society, the correspondence principle posits a relationship between schooling and work. In this relationship our technocratic, hierarchical, and antidemocratic economic order is justified by appeals to meritocracy. Thus, schools foster an ideological landscape in which students, as workers, learn to compete for limited rewards in a "rigged" competition that appears to be equal.[18] Schools legitimate the dominant social ideology by fostering a "general consciousness among individuals which prevents the formation of the social bonds and critical understandings whereby existing social conditions might be transformed."[19] The only way to alter this relationship is to recognize that "the major characteristics of the educational system in the United States today flow directly from its role in producing a workforce able and willing to staff occupational positions in the capitalist system. We conclude that the creation of an equal and liberating school system requires a revolutionary transformation of economic life."[20]

Attempting to move beyond the functionalist nature of much of the economic reproduction work is that of Pierre Bourdieu.[21] Dismissing such work as overly deterministic, Bourdieu argues that schools are relatively autonomous social institutions that have adopted the cultural symbols and forms of the dominant social elite. Thus, while appearing to be neutral sites of social transmission, schools in fact promote inequality in the guise of objectivity and fairness. Located within the concept of cultural capital, Bourdieu argues that schools "confirm the culture of the ruling class while simultaneously disconfirming the cultures of other groups."[22]

This understanding of cultural reproduction moves beyond economic reproductive models in seeing the dominated classes as actually playing a part in their own domination. The political nature of the curriculum, evolving through the larger culture's struggle over what configurations of social commodities such as work, art, and history are valued, is confronted as fundamental in understanding the social role of schooling. It is not only economic structures, but social and cultural structures as well that influence and control the logic of schooling.

Perhaps most directly related to this discussion of the social role of schools in a democracy is the hegomonic-state reproductive model of schooling. These theories are concerned with how the state is controlled by or related to the capitalist economic system and then how the state is related to schooling. Arguing that state institutions work through both repressive functions as well as ideological means to support the structures of capitalism,[23] these theorists[24] claim the state strives to separate economic issues from political discourse. Thus, the only social issues that are left are those concerned with individual rights.

---

[15] Among L. Althusser's works referred to here are *Essays in Self-Criticism*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1976); *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971); *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1969).

[16] Giroux, "Theories of Reproduction and Resistance," 263.

[17] See the essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in Altusser's *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* for the clearest discussion of this concept.

[18] See W. Ryan's *Equality* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), on this point.

[19] Bowles and Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America* 101.

[20] Ibid., 265.

[21] See P. Bourdieu, *Outline of Theory and Practice* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1977); and Bourdieu and J. C. Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture* (London: Sage, 1977).

[22] Giroux, "Theories of Reproduction and Resistance," 268.

The state, through support of public education, works in a variety of ways to protect and reproduce this limited conception of democracy. Perhaps the clearest statement of this is offered by Apple:

> The state will take on the large initial cost of basic research and development. It then "transfers" the fruits of it back to the "private sector" once it becomes profitable. The state's role in capital accumulation is very evident in its subsidization of the production of technical/administrative knowledge. . . . examples of this pattern of intervention are becoming more visible. They include the emphasis on competency-based education, systems management, career education, futurism (often a code word for manpower planning), continued major funding for mathematics and science curriculum development (when compared to the arts), national testing programs. . . . All of these and more signal the sometimes subtle and sometimes quite overt role of state intervention into schooling to attempt to maximize efficient production of both the agents and the knowledge required by an unequal economy.[25]

What have these three lines of inquiry into the hidden curriculum revealed about the social role of the schools? First, it seems clear that traditionally the schools have operated to support and legitimate the dominant cultural, social, and economic order. This is not a remarkable finding. What makes it important are the aspects of the social order that seem most clearly reflected by schools. It seems that in a state which pays frequent lip service to political equality and, at a minimum, equality of social opportunity, the schools instead reinforce political, cultural, social, and economic inequality.[26] Thus, one of the most crucial current social roles of public schooling seems to be the reproduction of an unequal social order. While there are important limitations to the work of reproduction theorists (see below), they have at least made clear the ways in which schools play a social role acceptable to the dominant culture.

What are the messages that schools convey to students leading to their "fit" within the dominant rationality? This query leads us to the second lesson one can take from reproductive theorists with regards to school's social role — that schools teach a limited, very limited, vision of democracy. By removing economics from politics, imposing only particular cultural configurations as being appropriate, limiting student and teacher participation in school decision making, glorifying a hierarchical, rule-governed administrative organization, and removing from the curriculum any mention of citizen action or resistance, schools seem to limit our vision of democracy to an occasional trip to

---

23. See A. Gramsci, *The Prison Notebooks*, trans. Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971).

24. For example, see M. Apple, *Education and Power* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982); and N. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: New Left Books, 1973).

25. Apple, *Education and Power*, 54-55.

26. A brief sampling of the theoretical and empirical work in this area includes J. Anyon, "Social Class and the Hidden Curriculum of Work," *Journal of Education* 162, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 67-92; J. Anyon, "Ideology and United States History Textbooks," *Harvard Educational Review* 49, no. 3 (August 1979): 361-86; T. Sieber, "The Politics of Middle-Class Success in an Inner-City School," *Journal of Education* 164, no. 1 (Winter 1982): 30-47; Bowles and Gintis's, *Schooling in Capitalist America;* R. Rist, "Student Social Class and Teacher Expectations: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Ghetto Education," *Harvard Educational Review* 40, no. 3 (August 1970): 416-51; M. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979); M. Apple and N. King, "What Do Schools Teach?" *The Hidden Curriculum and Moral Education: Deception or Discovery;* H. Giroux, *Ideology, Culture, and the Process of Schooling* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981).

the ballot box. Gone is the active participant; enter the passive consumer. How this role fits with our current conception of democracy and how this conception of democracy is limited in ways opposed to democracy in its best sense will be discussed below. What is important to note here is that by adopting such a limited sense of democracy, schools often play a social role characterized again (as above) as supporting the existing social order — even when doing so is not in the best interest of students.

The third lesson taken from reproductive theory is the positivistic, pseudoscientific nature of much of what passes for teaching and learning in schools. Curriculum reflects only "truths" handed down from authorities in the field. Knowledge is reified, and human agency is removed from considerations of how one "knows." A steady stream of objective facts is given students who are never encouraged to see knowledge as a contested terrain. Teaching as well ceases to be a creative activity but is instead a cookbook process based upon "scientific" methods. As Apple[27] has pointed out, the curriculum has become "teacher proofed" and thus reflects a world where all the important issues are resolved.[28] Creative thought, critical inquiry, reflective thinking all seem unnecessary in a society where the problems are merely technical. The social role of the school seems best described as working to depoliticize questions of value, social policy, and cultural goals by substituting a faith in science and technology. These twin cures for all of our ills are not subject to citizen control, but are best placed in the hands of experts removed from the political sphere. Again, schools function to support the dominant, unequal social order by limiting the democratic sphere to contain only choices between competing elites, not between competing social visions.

Finally, reproduction theories illuminate the ways in which schooling elevates particular cultural forms at the expense of others. Not only are choices made about modes of speech, thought, and behavior, but history as well falls under the rubric of neutral cultural norms. While the school claims to be merely presenting a previously agreed upon and generally resolved cultural heritage, it is, in fact, doing cultural violence to the diverse traditions children bring to school. By reflecting the supposed norm which operates within the larger framework of political and social power, the cultural traditions borne by children which vary from this norm, including traditions of political resistance, economic conflict, and social creativity, are seen as only deviant and are best rejected. This process is easily seen in the work of social linguists who link language forms to social power.[29] More importantly, the notion of cultural capital, those meanings, symbols, and objects that legitimate particular forms of social action (or inaction), emerges from this work, helping us understand the role schools play as a cultural moderator. Moderating the struggle between oppressed and dominant cultures, schools lead students to see the dominant culture as the norm and any of their own lived cultures that vary from that norm as deviant. Thus, they reject the very heritage they know and take a second-class position in a culture imposed upon them.

Given the reproductive model, it seems clear that for the moment schools have accepted as resolution of the state/child paradox the side of the state. Only by ignoring the unequal outcomes of schooling as demanded by the culture at large can educators continue to play the social role currently employed. This is not to argue that educators have, in fact, literally abandoned their charges to serve the needs of the state. Rather, by serving the state they seem to believe that they are meeting the needs of students in the best possible manner. This becomes clearer when we look at the current democratic rationality that captures our vision of democracy and demands schooling for the status quo.

---

[27] M. Apple, *Cultural and Economic Reproduction in Education* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982).

[28] See also the recent work of K. Sirotnik, "What You See Is What You Get: Consistency, Persistency, and Mediocrity in Classroom," *Harvard Educational Review* 53, no. 1 (February 1983): 16-31; and J. I. Goodlad, *A Place Called School* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983).

[29] See B. Berstein, *Class, Codes, and Control: Towards a Theory of Educational Transmission* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977).

Contemporary Democratic Theory

Carole Pateman[30] has provided us with the definitive work outlining the contemporary Western framework of democracy. Tracing this theory through the work of Schumpeter,[31] Berelson,[32] Dahl,[33] Sartori,[34] and others, she has argued that the contemporary theorists have abandoned the essence of classical democracy. Later her argument for a democratic renaissance will be examined; here her discussion of the contemporary theory which dominates democratic discourse is briefly outlined.

Pateman argues that fundamental to the contemporary theory of democracy arising from all of these analyses is the minimal role played by popular participation. This springs first from contemporary theorists' view that classical theories of democracy (though they never clearly specify what classical theorists they have in mind), having maximum participation as a central theme, are obsolete. The second influence at play is a fear of totalitarianism and the belief, taken from the experience of the Weimar Republic, that mass participation predicates a collapse into instability. That is, an increase in political participation by present nonparticipants, primarily those in the lower socioeconomic status brackets who supposedly do not share the democratic attitude, would lead to political instability and open the door to antidemocratic or totalitarian governance.

These contemporary theories have wrapped themselves in the mantle of empiricism. This began with Schumpeter's argument that classical democratic theories rested on empirically unrealistic grounds ignoring the undemocratic attitudes among the populace. To replace such theory, he argued that, given this attitudinal problem, democracy could best function by embracing the competition by potential decision makers for the people's vote. By this single move and through similar arguments for political elites (which seem to mirror economic elites within the capitalist system) founded on a claimed empirical basis, the whole nature of democratic theory was transformed.

This transformation from participatory democracy to what is labeled protective democracy began in the 1940s and was completed in the 1950s. Berelson, in agreement with Schumpeter, argued that the attributes needed by citizens in the classical participatory model could not be found in empirical research. Thus, limited participation and political apathy played a positive function for democratic systems preventing the undue stress of intense political conflict. It was left for Dahl to complete the transition of democratic theory from participatory to protectionist. His argument that the most important element of a democratic system is the election process, by which nonelites chose political elites to govern, closed the circle: democracy was a system within which some citizens make leadership choices not in order to make political decisions, but to protect individual or group interests.

It is fairly clear that the contemporary theorists have done nothing more than describe reality rather than outline democracy's promise. Indeed, those who gain the least from the current economic and social order are the least likely to vote. Thus, the system is guaranteed relative stability as those issues of concern to the nonvoters, primarily economic and primarily involving an alteration of existing economic structures, are not addressed.

Additionally, the role of the citizens in Western democracies is largely limited to attendance in the voting booth. In fact, direct action on social issues — picketing, protesting, democratic takeovers — is widely discouraged as counterproductive or only symbolic. Further, voters are limited to choosing between elites for representatives' political posts but do not choose the direct decision makers on the economic front.[36]

---

[30] C. Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

[31] J. A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1943).

[32] B. R. Berelson, "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Summer 1952): 313-30.

[33] R. A. Dahl, *Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

[34] G. Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1962).

Schools, operating as quasi-reproductive institutions, work to produce students "safe" for such a protective system. By generally endorsing the system and glorifying limited democracy, giving the impression that all "real" knowledge is objective and thus best used by impartial technocrats to solve public problems, and legitimizing a culture that comfortably functions in such a limited democracy, schools work to encourage passive citizenship. This is even more clearly seen in what currently passes for "civic education" — the most direct attempt by schools to play a social role.

Civic Education

In the area of what is currently referred to as civic education, the current social role of schools presents itself most clearly. Primarily, civic education has fallen under the banners of either citizenship transmission or a social-science approach.[38] In both models knowledge is assumed to be value free and democracy a concept limited to only a few public spheres. With the former, the idea is that students will learn, through reading or simulation, the appropriate role of a citizen. Such a role is best demonstrated by Remy's *Handbook of Citizen Competencies*[37] in which the emphasis seems to be upon making citizens safe for democracy. This is done by endorsing only political tools and citizen activities which fit within the current democratic rationality such as voting, letter writing, interest group formation, and the like. In addition, those elements explicitly feared by contemporary democratic theorists for their destablizing impact upon the system, lower socio-economic status groups in particular, are seldom, if ever, addressed.[39]

This reflection of contemporary theory in the citizenship transmission model is further illustrated in the explicit content of citizenship education programs. Witness the emphasis upon choosing leadership elites wisely and holding them responsible. Seldom, if ever, is the content of such programs devoted to the actual making of decisions — the focus is on the once-removed step of choosing the decision choosers. Secondly, the social studies content in general is filled only with examples of great men and/or women making decisions — never examples of common people banding together to change their lives and circumstances through direct decision making. Third, the Western democratic system itself is seemingly removed from scrutiny. Once it passes muster in comparison to Soviet totalitarianism (not to be confused with South African authoritarianism), the protectionist democracy of the West is fully embraced. Nary a word is said in the curriculum about the potential contradictions between capitalism and democracy, the need of the system for nonparticipation, or the limits on decision making.

The social science model, while it goes beyond the notions of citizenship transmission by seeming to make students active and creative thinkers, recycles the very assumptions of citizenship transmission it seeks to redress. This is because notions of critical thinking and social conflict slip away before the priestly chairs of the scientific experts. While claims are made that students "choose" solutions in response to social problems they are inquiring about, the deck is in fact stacked in favor of technocratic solutions proposed by experts. Thus, social problems are not resolved on an historical, political, or normative terrain over which varying notions of right and wrong are put forth outside of objective scientific discourse. Instead, students face a cookbook

---

35. For an interesting recent statement of this position, see George Will, "In Defense of Non-Voting," *Newsweek*, 10 October 1983.

36. See Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education*.

37. R. C. Remy, *Handbook of Citizen Competencies* (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1980).

38. Similar critiques could be made of J. P. Shaver, ed., *Building Rationales for Citizenship Education* (Arlington, Va.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1977); and F. Newmann, *Education for Citizen Action* (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan, 1975).

approach in which only certain types of knowledge are legitimate and solutions to problematic situations are judged on their technical rather than humane merits.

How is it that an educational program such as civic education, stemming from a genuine desire on the part of educators to help students as "educated citizen(s) act upon an unswerving loyalty to democratic ideals,"[39] turns out to serve such a limited conception of democracy? Again we come face to face with the paradoxical nature of education's social role: in attempting to serve students, the overriding logic of the state directs educators to work at fitting students to the preexisting roles for them in the cultural, political, and economic matrix of postindustrial capitalism. Of course, to adopt such roles may, on the surface, make a great deal of sense. But in the long run the roles and actions endorsed and embraced limit and perhaps destroy the abilities, hopes, potentialities, and dreams students have for a better world. Thus, civic education works to reproduce the established social order through limiting the sphere of democratic operations and further refusing to develop the skills needed by democratic citizens critically to examine claims to objective truth, to challenge the opinions of experts, and to utilize their own histories in both opposing the dominant order and building a new one.

Any suggestion that such models are soon to be repudiated by schools is belied by recent government-sponsored reports on the future role of the schools. Dominating the popular press and current Presidential campaign rhetoric is the claim that "our educational foundations are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity threatening our very future as a nation and a people."[40] To combat this feared flood, a program of "new basics" is recommended.[41] The ways in which this program of "new basics" would merely extend the current social role of schooling as described by reproductive theorists is most clearly seen in the recommendations dealing with science and social studies:

> 3. The teaching of science in high school should provide graduates with an introduction to: (a) the concepts, laws, and processes of the physical and biological sciences; (b) the methods of scientific inquiry and reasoning; (c) the application of scientific knowledge to everyday life; and (d) the social and environmental implications of scientific and technological development. Science courses must be revised and updated for both the college-bound and those not intending to go to college. An example of such work is the American Chemical Society's "Chemistry in the Community" program.
> 4. The teaching of social studies in high school should be designed to: (a) enable students to fix their places and possibilities within the larger social and cultural structure; (b) understand the broad sweep of both ancient and contemporary ideas that have shaped our world; and (c) understand the fundamentals of how our economic system works and how our political system functions; and (d) grasp the difference between free and repressive societies. An understanding of each of these areas is requisite to the informed and committed exercise of citizenship in our free society.[42]

Little comment is necessary to point out the reproductive nature of such recommendations. Returning to the lessons gained from the reproductive theorists, the ways in which such proposals operate are quite clear. First, they would only operate to reinforce the dominant society by linking politics with the economy (recommendation 4a and 4c) and setting up our society as "free" and thus superior to all others (recommendation 4d). In addition, the very content of such curricular programs would be dictated by those who have the greatest stake in containing democratic inquiry so as to leave their own actions beyond control (e.g., the American Chemical Society).

---

[39] This enduring rationale statement is taken from the National Education Association's 1938 statement, "Purposes of Education in American Democracy."

[40] National Commission on Excellence in Education, *A Nation at Risk* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, 1983), 5.

[41] Similar programs have been offered, such as M. Adler's *The Paideia Proposal: An Educational Manifesto* (New York: Macmillan, 1982).

[42] National Commission on Excellence in Education, *A Nation at Risk*, 24-25.

Second, the notion of democracy would be limited to current conceptions of protectionist democracy. Stressing the present system's "long-standing" nature (recommendation 4b), its ability to provide everyone a "place" (recommendation 4a), and its comparatively positive nature (recommendation 4d), the message is that there is no need for expansion of the current model or for change. In fact, the very notion of change, struggle, even revolution as democratic tools is totally absent.[43]

Third, the very conception of knowledge here is locked within the positivistic notion of objective facts. The solution to social problems rests on the correct, objective application of science (recommendations 3a and 3d). The scientific knowledge to be used is, or course, objective, rational, and true, conforming with a positivist notion of science (recommendations 3a and 3b). Nothing is said here which would lead us to believe that knowledge is at best problematic and that the positivist notion of science itself is not generally accepted.[44] Rather, truth exists in a vacuum, to be merely passed on and absorbed.

Fourth, the recommendations seem to occur in a cultural vacuum in which only one cultural tradition of knowing (recommendation 3b) and of social organization (recommendation 4b) is acceptable. These recommendations are silent on the existence of oppositional cultures. In fact, the very idea that students come with divergent cultural backgrounds is totally lost throughout the monolithic structure proposed for schools. Looking at the report's recommendations as to standards, what is most striking is the reliance on standardized testing and uniform objectives. What this means, when put within the framework of the curricular recommendations, is an educational arena in which students are evaluated solely on their ability to reproduce precisely the knowledge, values, cultural symbols, and the like of the dominant culture.

Yet the recent spate of such reports may indeed prove advantageous to educators desiring to relocate the role of the public school within the best intentions of democracy. Public interest in public education is increasing. A primary concern among many parents is the seeming inability of public schooling to give their offspring the benefits so often claimed, simply stated as a better life. Educators need to seize the moment, work with parent groups to help locate this failure within the relationship of schooling and the dominant social order, and present the alternative of educating for participatory democracy. Such a relationship should be informed by Johnson's argument that

> being actively educative is not just a question of "carrying a policy to the public" or destroying myths about public education. It involves learning too. It involves really listening to popular experiences of formal education. It involves research, centering around particular struggles and local issues. It involves making links with other local agencies — researchers, community activities, black groups, women's groups — not to take them over, but learn from their experiences and practices.[45]

In so doing, educators might be better able to come to the defense of public education, fending off attacks that only insist on more of the same and taking the offensive in arguing that schools do have a definitive social purpose — a service defined by the imperative to create a literate, democratic, and active citizenry, that is, citizens who would be self-governing and active in shaping the public welfare.

---

[43] I am indebted to my colleague Dr. Crystal Gips, herself a former school principal, for pointing out how passivity in general pervades these recommendations. Note how students are to be "introduced" to, and thus learn, science rather than doing it. Students are seen throughout as passive receptors rather than active producers or expressors — exactly the role they are expected to play politically.

[44] Two of the better discussions on the nature of science continue to be T. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); and P. Feyerabrand, *Science in a Free Society* (London: New Left Books, 1978).

[45] R. Johnson, "Socialism and Popular Education," *Socialism and Education* (Winter 1981).

Creating a New Social Role

> Education has fundamental connections with the idea of human emancipation, though it is constantly in danger of being captured for other interests. In a society disfigured by class exploitation, sexual and racial oppression, and in chronic danger of war and environmental destruction, the only education worth the name is one that forms people capable of taking part in their own liberation. The business of the school is not propaganda. It is equipping people with the knowledge and skills and concepts relevant to remaking a dangerous and disordered world. In the most basic sense, the process of education and the process of liberation are the same. They are aspects of the painful growth of the human species' collective wisdom and self-control. At the beginning of the 1980s it is plain that the forces opposed to that growth here and on the world scale are not only powerful but have become increasingly militant. In such circumstances, education becomes a risky enterprise. Teachers too have to decide whose side they are on.[46]

If schools and educators are to recognize their potential to serve students, liberating them as it were from protectionist democracy, it will require that educators display themselves and instill in students a sense of civic courage. As Giroux puts it, civic courage means helping students gain the willingness to act *as if* they were living in a democratic society. At its core, this form of education is political, and its goal is a "genuine democratic society, one that is responsive to the needs of all and not just of a privileged few."[47]

Before this can be done, the limitations of reproductive educational theory must be overcome. While reproductive theory does help reveal the deeper structures of the hidden curriculum, linking them with the dominant rationality of the state, they also work to limit insight into schooling. More precisely, what escapes from these theories is any notion of human agency. Extensively argued by Giroux[48] and others,[49] this suggests that reproductive theorists have an all too passive notion of human beings. Locked into their structuralist understanding of society, they look at schooling as if it were a black box. Students enter, and passive workers emerge. But how the process occurs, what actually happens within school walls, escapes the reproductive theorists' gaze. Thus, in spite of the insights provided by reproductive theory, there seems to be no alternative role for schools to play other than that they describe. As Boggs has put it, "It is a strange paradox of Marxism that a theory that has shaped and inspired the greatest revolutionary movements of this century has at the same time given birth — particularly in the most advanced capitalist societies — to a powerful non-political tradition."[50]

Attempting to recapture human agency without losing the notion of structural influences has been the work of the new sociology of education, often titled resistance theory. Pioneered by Paul Willis's study of working-class students' oppositional culture in schools,[51] this line of inquiry has fostered a wide variety of looks inside the schoolhouse doors to see how students not only accept, but often reject, mediate, or ignore the message of schooling.[52] What these studies demonstrate is that students of dominated cultures, through their actions in schools, often penetrate the fallacy of schooling for them and thus come to reject its covert messages.[53]

---

[46] R. W. Connell, P. J. Ashenden, S. Kessler, and G. W. Dowsett, *Making the Difference* (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1982).

[47] Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education*, 201.

[48] Ibid.; Giroux, "Theories of Reproduction and Resistance," and *Ideology, Culture, and the Process of Schooling*.

[49] See G. H. Wood, "Beyond Radical Educational Cynicism," *Educational Theory* 32, no. 2 (Spring 1982), and *Schools, Social Change and the Politics of Paralysis* (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1981); D. Kellner, "Ideology, Marxism, and Advanced Capitalism," *Socialist Review* 8, no. 2 (1978): 37-65; M. Erben and D. Gleeson, "Education as Reproduction: A Critical Examination of Some Aspects of the Work of Louis Althusser," in *Schooling, State, and Society*.

[50] C. Boggs, "Gramsci's Prison Notebooks," *Socialist Revolution* 2, no. 5 (September-October 1972): 79.

[51] P. Willis, *Learning to Labour: How Working-Class Kids Get Working-Class Jobs* (London: Saxon House, 1977).

Resistance theorists, through observing actual student behavior in the schools, suggest that a variety of things happen to school messages that are completely unintended. First, these covert messages are often directly rejected, through patterns of student deviance that often replicate shop-floor worker resistance. Secondly, they are often merely ignored in a passive fashion as students are unwilling to engage themselves at all in the educative enterprise. Finally, students create their own cultural structures which they use to defend themselves from the imposition of the schools.[54] The unfortunate side of this oppositional behavior is that these students reject the very tools available for their own liberation (literacy primary among them) and thus are indeed condemned to a life on the margin.

This is not to suggest that resistance theory has resolved all the problems of understanding cultural and social reproduction through schools. In fact, much of the resistance theory tends to glorify the oppositional behavior of students regardless of the consequences. Thus, sexist, racist, and violent behavior is at times suggested to be the key to liberation. One suspects that this unwillingness to criticize such behavior as counterproductive and antisocial stems from a fear of imposing values upon students and thus behaving in ways already deemed unacceptable when carried out by schools at the present time. This avoids the fact that schooling, regardless of its master, is always a form of imposition. Dewey[55] was one of the first to argue that such imposition was possible in the name of a good society. For educators who believe that there is a better world possible and that schools can play a role in bringing about that world, resistance theory demonstrates a dent in the armor of social determination. The task is to locate a pedagogy that utilizes such oppositional behavior in the name of a democratic transformation.

Rather than succumbing to the capitalist domination of the democratic political system and serving the state over students, educators could see themselves as using student resistance in order to foster a social role for schooling devoted to human liberation and fulfillment. If such a space does exist within the life of the school, what legitimate alternative roles for educators might exist? In order to establish such a role, it is first necessary to return to our consideration of democracy and attempt to establish a theory of democracy that serves people first and structures second.

Participatory Democratic Theory

Earlier it was suggested that current democratic theory and practice is locked within a protectionist rationality. That rationality favors limiting participation in the governing process to the elite and narrowing the scope of those issues deemed worthy of the political process. The social toll of our protectionist theory is becoming all too clear. Millions of the culturally disenfranchised recognize that they are not wanted nor needed by the political system and abandon it. Elections have become merely fundraising contests, and politics have reached an all-time low for mudslinging in an attempt to bring out the darker side (the racist, sexist, fearful, selfish side) of the electorate's protectionist nature.

---

[52] See, for example, Women's Study Group, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, eds., *Women Take Issue* (London: Hutchinson, 1978); D. Robins and P. Cohen, *Knuckle Sandwich: Growing up in a Working-Class City* (London: Pelican Books, 1978); P. Corrigan, *Schooling and the Smash Street Kids* (London: Macmillan, 1979); A. McRobbie and T. McCabe, *Feminism for Girls* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981); T. Popkewitz, B. R. Tabachnick, and G. Wehlage, *The Myth of Educational Reform* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982); P. Olsen, "Inequality Remade: The Theory of Correspondence and the Context of French Immersion in Northern Ontario," *Journal of Education* 165, no. 1 (Winter 1983): 75-76.

[53] See Willis, *Learning to Labour*.

[54] See P. Willis, "Cultural Production and Theories of Reproduction," in *Race, Class and Education*, ed. L. Barton and S. Walker (London: Croom-Helm, 1983).

[55] J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1916), and *Experience and Education* (New York: Kappa Delta Pi, 1938).

As an alternative to such a system, educators and others should strive to recapture the participatory framework upon which the dream of American democracy rests. Pateman[56] demonstrates how such a framework's rationale is found in Rousseau's *The Social Contract:* (1) Participatory systems are self-sustaining, because the very qualities required of citizens if such a system is to work are those that participation itself fosters; (2) participation increases one's "ownership" over decisions, thus making public decisions more easily acceptable by individuals; and (3) participation has an integrative function — helping individuals establish the feeling that they belong. These premises were further developed by theorists John Stewart Mill[57] and G. D. H. Cole.[58] Mill argued that the primary consideration in considering a society or government to be good was the effect that system had upon individuals. Rather than concern himself with efficiency, as contemporary theorists are want to do, Mill argued that participatory democracy fostered within individuals the psychological attributes needed in self-governance. In addition, Mill and Cole argued that these characteristics are best developed at the local level. Through such local participation citizens come to own decisions on an immediate level and develop those skills and attitudes necessary for self-governance in the national arena.

What particularly is meant by referring to attributes needed for self-governance? J. S. Mill argued that an active character would emerge from participation, and Cole suggested that a nonservile character would be generated. What this seems to mean is that individuals should have the confidence that they indeed are fit to govern themselves. The term often utilized to describe such a state is known as a sense of political efficacy; that is, as Campbell et al.[59] have pointed out, the belief that individual political action does have an impact on decision making and that it is thus worthwhile to perform one's civic duties. In fact, there is empirical evidence to suggest that participation does enhance feelings of political efficacy. Studies by Almond and Verba[60] and Carnoy and Shearer[61] point out that participatory models in local governments, workplaces, and associations do lead to higher levels of participation in national politics.

Let us be clear about what is meant in these theories and studies when the term participation is utilized. Three conditions must be obtained: first, the participants must be in the position of decision maker rather than decision influencer; second, all participants must be in possession of, or have access to, the requisite information on which decisions can be reached; and third, full participation requires equal power on the part of participants to determine the outcomes of decisions. The research suggests that when individuals experience participation in this sense at a local level, they will gain a greater sense of political efficacy in the national arena.[62]

Educators must recognize that the social role they play within schools depends upon the conception of democracy, participatory or protective, which they choose. Fundamentally that choice is between two polar opposites. On one hand rests a conception of democracy within which the participation of the minority elite is crucial and the nonparticipation of the apathetic ordinary man is necessary to maintain the system's stability. On the other hand, democracy is conceived as encompassing the

---

56. Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory.*

57. See J. S. Mill, *Collected Works* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), and *Essays on Politics and Culture* (New York: Random House, 1963).

58. G. D. H. Cole, *Social Theory* (London: Methuen, 1920).

59. A. Campbell, G. Gurin, and W. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Chicago: Row and Peterson, 1954).

60. G. A. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945).

61. M. Carnoy and D. Shearer, *Workplace Democracy: The Challenge of the 1980s* (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1980).

62. See also H. Boyte, *The Backyard Revolution* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980).

broadest participation of the people working to develop political efficacy and a sense of belonging in order to further extend and enhance participation.

Teachers, from their own experience, know intuitively the reality of protectionist as opposed to participatory democracy. Faced daily with protectionist limits upon their own lives, through the teacher-proofing of curriculum, external demands for standardized competency tests, and the increased bureaucratization of schools, they confront the stifling nature of the current social rationality. If they could link their struggles for academic freedom and democratic civil liberties to the same struggles carried on by their students and parents outside of the school, their conception of democracy could be broadened to embrace participatory theory. Only when all of society is liberated from the protectionist mind-set will teachers be allowed to move toward direct control of their own social conditions. Such knowledge should provide sufficient rationale for educators to base their social role upon democracy in its participatory sense. If such a vision of democracy is adopted, what does that mean pedagogically? Developing such a pedagogy demands retaining what is useful from reproduction theorists and acting upon the possibilities offered by resistance theorists. What follows is informed by the understanding that schools always operate within an existing social reality, but that men and women can alter what is reality to mirror what they favor as a possibility.[63]

Pedagogy for Democratic Participation

It is important to note at the outset that what is to be suggested here is not a full-blown and predetermined curriculum. To suggest such would only be one more step in the devaluing of teaching and would most certainly be debased itself into mere cookbook practice. Rather, what is suggested are the parameters educators who are concerned with capturing for themselves a unique social role through schools should use as a referent. If indeed a historical period exists within which educators could perform a vital social role in assisting in the development of participatory democracy, their actions must be consistent with that goal. In what follows the case will be made

---

63. Absent from the following discussion, due to space and time considerations, is exploring the meaning of these suggestions for colleges and schools of teacher education. Certainly, before teachers adopt a new social role, that role will have to be legitimated, or at least explored, in their professional preparation. Currently, such preparation is dominated by exactly the empiricist, positivist notion of knowledge critiqued. To move beyond this requires that faculties of education react to the current critique of their work by positing their unique function in the university. Thus, it is necessary to oppose notions of colleges of education as having no internal discourse, borrowing extensively from the "disciplines." Rather, moving beyond the claimed neutral discourse of science, the normative nature of the educational enterprise needs to be recaptured through the linkage of means and ends in education.

This is a discussion which deserves the attention of faculties of education, especially those concerned with their very survival. It is also beyond the scope of this piece to work out the potential parameters of such an inquiry. Recently, however, several pieces have emerged to tackle exactly these issues (such as P. Smith and R. Traver, "Program and Prophecy: The Face of General Studies in Teacher Education," *Educational Theory* 33, no. 2 [Spring 1983]: 73-77; R. LaBrecque and H. M. Sokolow, "Pseudo-Educational Theory: How Not to Theorize in Education," *Educational Theory* 32, nos. 3-4 [Summer-Fall 1982]: 143-56; H. Broudy, "Predicaments, Problems, Puzzles and Paradoxes in Educational Research," *Educational Theory* 33, no. 2 [Winter 1983]: 33-40; and D. L. Duke, *Teaching: The Imperiled Profession* [Albany, N.Y.: The State University of New York Press, 1984]), and more are likely to emerge. These inquiries and programs could help illuminate the reality claimed by Smith and Traver:

> A professor who spends time examining the virtues and vices of various human and social norms is seen as soft-headed, if not downright subversive. The best professor is the one who can best promote current empirical and analytical techniques and transmit information gathered through their use. The best students are those who show their approval of those techniques in writing and laboratory settings and who can show they have mastered the literature. Thus, it should not be surprising that the lecture method, with its emphasis on a one-way transfer of knowledge, and "cookbook" labs in science and "formula" writing classes in the humanities should be so pervasive in American higher education (24).

that an academic program aiming at critical literacy, at academic skills obtained within a course of studies that embraces diverse cultural heritages along with both overt and covert endorsements of a democratic spirit (or civic courage), and at democratic values provides the necessary conditions for such a role. What this means for the direct public role of teachers will also be explored.

A pedagogy of critical literacy must begin with what parents have long understood but radical educators often seem loath to discuss — the necessity of basic academic skills. The transformative powers of the basic academic skills was proposed by no less a radical democrat than Antonio Gramsci.[64] He recognized that the creation of a potential counterideology which embraced widespread democratic participation required that the oppressed classes be able to manipulate communicative and analytic symbols in ways that enabled them to challenge the dominant elite.[65] It is not possible for students to comprehend a new world view, to analyze critically their place in society, to resist in a positive way the demands of a fundamentally unequal social system without having obtained the basic academic skills. This is not to argue for the totality of the basics, overwhelming every other facet of the curriculum, or for a rote-memory approach that merely forces students to accept, predigested, the rudiments of workbooks, dittos, and drills. Rather, it suggests that basic literacy skills understood as the comprehension, not mere memorization, of the way in which language, numbers, and logic function, be the basis for any social role of the schools.

Such an understanding would move beyond mere literacy to critical literacy if schooling in the basics could be informed by the work of Paulo Freire.[66] Working with impoverished Brazilian peasants, Freire drew directly from their experience to teach academic skills. Rejecting a banking approach to education utilized by most programs for basic literacy, he felt that information could not be deposited in students' heads for withdrawal later but should be drawn out of their daily lives. Of course, the dominant reality of their lives was their economic, political, social, and cultural oppression. It was by concretizing these experiences through the written word that peasants not only learned how to read, but also how to oppose the structures enslaving them. This is critical literacy, students gaining a critical consciousness of the world about them while obtaining basic literacy skills.

For students in this country, a similar program of critical literacy needs to be undertaken. To enable students to attain the literacy skills needed for democratic action, critical-literacy work could help students uncover the reality of the current social relations. With students in our schools, Kohl suggests an approach similar to Freire's:

> Perhaps the most important thing we can do *at present* is point out that fact and expose our students to the biases of texts in all subjects as well as in the structure, management, and financing of schools. . . . The system itself is an object worth studying with our pupils. Let them find out what it is, how it works, who serves it, and whom it serves. Let them research and find out for themselves, and let us as teachers and educators find out for ourselves, since often we are as ignorant as our students.[67]

Beyond the school, students can use the conditions of their daily existence in the search for critical literacy. Uncovering the ways in which select social and economic areas are removed from democratic decision making, students can name, thus potentially oppose, limits on democracy. A simple example from our work in Appalachia can illuminate this. While rich in natural resources, the Appalachian region continues to be one of the poorest in the country. One of the main tools used to exploit the region is known as a broad-form deed, clauses of which entitle those holding title to minerals to remove them in any way they see fit — including strip-mining. Further, many of these mineral rights deeds grossly undervalue the raw materials to be removed. Utilizing these deeds as a basic element of the curriculum one can teach reading (vocabulary), math, law, economics, etc., and at the same time open up the ways in which these documents deprive the people of the region of their rich birthright. Additionally, exploring how these documents are able to survive legal challenges without becoming a part of political discourse not only teaches "subject matter," but raises questions about the legitimacy of the entire political system. Thus, students become critically literate — not only able "to read" and "do math," but able to penetrate the very structures which oppress them. This is the first step towards a pedagogy for democratic participation.

---

[64] A Gramsci, *The Prison Notebooks*, trans. Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971).

[65] H. Entwistle, *Antonio Gramsci: Conservative Schooling for Radical Politics* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979).

[66] P. Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. M. B. Ramos (New York: Seabury Press, 1970).

[67] H. Kohl, "Can the School Build a New Social Order?" *Journal of Education* 162, no. 3 (Summer 1980): 63.

If students are to develop the civic courage that makes it possible for them to act democratically, it is necessary that they understand their own histories. When students become aware of the worth of their own histories, they can come to value their own perceptions and insights. They will not have to rely upon the history of the dominant culture to validate their experiences and truths. Rather, they can look to themselves as useful members of a cultural tradition that empowers them to speak with their own voices. This has indeed been the experience of minorities in this country as they have strived to recover a sense of their own worth within an understanding of their value to the culture at large. Teachers need to incorporate such a historical perspective within the curriculum for all children, so that this sense of self-worth will permeate their social actions.[68]

Such work, which celebrates the contributions of working people, women, and minorities to our general cultural pool, would provide students with their own "cultural capital." A concept that illuminates the way in which one's stock of cultural understandings empowers one to act, cultural capital has traditionally been utilized to understand how students stockpile the symbols, meanings, understandings, and language of the dominant culture. Here it is being argued that students could stockpile an alternative "bundle" of cultural capital. These symbols and the like would be taken from the "peoples' histories" of groups and individuals who have striven and are striving to expand the meaning of democracy. Already existing curricular materials[69] which focus on the struggles of American men and women to expand the terrain of freedom and to improve the qualities of their lives could be employed to demonstrate to students actions taken by those in situations analogous to theirs. Such material could operate to change the current way students are led to view social history as linear, conflict

---

68. R. Darnton (in "Poland Rewrites History," *New York Review of Books*, 16 July 1981) discusses a recent example of precisely such a use of cultural capital in his discussion of Poland. The Polish labor movement "Solidarity" has begun to reclaim the history of people's liberation movements in Poland from Soviet censors. The revolutionary potential of this knowledge, which comes from filling the "blank spaces" of Polish history, is demonstrated in the inspiration such history lends to the "Solidarity" movement. Darnton sees it as follows:

> Try telling a Pole that events don't matter, that diplomacy and politics are epiphenomena, that one can neglect dates in order to study structure. He will reply that the differences between 1940 and 1941 (the disputed dates of the Katyn massacre) is a matter of life and death; that nothing could be more important than the secret provisions of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact; that the whole meaning of Poland can be strung out on dates, 1772, 1793, 1795, 1830, 1863, 1919-1920, 1939, 1944-45, 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1980. The events of August transformed the world for him. For the rest of us they suggest that history can play tricks on itself, and that it can go back to work at its old task, teaching lessons and shaping a national consciousness (10).

69. See, for example, D. Cluster, *They Should Have Served That Cup of Coffee: Seven Radicals Remember the 1960s* (Boston: South End Press, 1979); R. Cooney and H. Michalowski, *The Power of the People: Active Nonviolence in the United States* (Culver City, Pa.: Peace Press, 1977); and H. Zinn, *A People's History of the United States* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980).

free, dominated by white males, and occurring almost without human agency.[70] This alternative stock of cultural capital would indeed encourage and empower students to speak with their own voices as they link their own reality to the struggles for a possible alternative future by others.[71]

It is not enough merely to arm students with the intellectual tools and cultural understandings for them to transform rejection into resistance and action. Educators concerned with participatory democracy must go one step further and arm students with the understanding that there are other ways to organize social life. Allowing students to continue to think that current social arrangements are merely "natural" causes the critical moment of moving from critique to change to be lost. Rather, students merely become distrustful, angry, and cynical. Part of this is due to the unfounded supposition, laced throughout the curriculum, that change always occurs in an orderly and linear fashion. Students are deceived into believing that they can alter existing social arrangements merely by voting in preferred ways. What this misses is the powerful forces lined up behind the status quo, ready to defend current arrangements in the face of any frontal attack. In presenting alternatives to students, teachers should honestly face the fact that change only occurs with struggle and sacrifice and hope that they can act accordingly.

But act in the name of what? Currently the curriculum offers no alternatives to our accepted order. Teachers must be prepared to present to students, both through example (more on this below) and study, alternatives to the existing order.

> The most important educational thing we can do is have our students understand that socialism, communism, anarchism, and other noncapitalist forms of organizing human life are serious, and must be thought about; and that people have a right to choose the social systems they believe will meet their needs and the needs of their communities. Young people also ought to be given an opportunity to know that people fight for such abstractions as justice and for such concretions as the elimination of poverty and oppression.[72]

Additionally, Dreier[73] suggests that students be exposed to attempts in the Third World to transform a harsh reality into a humane society as examples of what people, through cooperative action, can accomplish. Making the connection between the Third World and our technological society can be enhanced by exploring examples of similar social alternatives in this culture. Such examples range from the publicly owned and operated plants and utilities in the United States providing products and services at significantly lower costs with more efficiency than similar privately owned utilities,[74] to such large-scale projects as Canadian socialized health systems, England's nonprofit housing system, and Sweden's mass-transit system. Coupling these two sets of examples provides alternatives to the existing order and demonstrates the means by which such alternatives arise and take their places in a transformed state.

---

[70] See F. FitzGerald's treatment of this point in *America Revised* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).

[71] Drawing again from our work in Appalachia, the Highlander Center provides an excellent example of creating such cultural capital. Programs designed to empower the poor and minorities in the region focus on drawing from shared, lived experiences their understandings of oppressive forces at operation. Additionally, work focuses on reclaiming the culture of opposition in the region through both political and cultural action. This work has brought forth the leaders of the black civil rights movement (including Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King), the Southern labor movement, and the current struggles for economic and political justice (see F. Adams, "Highlander Folk School: Getting Information. Going back and Teaching It," *Harvard Educational Review* 42, no. 4 [November 1972]: 497-520). In addition, it has yielded a wide heritage of artistic forms which celebrate resistance (see G. Carawan and C. Carawan, *Voices From the Mountains* [Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1982]).

[72] Kohl, "Can the Schools Build a New Social Order?" 64.

[73] P. Dreier, "Socialism and Cynicism: An Essay on Politics, Scholarship, and Teaching," *Socialist Review* 10, no. 5 (September-October 1980): 105-31.

[74] Carnoy and Shearer, *Workplace Democracy.*

Beyond the analysis of systems lies the analysis of values that are conducive to civic courage. Butts[75] has proposed a schema of civic values that are conducive to a democracy, including justice, freedom, equality, diversity, authority, privacy, participation, due process, personal obligation for the public good, and international human rights. Indeed, these values do form the nucleus of the democratic society for which this paper proposes schools should work. But it is not enough merely to teach students to embrace such values. Rather, they should first be linked to democracy, and then students should attempt to see how such values are treated in the culture. Through the examination of their own lives and those of others, they should directly face the powerful forces lined up against justice, freedom, equality, and the rest. In contrast to this, students should be given examples of lives lived in pursuit of these goals by people of both sexes, all colors, and any creed. Thus, they will be given not only the tools for transformation, but also the alternatives available, values to strive for, and the courage to undertake such a role — that of living and behaving democratically in an undemocratic society.

What is missing from many proposals for the schools' social role is the fact that teachers teach by example. If the social role of the school is to act for a democratic transformation, teachers will have to behave consistently with the goal both inside and outside their classrooms. In their classrooms they will have to avoid belittling students and devaluing their cultures and instead celebrate with them the wealth of their diversity. They will have to be willing themselves to look deep into the structures of oppression, see how they inform their own practice, and search for alternative classroom practices consistent with democratic values. Taking seriously the democratic values listed above, can teachers treat children in ways that demonstrate those same values? Taking for example the value of equality, can teachers overcome the class-biased ways in which children are treated[76] and curriculum is parcelled out?[77] With the value of participation, can teachers allow students a meaningful role in the making of classroom decisions? Similar questions can be raised about the values mentioned. Only when teachers can replicate these values in the classroom will students take them seriously.

Outside of the classroom, teachers need to demonstrate both a genuine concern for children and the civic courage they are attempting to instill in students. If they are sincere about adopting a social role for schools which takes the side of children and the possibilities of education, they need to have the civic courage to act for children now. Currently, teacher unions are primarily interested in teachers' working conditions, and professional associations are interested most in establishing the legitimacy of and furthering a subject area. These are certainly important goals. Yet one is hard pressed to find teachers actively working through their organizations for the betterment of children. Campaigns against child abuse and for adequate child nutrition, housing, and health care are more often carried on outside of the educational community than within it. Such campaigns would certainly call into question the dominant social reality and be challenged by those with political power. Educators, by taking on such struggles, would demonstrate both to students and parents the very civic courage they are attempting to instill.

Through this combination of pedagogy and action educators can work to turn student resistance into action for participatory democracy. This would be the most valuable social role schools could play in this democracy. By working within the possibilities of education, teachers could build this definitive, justifiable social role while simultaneously attending to the academic role the public expects of schools. It is only when schools, and educators within them, can capture this role that they can justify their claim to being the social agency primarily concerned with children. Otherwise, they need to admit that their main allegiance is to the state and that their social role is to reproduce the unequal social order that hides itself behind the guise of democracy.

---

[75] R. F. Butts, "The Revival of Civic Learning Requires a Prescribed Curriculum," *Liberal Education* (Winter 1982): 377-401.

[76] For example, see T. Good, "Teacher Expectations and Student Perceptions: A Decade of Research," *Educational Leadership* (February 1981): 415-22.

[77] For example, see J. Anyon, "Social Class and the Hidden Curriculum of Work."

CONCLUSION

Like George Counts, I am not naively optimistic that the schools, and educators within them, can be relied upon to take on the social role suggested herein. Nor should this be taken as an argument that schools alone will alter existing social, political, and economic relationships. We have too often relied solely upon children to restore a world order damaged by adults.[78] However, schools will certainly be an essential part of any attempt to develop and instill the civic courage needed to reclaim our democratic heritage. Thus, what has been argued for here is the way educators can play a distinct and vital social role by developing in children the tools, skills, and attitudes necessary to live democratically. Further, it has been argued that teachers as citizens have a valuable role to play in directly altering the current social order, working for a society in which justice and democracy have real meaning.

I am struck by two limitations that must be dealt with. First, do teachers currently in the field or preparing to enter the field have the potential to take on the role described herein? There are times when my answer to this question is an unequivocal no — when I witness teachers demeaning children, belittling parents, avoiding political and social action, and, in general, teaching their subject rather than teaching children. And yet, I do believe that most teachers enter teaching because they are concerned about children and the lives they will lead. This concern gets lost in the technocratic rationality of teacher preparation, the mundane duties forced on teachers, and a lack of professional rewards and esteem (for instance the teacher-proofing of the curriculum). Teachers are not inherently better than any other occupational group when it comes to reacting to the reality of the workplace.[79] Thus, their often destructive actions must be seen within the reality of their jobs and education.

As a beginning step towards changing this reality, I believe it is necessary to take seriously recommendations of Goodlad[80] and others[81] with regard to the conditions of teaching. Teachers should be released from all extraneous duty, empowered to deal directly with curriculum, given more time for research and development (perhaps through expanding contracts to eleven months), and paid a reasonable wage. Further, teachers should be entitled to a career ladder which rewards good teaching.[82] Finally, teachers who are unfit for duty should be removed from classrooms by either more adequately trained and screened administrators or committees of administrators, teachers, and parents. If we seriously expect teachers to play a vital social role, it is necessary that that role be *allowed* through the structure of the job. Not all teachers will respond to such a change in conditions in the ways suggested. But coupled with the changes suggested for teacher education above, many teachers will respond by taking the side of children over the state.

---

[78] See R. DeLone's discussion of this in *Small Futures: Children, Inequality, and the Limits of Liberal Reform* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979).

[79] For an excellent discussion of blue-collar workplace reality, see B. Sexton and P. Sexton, *Blue Collars and Hard Hats: The Working Class and the Future of American Politics* (New York: Random House, 1971).

[80] J. I. Goodlad, *A Place Called School* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983).

[81] E. Boyer, *High School: A Report on Secondary Education in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1983).

[82] Immediately I must disclaim any allegiance to the current "merit pay" proposals being floated by leading politicians. What I am proposing is adoption of a system similar to that in Great Britain. In this system the teacher has the possibility of moving through five career tracks within which pay is equal by seniority but differentiated between tracks. In addition, responsibility for curriculum development, supervision of new teachers, etc., increases with each step. To move up a track, the teacher must meet, to the satisfaction of a committee of his/her colleagues, a series of performance and educational standards. The top track in this system is that of Head-Teacher, thus encouraging the best teachers to become the building leader. I anxiously await either the NEA or AFT to embrace such a plan.

The very question of state funding of education raises the second limitation. Is it true, as has been suggested by many writers,[83] that schools can do nothing but serve the needs of the state as long as it pays the bills? Earlier it was argued that internally schools do not work in a lockstep manner with the demands of capitalism as suggested by reproductive theorists. Here I want to suggest that what much of the criticism of state domination misses is the great degree of potential local autonomy schools have. Local school authorities or school boards have jealously guarded their authority to hire staff, set curriculum, and manage the local schools. Only in a few states has this authority been overridden, and even such mandates as competency testing have been left to local authority. This is not to deny that school boards often abandon their authority to school administrators[84] or are controlled by the most conservative elements in a community.[85] What it does mean is that educators must take seriously the political potential of school boards and work to populate them with individuals who will join the struggle for a new social order.

Even given these limitations and the schools' history of dashed promises, it is imperative that educators strive to claim a social role for schools that speaks to the best of our potential. Today the world is a fearful place for children. Not only is real life terrifying and wars, crime, and domestic violence all too common, but fantasy, as represented by the cultural regulator television, is itself a frightening world full of guns, gratuitous violence, and useless consumption. Even more unnerving is the feeling that nothing is to be done in the face of this ruthless world.

But that, ultimately, is the promise of democracy, that people can and should control their own destiny. It has been my argument that the only justifiable role for schools in our democracy is to equip students with the tools necessary to do this. That means possessing skills critically to analyze the ways in which present structures prevent our taking control of our collective destinies. Further, it means equipping students with the knowledge that they and their culture are important. Finally, it means instilling the values necessary in a participatory democracy and the civic courage necessary to act upon those values. It is only when educators see, and act upon, these proposals that schools will justifiably lay claim to their urgent, unique, and crucial social role: preparing children to act democratically in an undemocratic society. When educators so act, they will ultimately have to side with children against the state, an act demanding civic courage of them as well.

---

[83] See, for example, S. Arons, *Compelling Belief: The Culture of American Schooling* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982); I. Illich, *De-Schooling Society* (Cuernavaca, Mexico: CIDOC, 1970); E. Reimer, *School Is Dead: Alternatives in Education* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971); and J. Spring, *The Sorting Machine* (New York: David McKay, 1976), and *Educating the Worker-Citizen: The Social, Economic, and Political Foundations of Education* (New York: Longmans, 1980). For a more detailed critique of this position, see G. Wood, "The Theoretical and Political Limitations of Deschooling," *Journal of Education* 164, no. 4 (Fall 1982): 360-77.

[84] See G. Wood, "School Boards and School Governance: A Case Study" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Montreal, Canada, 1983).

[85] See L. H. Zeigler and M. K. Jennings, *Governing American Schools: Political Interaction in Local School Districts* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1974).

Source: G.H. Wood, 'Schooling in a democracy: Transformation or reproduction?', *Educational Theory*, vol. 34, no. 3, 1984, pp. 219–39.

Annotated bibliography



Birrell, R., & Birrell, T. *An Issue of People: Population and Australian Society* (Australian Studies). Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1981.
This book examines Australia's immigration policies since the war as a prelude to a more extensive analysis of the social and economic position of migrants in Australia today. The implications of this analysis for a policy of inter-ethnic relations are then explored.

Bullivant, B. *Pluralism: Cultural Maintenance and Evolution*. Multilingual Matters, Clevedon, England, 1984.
The most interesting feature of this short book is that it analyses how the dominant ethnic group in Australia has attempted to resist and thwart pluralist tendencies in order to maintain its ideological and political hegemony.

Bullivant, B. *The Pluralist Dilemma in Education: Six Case Studies*, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1981.
Based on six cross-national case studies, this book identifies common misconceptions and exaggerated claims in the rhetoric of multiculturalism. It addresses the difficult issues of economic power and political control in its analysis of ethnic relations. The chapter on Australia (Chapter 6) brings together a lot of diverse material to demonstrate the development of Australia's ethnic education policies.

Castles, S., & Kosack, G. *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*. Oxford University Press, London, 1973.
Written from a neo-Marxist perspective, this highly acclaimed book presents a comprehensive survey of data on immigrants in Western Europe. The way the immigrants have been received and their placement in existing social structures are extensively analysed by the authors, who formulate a socialist theory of the position of immigrants in the working class. A number of Australian scholars, including Collins and de Lepervanche, have critically used Castles and Kosack's analysis to explore parallels in the Australian situation.

Collins, J. 'Political economy of post-war immigration'. In E. L. Wheelwright & K. Buckley (eds). *Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism*, vol 1. ANZ Book Co., Sydney, 1975.
Collins discusses the applicability of the Marxist notion of 'labour aristocracy' and 'reserve army of labour' to the Australian context. In this paper he argues that the immigrants in Australia have been used as the 'reserve army of labour' by the State.

de Lepervanche, M. 'Immigrants and ethnic groups'. In S. Encel & L. Bryson (eds). *Australian Society: Introductory Essays*. 4th edn, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1984.
De Lepervanche takes a Marxist perspective to ethnic issues and argues that inequalities of class underlie the social conflicts, which are expressed in the language of race and ethnicity. Her article also contains an excellent review of the late Jean Martin's influential work on the migrant presence in Australia.

Jupp, J. (ed.). *Ethnic Politics in Australia*. George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1984
This book brings together a number of interesting essays concerned with multiculturalism, migrant settlement, and ethnic participation in Australian politics. Running through many of the essays in this volume is the continuing debate between those who emphasise 'ethnicity' as an explanatory notion and those who accord class theoretical primacy. Chapter 8 by P. Kringas, 'Really educating migrant children', should be particularly noted.

Lowenstein, W., & Loh, M. *The Immigrants*. Hyland House, Melbourne, 1977.
In this very interesting easy-to-read book, seventeen people, representatives of a variety of ethnic groups, present in their own words the joys and sorrows of being immigrants to Australia.

Marjoribanks, K. *Ethnic Families and Children's Achievement*. George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1980.
In this book, Marjoribanks reports the findings of a research study into the relationship between the family characteristics of various ethnic groups and school performance. Although conducted within a functionalist perspective, the findings do provide some interesting information that would assist teachers of children of non-English-speaking backgrounds.

Martin, J. I. *The Migrant Presence*. George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1978.
This book is perhaps the most authoritative account of the way Australian institutions have responded to the presence of migrants of non-Anglo-Saxon origin in Australia. Chapters 3 and 4 present a discussion of educational policies that are characterised by a shift from migrant to multicultural education.

Martin, J. I. *The Ethnic Dimension*. George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1981.
This book brings together previously unpublished essays of the late Jean Martin, whose name is synonymous with the study of migration in Australia. The most interesting in the collection are the third and the fifth essays, both dealing with questions of equality and economic conditions of migrants.

Miles, R. *Racism and Migrant Labour*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1982.
The author of this British-based book challenges the value of notions of 'ethnicity' and 'race', and argues that their construction is ideological. He goes on to show how, contrary to many sociological claims, Marxist analysis *can* deal with the phenomenon of racism without falling into the trap of economic determinism.

Piore, M. J. *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979.
This influential study by Piore presents an analysis of migration to urban industrial societies from underdeveloped rural areas. It argues that such migrations are a continuing feature of industrial societies and that they are generated by forces inherent in the nature of capitalist economies.

Rex, J., & Tomlinson, S. *Colonial Immigrants in a British City: A Class Analysis.* Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979.
This highly influential book, based on a four-year British study in the Handsworth area of Birmingham, is concerned with ethnicity, race, and community relations. It attempts to locate ethnicity within the broader framework of the class structure of a British city.

Sherwood, J. (ed.). *Multicultural Education: Issues and Innovation.* Creative Research, Perth, 1981.
A collection of essays that are mostly written from the liberal perspective. A notable exception is the essay by McConnochie and Kapferer, which presents a more radical view of multiculturalism, examining the key notions of stratification and legitimation.

Smolicz, J.J. *Culture and Education in a Plural Society.* Curriculum Development Centre, Canberra, 1979.
Smolicz discusses the principles that underlie cultural and social interaction in a pluralist society in relation to education. Smolicz adopts a 'humanistic sociological' perspective that tends to limit somewhat the scope of his analysis. A major emphasis in the book is the relationship between ethnicity and language.

Tirney, J. (ed.). *Race, Migration and Schooling.* Holt, Rinehart & Winston, London, 1982.
Written from a critical standpoint, this book offers an examination of the sociology of race and racism in schools. This British-based book questions assumptions about the nature and provision of multicultural education.

Wilkinson, P. et al. (eds). *Education for a Multicultural Society: A Kit for Educators,* Clearing House on Migration Issues, Melbourne, 1981.
A well-put-together kit with three policy charts and twelve issues papers written by some of the leading scholars working in the area of multicultural education in Australia. Policy charts outline statements on multiculturalism by various government agencies.

Yarwood, A., & Knowling, M. *Race Relations in Australia: A History.* Methuen, Sydney, 1982.
A study of race relations in Australia since the time of the British invasion in 1776. The last chapter, 'Racism in Retreat', examines the extent to which racism still exists in Australia.

About the author

Fazal Rizvi is a lecturer at Deakin University. He was born in India and, as a teenager, migrated to Australia in 1967. Before completing his doctorate in philosophy of education from Kings College, University of London, he taught in primary and secondary schools. His academic interests include multiculturalism; policy studies; and ethics and educational administration. He is presently working on a book on Wittgenstein's later philosophy, as it applies to problems in educational theory.

Acknowledgments

Quotations on p. 29 from C. Mullard, 'Multiracial education in Britain: From assimilation to cultural pluralism', in J. Tierney, et al., *Race, Migration and Schooling*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, London, 1982; Quotations on pp. 10, 14, 16, 17 from J. I. Martin, *The Migrant Presence*, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1978; Quotations on p. 25 from S. Castles & G. Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973; Quotations on pp. 24, 28, 30 from Australian Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs, *Multicultural Education for All Australians: Our Developing Nationhood*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1982; Quotations on pp. 18, 19 from Australian Ethnic Affairs Council, Australia as a Multicultural Society, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1978; Quotations on pp. 19, 20 from Review of Post-arrival Programs and Services for Migrants, *Migrant Services and Programs*, vol. 1, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1978; Quotations on pp. 14, 20 from L. E. Foster, *Australian Education: A Sociological Perspective*, Prentice-Hall, Sydney, 1981; Quotations on p. 23 from L. Hannan, 'Problems and issues for teachers making decisions on curriculum', in B. Falk & J. Harris (eds), *Unity and Diversity: Multicultural Education in Australia*, Australian College of Education, Melbourne, 1983; Quotations on pp. 6–7, 26–7 from M. de Lepervanche, 'Immigrants and ethnic groups', in S. Encel & L. Bryson (eds), *Australian Society: Introductory Essays*, 4th edn, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1984; Table 1: Reproduced by permission of Australian College of Education, Melbourne; Reading 1: Reproduced by permission of Allen & Unwin Australia; Reading 2: Reproduced by permission of the author; Reading 3: Reproduced by permission of the Department of Sociology, La Trobe University; Reading 4: Reproduced by permission of the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.

Deakin University

ESA842 Policy development and analysis
Multiculturalism as an educational policy
ISBN 0 7300 0118 0
Cat. no. ESA842M03